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
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2. C.H. 1831

THOUGHTS
ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS.

BY
WILLIAM DANBY, Esq.
OF SWINTON PARK, YORKSHIRE.

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PREFACE.

THE only excuse I can make to the Public for this " iterum Crispinus," is the reiteration of the same as, or the suggestion of thoughts similar to, the " Ideas and Realities," which I published before, with the revision or the development of them upon further consideration. If we live to learn, we shall indeed unlearn as well as learn, which will be the case with us all, more or less ; nor shall we be ashamed of changing our opinion, if we do it from proper motives. Having already grown old in the school of the world, I cannot say this is much the case with me, though I may have modified some of my opinions, and adhere to none from any other motive but that of a sincere conviction of their rectitude. I cannot but wish

the same course may be followed by my readers, as well as myself, to the benefit of both ; and that we may regulate our opinions not “ ut violet usus,” but as our maturer judgment shall dictate ; and that we may teach each other “ Vero distinguere falsum ;” and as “ Catius” advises, though not as Horace makes his sensualist mean, that each may say,

——“ mihi cura

Non mediocris inest, fontes ut adire remotos,
Atque haurire queam vitæ præcepta beatæ.”

If I prefixed any dedication to this, it would be to the public good ; but I hope my book will speak for itself ; and that my only prayers for my readers and myself need be, *Vivamus et valeamus.*

St. Leonard's Hill,
June 1st, 1831.

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
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THOUGHTS

ON

VARIOUS SUBJECTS.

PERFECT self-knowledge is impossible to man : there will probably be some degree of delusion, more or less, in our judgments of ourselves. Reason, however, will tell us where to stop : it will say, with the same reference as in Addison's Cato, but with the additional lights given us by the *Gospel*, " here will I hold," &c. And where can we have a better hold than *that* affords ?

II.

The sense of our unworthiness may sometimes sink us so low, as to make us diffident of appealing to the Divine mercy, if we did not know that it " reaches unto the heavens," and trust that the humiliation of the moment will be accepted, even though we cannot answer for the next. These assurances we may derive from an authority that will secure us from self-delusion, prone as we are to it. But, like our other " secret faults," it is within the reach of prayer.

III.

Well, if human approval is here allowable, did our Saviour say, "there is none good, but God." For real goodness can only be found in the source of it. Goodness may be considered as a fountain, which issues pure from the rock, but is soon defiled by the earthy matter with which it is afterwards mixed. Is it not in this sense that man is said to be created "an image of his Maker?"

The character of Christ, unquestionably as the apostles have described him to have been, is in a manner an abstracted one to us, so far is it exalted above all human example. Perfect, however, as he was, we see that he disclaimed all right to the title of "good."

IV.

"Il n'y a de différence parmi les hommes," said an old chevalier de St. Louis, at Toulouse, to me, in the year 1787, "qu'entre les bons et les mauvais." We may then hope that there are similarly good men in all countries, as far as the condition of our nature allows, and that the only differences between these, are what may be of importance in the eyes of men, but of none in the sight of God. The "*nemo vitiis sine nascitur*" extends to all, and to all have been extended the same means of mercy and atonement. Our powers of discrimination are very limited, and our judgments are apt to be blinded by a variety of causes. It is

something for us to know, or even to think we know, that "we are fools."

V.

I wish to live a little longer.—Why?—That I may do a little more good.—What good, thou "unprofitable servant?"—True, I am so; but may we not lower our comparisons?—You may, but take care how you make them.

VI.

In reading sublime or beautiful poetry, especially the former, we feel a pride in the sensations it excites in us, without any hope, or even desire, of imitating it ourselves, but from the value that it makes us set on our feelings, which tell us that

"His nature no man can o'er-rate," &c.

It lifts us in a manner above ourselves, exalting the better parts of our nature, and repressing the bad ones: and it does this the more, as it makes us look up to what is far above us, but what we hope hereafter to make a nearer approach to. When, however, we make a comparison between ourselves and the Being "in whose image we are made," we are forced to feel that "none of us can under-rate his merit."

VII.

To be preserved from the influence of our bad passions, to be assisted in directing that of our good feelings to their proper end, should be one of our

most earnest prayers. If we have the inclination given us to do this, we may well hope that habit will confirm us in it.

“Thy grace it is that prompts the prayer;
That grace can do the rest.”

BISHOP MIDDLETON'S ODE.

For without that grace neither the inclination nor the habit can be secured to us.

VIII.

We need never be afraid of being thought too righteous, as long as our opinions are regulated by reason: for others, those at least who are themselves rational, will judge of us from the feelings that they experience themselves. Our chief endeavour then should be, to be consistent: for this is the test by which we shall be judged, both by them, and by a far higher Judge. Some lapses may be pardonable at both tribunals: but if man is “extreme to mark what is done amiss,” his severity may be some security, if it has the proper effect upon us, against our incurring that of a higher tribunal. But for this we must be assisted by the grace of God.

IX.

If obscurity in writing is ever allowable, it must, I think, be not merely when that obscurity is not impenetrable, but when it is also worth the trouble of penetration. This, I believe, will extend, if it is not

peculiar, to works of imagination, especially when the imagination is exercised upon subjects of importance. Some of these, from their own nature, relatively to ours, cannot be otherwise than obscurely treated of; as all metaphysical subjects: but this, to a mind that loves to investigate, and is sensible of the difficulty of discovering truth, will be no objection to their being treated of at all: for to such a mind the investigation may be, next to the deference which it owes to scriptural authority, one of its best resources against scepticism, by convincing it of the incompetency of its powers.

X.

The French have a saying, that “*La vie est l’art de savoir s’ennuyer* :” which is partly true; but it is also true, that we may make life *l’art de se corriger*; that is, in making our submission to the ennui of life, and our accommodation to the humours and inclinations (not the vices) of others, not a mere matter of policy, but a means of gaining useful knowledge by it, and of applying it to the proper end of self-correction and improvement, which cannot fail to be the case, if the great object of our attention and our efforts is to do our duty to God, to our fellow-creatures, and to ourselves.

Can we be meant to be uniformly happy in this life? Is it not a state of trial? and whatever degree of happiness may be attainable in it (for “*lucky life*” may have “*some*”—perhaps many—“*perquisites* of

joy,") must it not be by our sustainment of that trial, and by "acting well our part" in it?

XI.

How cheaply do we purchase our own approbation, when we abstain from doing an improper thing, because we like better to do another that happens to be proper!

XII.

How many good qualities may be vitiated and perverted by self-indulgence!

XIII.

We may sometimes be apt to refine too much in reasoning upon the characters of others; but unless we carry that reasoning farther than is generally done, we have no right to form decisive conclusions, especially if they are unfavourable ones: nor will all our powers of reasoning and examination give us that right, at least beyond a certain point.

———"mihi dulces

Ignoscent, si quid peccaro stultus, amici:

Inque vicem illorum patiar delicta libenter."

XIV.

What ample occupation does our intercourse with each other give us, and how useful may it be, both to others and to ourselves! How often may it enforce the truth of—"Blessed are the peace-makers," &c.—

But we must not be too sanguine, nor too officious.
We should watch opportunities.

XV.

There may be occasions when the happiness which others possess in their own opinions, induce us to say of them, "*Haud equidem invideo, miror magis.*" I hope this is not my case; if it is, it will probably soon find its remedy in mortification. "He that exalteth himself," &c. And without that remedy, how difficult would self-humiliation be, comparatively and partially as we are apt to judge of ourselves.

XVI.

A man who is attentive to what passes in his own mind, will be sensible of the truth of the proverb, that "every man is an epitome of all mankind:" for he will feel that he has in himself the seeds of all the vices, and of some at least of the virtues, that influence the characters and actions of his fellow-creatures.

XVII.

A reasonable man, who can depend on his own resources, will wish to observe what passes in the world, in which he cannot but feel himself interested: but he will not desire to mix much with it, as that would subject him to the risk of losing more than he would gain by it: for Young truly says,

"The world's infectious; few bring back at eve
Immaculate the manners of the morn."

Thus life is an alternation of sinning and repenting. Much of this, however, will depend upon our habits and natural dispositions, our opinion of ourselves, and, above all, the sense of our moral and religious duties.

XVIII.

“The goodness of God,” which “endureth yet daily,” is perhaps no where more strongly shewn than in the various means in which he allows men to find their enjoyments in this life ; provided they are consistent with themselves, and not inconsistent with the duties which he has prescribed to them, many of those may probably be included in the “strait and narrow path which leadeth to heaven.”

XIX.

They who most indulge themselves in habits of reflection, can best tell the enjoyment, and I hope I may add the utility, that results from it: for it will produce a degree of self-satisfaction which surely cannot but be well-founded, when it arises from the improvement they make in their minds, and the rational, but not overweening confidence which it gives them in themselves : and, above all, the hope of approval at a far higher tribunal.

XX.

Calvinism may be nothing more than a not unnatural, though not very reasonable, and certainly a

very vain attempt, to solve the difficulty which the impossibility of our reconciling the free agency of man with the omnipotence and omniscience of God keeps us under : we fancy that

“Deus intersit, quia dignus vindice nodus.”

Considered, however, more seriously and severely, it may appear to be an impious, or at least a presumptuous attempt, to

“Snatch from His hands the sceptre and the rod ;
To judge His justice,” &c.

Why should we not be content with our own individual responsibility, whatever anxiety the sense of it may keep us under, and leave the final judgment of it with Him, who alone can judge it? Are we called upon to unravel inexplicable but undeniable mysteries? Have we not all his attributes to refer them to? “Humanum est errare” et nihil scire nisi quod “magis ad nos attinet, et nescire malum est.” Why then attempt to measure the movements of the great wheel of the universe, forgetting that we are less even than the flies upon it? Attempts to bring down the mysterious doctrines of religion to the level of our reason, are, in fact, attempts to disengage ourselves from the necessity of faith, which indeed is to be founded on reason, not in the comprehension of those doctrines, but of the evidence which vouches for their truth.

XXI.

No man, or at least no thinking man, can perhaps

be a thorough, unmixed, and uninterrupted Atheist, even though he may be "fool" enough to "say in his heart there is no God." But a man may be an Atheist in practice, and virtually one in principle: he may live "without God in the world;" which seems to have been the case with one who, being urged to pray, made this shocking reply, "To whom should I address my prayers?"

XXII.

The Epicurean maxim seems to be, "Virtue must produce pleasure; therefore the pursuit of one must be that of the other also. Virtue must be pleasure, and pleasure virtue." But they cannot be so confounded; for though virtue must produce pleasure, pleasure may not, and cannot always, if ever, produce virtue: they cannot, vice alternâ, be the media to arrive at each other: if they were made so, the immediate excitement to virtue would be sought in present enjoyment, which, agreeably to the natural inclination of man, would, on the contrary, be in the indulgence of sensuality, for the "flesh" would certainly prevail.

XXIII.

"Omnino est amans sui virtus: optimè enim se ipsa novit, quamque amabilis sit, intelligit." True as this is, such self-love can only be an attribute of divinity; but it must exist there, or virtue would not do justice to itself. Supreme perfection must be

supreme enjoyment, concentrated in itself. Human virtue has too many alloys to admit of being so abstracted and personified.

XXIV.

In one sense, the idea of a Supreme Being must be an abstract one to us : for we can only see Him through his works, assured as we are of his existence by our reason, our feelings, and by the authorities which are given to us.

XXV.

“ Vice is a monster of such frightful mien,
That to be hated, needs but to be seen.”

We need not then be afraid to look at the face of vice, provided we make the proper comparison between it and the beauty of virtue : if our admiration of the one produces an abhorrence of the other. But for this we must call in the aid of religion, for it is only in the supreme object of that, that the perfection of virtue can be found, which must and can only reside in Him. Most truly then did our Saviour say, “ There is no one good, but God.”

Christ Himself, however, we are sure was good, though He refused to be called so in his human state. Is He not therefore now divine ?

But we must not forget, that as “ man was made in the image of God,” so men are also “ his temples,” which therefore are not to be “ defiled.”

XXVI.

The material difference between men, is not in the power of expressing good sentiments, but in the reality of their feeling, and being actuated by them. Uniform, however, as they ought to be in this, some occasional lapses may and surely will be pardoned ; for who is not liable to them ?

XXVII.

How little is required to vary the occupations of the day, and to prevent the tædium of monotony, to those whose passions want no strong excitements, and who can trust to their own resources ! They cannot, however, entirely dispense with the assistance of others, nor free themselves from the obligation of returning that assistance. The circle of a man's duties and occupations would be very narrow, if confined to what merely regards himself : nor would it be less, but perhaps would be more laborious : and without the

" Molliter austerum studio fallente laborem."

So happily are our duties and enjoyments mixed.

XXVIII.

The more credit we gain in the opinion of others, the more solicitous we should be, really to deserve it, which we shall do, if we consider the only real advantage it can be of to us, viz. that of obtaining

the approbation of our own consciences, and the hope of that of our Supreme Judge. But how constant and unremitting is the battle that we have to fight with our passions, irritated as they often are by their collisions with those of others! In the mean time, it is well for us that we are some checks upon each other, and that the "praise of men" is both assisted and counteracted by their rivalry and their censure. Virtue then, which, as Cicero makes Lælius say, "*et conciliat amicitias et conservat*," is, as well as "honesty," the "best policy," both here and hereafter; and if the best policy, the highest duty also: after the more immediate ones to God, which Christianity prescribes to us.

XXIX.

Whatever belief we may or may not have in the agency of the Devil, (and we certainly shall not be justified in rejecting it altogether,) we may at least be sure, that the inclination to do wrong must proceed from an evil principle, and to do right from a good one. From whence then are these propensities in our nature? They are trials; and whether ordained or permitted, we should only consider them as such.

XXX.

Our partiality to, or dislike of others, makes us in some degree blind to their faults or their virtues. We have then to guard against this, by endeavouring to

do justice to them as much as we can, and also to prevent the want of it reacting upon ourselves, by obtaining as much self-knowledge as we are capable of. This, among other good effects, will “arm us strong in honesty,” and I believe I may add, both in pride and humility also: for will not both these meet at the neutral point of reason?

XXXI.

“There’s not a bliss the human heart can find,
But some way leans and hearkens to mankind.”

How truly is this exemplified in all we do, or can do; and even the “tyrant mad with pride,” has the same leaning, not in good will certainly, but in being actuated by jealous and vindictive passions. As to the “cavern’d hermit,” his best excuse and consolation must be in the exclusive duty which he thinks he owes to his Maker, overlooking that which he owes to his fellow-creatures. Possibly a degree of misanthropy may be mixed with this, or some other less odious feelings. Pride I believe there must be, for of that, like “Nature,” of which in us, it is a part, we may say,

“Expellas furcâ, tamen usque recurret.”

Some enthusiasts have absurdly attempted to “expel” it, by reprobating all pride; forgetting that Providence has far more wisely given a corrective of it, by subjecting it to the control of our reason, and when that fails, by the mortifications which it is

sure to bring upon us, when not properly regulated. This world, when seen in its most favourable light, may be considered as a preparatory school for a better, and men as the tutors of each other. The duties of one are surely connected with the interests of the other, as well as with its own.

XXXII.

We may sometimes be backward in meeting and performing the duties of society, either from indolence or diffidence, or we may fancy that they require more ability than they really do ; pride too (that *remora*) may have its share in this. But if pride is a *remora*, it may impel as well as retard, and impel too with almost the force of a steam-engine ; but it also requires a safety-valve : nay it may be a rudder too, and may direct our motions, if properly steered ; steered by reason, and checked by religion.

XXXIII.

Our responsibility must be in proportion to our free agency ; we can no more know the limits of the one, than we can those of the other. But reason and conscience are guides sufficient for all the purposes which both require.

XXXIV.

The great object of education should be to encourage the good propensities, and repress the bad ones ;

but for this much is required, and particularly a well directed attention. How little do many of us (and I must include myself in the number,) avail ourselves of the opportunities, few as they may have been, of doing this ! Must we be schooled ourselves, before we can school others ? And is the better half of our lives required for it ?

XXXV.

It is well for a man if he can make the close of each day, if not all his hours of solitude, similar to what the close of his life (especially when he approaches towards it) must be, if he thinks and feels.

XXXVI.

Perhaps there may not be very many who really deserve pecuniary assistance, at least to any considerable amount, and of those who do, there may not be many who are likely to want it, which their own prudence will generally have prevented : but there may be many, to whom we ought to afford it, to a certain degree at least, more because they want it, than because they deserve it, which, after all, we are but imperfect judges of : and to afford it in such a manner as to prevent, if possible, their wanting it still more, or their using more improper means of procuring it. Preventing crime is as much a duty as relieving distress.

XXXVII.

We are pleased with those who amuse us, we respect those who instruct us, and we are in awe of them, whatever guise we may assume, if their understandings and acquirements greatly exceed ours, unless they divest themselves of the appearance of that superiority, and bring down their conversation to a level with ours, which they will do, if their heads and hearts are right, if they feel the necessity of a mutual dependence: for we are most satisfied with those whom we are most at ease with, which will be the case between those who agree in "thinking right and meaning well." All lesser differences, either of character or rank in life, are lost, though not unattended to, in this only material agreement, between man and man: for we may be sure that they will be of no moment in the concerns of another life, in comparison with which this is as nothing, except in what relates to it.

XXXVIII.

All serious thoughts are truisms to those who think and feel, and all are, or ought to be, instructions to those who do not. All, to a certain degree, is detached and desultory in this life, except as it regards another; and what, even in our most "idle words" and actions, does not? It will be said perhaps, then we have only to fix our thoughts on another life, to sum up all that concerns it in this. True; but is not

the detail of some use, if it is only in shewing their common relation ?

XXXIX.

How many are the confessions which we make to others, because we feel that we ought to make them with more sincerity than we really do, to ourselves ! Thus they may be said, in a manner, to be forced from us ; and to be a kind of atonement.

XL.

How many are the proofs of our inability to judge ourselves, which however we have ability enough given us to do, to justify and to obey the command given us, to “ judge ourselves, that we may not be judged ;” and that we may be deterred from judging others, at least to a certain degree. The best mode of doing it is in making them examples, either of imitation or avoidance, to ourselves.

XLI.

Where there is fulness of enjoyment, when the mind is filled and satisfied, there can be no satiety. This cannot be in this life, for too many bubbles are required to fill up the emptiness of our minds, fitted as they are to receive them ; and those bubbles will all burst.

XLII.

The more we know ourselves, the more easy we

shall be in our intercourse with others, and they with us: for mutual allowances will be made, and mutual credit given. When the case is too bad to admit of either, the intercourse will be avoided.

XLIII.

When such sentiments as Cicero's were accompanied by a suitable course of life, we may be sure that the "Gentiles" would be acquitted, as we are told they were to be "judged, by their own laws:" for both justice and mercy must have been the object of our Saviour's mission. How unwarrantable then is the exclusive doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church; for the eternal laws of justice could not be overlooked in that mission. In the maintenance of those laws only tempered with mercy, God must be a "respector of persons." When we consider the probable motives of the exclusive doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, we shall find it pretty evident that the principal one was the maintenance of its own power: how delusive then is this object, and how faulty are human expedients, compared with the unalloyed (but not untempered) justice of Omnipotence! Policy may appear to require the former, but what solid support can policy have, when so much at variance with justice? For a time it may, but what will the reaction be?

XLIV.

We are apt to censure (prone as we are to it) a

plan that has been followed, particularly in politics, and of which the result has not been satisfactory to us, without fairly considering what its want of success has been owing to, or what would have been the probable consequence of the adoption of an opposite plan. If we did that, we might perhaps be staggered in our objections. But we like to have somebody to blame, and in doing that we pay a compliment to our own discernment.

XLV.

One excuse may sometimes be made for those who do not practise what they preach : that is, the desire of atoning for their neglect by their admonitions to others to avoid what their own experience has made them sensible of the folly of. But they forget that their self-indulgence requires a different atonement, or at least a due sense of the great one that has been already made.

XLVI.

Our first respect is due to ourselves ; in paying that, we respect a higher power within us ; that power from whom our best dispositions proceed. It is not vanity then, but a far better motive that influences us in this.

XLVII.

“ Flattery ” cannot “ soothe the dull cold ear of death : ” nor yet can it ensure a permanent satisfac-

tion in life, mixed as it must be with insincerity : and " the paths of glory " may be strewn with thorns as well as laurels, even before they have " led to the grave," withered as those laurels may be, by the changes and chances of life, as well as by the sense of their comparative insignificance.

" 'Tis but a kingdom can be won or lost."

XLVIII.

The chief difference between the human and the brute creation appears to be, in the faculties of the one being more varied and extended than those of the other ; but the qualities that influence them are much the same in number, though different in degree, according to the different room there is for their exercise. Thus good nature and good sense in a man is good nature and sagacity in a dog, or other animal ; both being shewn in different manners and degrees, according as they are regulated by the faculties that accompany them. Reason is the chief of those faculties, but it is not always easy to distinguish between reason and instinct, which are more liable to be confounded, as the effects they produce are often similar : but similar as they are, they will differ in degree, which evidently shews itself in the power of thinking. In an animal this extends no farther than is necessary for the purposes of his existence here, and his connection with that of other beings. In man the power extends much farther, as

his connection extends farther, and is more immediate with higher objects; and this surely shews that the duration of his existence will be more extended, as the actual sphere of it is, and that he is intended for higher purposes than any that can be answered in this his first state of existence, precarious and transitory as it is.

XLIX.

What we can easily comprehend, may appear to us easy to compose, but the one may sometimes be in an inverse ratio with the other, which shews itself in the difficulty of an expressive simplicity. Perhaps this may arise from the manner in which ideas are arranged in the head, and from the difference of the qualities of taste, judgment, imagination, &c., that actuate those ideas.

L.

If modesty was not regulated by prudence and judgment, ability would not always do justice to itself.

LI.

Well founded ideas must necessarily be truisms when thoroughly examined, as they could not otherwise be in accordance with truth. But the mind pines for something more, as it feels its capacity for it. This capacity will be filled hereafter. The desire of novelty may only be the desire of extension; the capacity for that cannot be the only thing given in vain.

LII.

Ideas and expression must, to a certain degree, go hand in hand; if they were not commensurate, one would outstretch the other, which indeed is actually the case. I should think, therefore, that an abstract idea is more conceivable than an abstract term:—must not the idea have suggested the term?

LIII.

The qualities within our power of control must be the only ones essential to our responsibility. The extent of the one, therefore, must be that of the other also. But that extent can only be known after trial, which may depend upon circumstances, independent as those may be upon us. What an extension does this give to the sphere, both of justice and of mercy!

LIV.

The “mind’s eye” in man is subservient to (or at least dependent on) the action of his physical organs, to a certain degree at least. He has therefore the power of combination, but not of invention. This must precede creation, which can only belong to Omnipotence. Man can only avail himself of what he sees and knows.

LV.

If malignant passions shew themselves in one way, they will be pretty sure to shew themselves in another. So far even falsehood is true to itself. Ma-

lignant passions are, more or less, the property of low minds ; an elevated one may not be soft, but it cannot be selfish ; unless elevation does not necessarily imply extension also. It will, however, be a security against wanton cruelty or injustice, for self-love cannot, in it, be entirely exclusive of social. The bounds of thought will often (may I not say generally ?) be those of feeling also. Cruelty, or at least injustice, may arise from mere weakness ; for a mind must have some strength to be exempt from both. If they are owing to ignorance (involuntary ignorance) no blame can attach. All human ability must be limited : and all comprehended within the great sphere (comparatively little as that too is) of vanity. Sic, "omnia vanitas."

LVI.

How often should we be out of humour with each other, if we had not the resource of laughing at each other ! It puts us into good humour with others, as it does with ourselves. And this may often be done before them, if with moderation, even where no intimacy exists. It is a sort of "argumentum ad verecundiam;" and perhaps Cicero's lessons for friendship would have been improved, if he had added risus to his "monitio et objurgatio." The use of it would not have been inconsistent even with his senatorial gravity.

LVII.

How sensible we are of the expansion of the heart

when it is produced by social feelings ! for devotional are too much accompanied with awe and humiliation to allow them their full elasticity, encouraging and elevating as the hopes of mercy are. But sympathy gives life to the social feelings ; and truly does Cicero say of it (for " friendship " is sympathy), "*et secundas res splendidiore facit amicitia, et adversas, partiens communicansque, leviores.*" Thus it

" Doubles our joys, and half expels our pains."

LVIII.

We should judge much too hardly of mankind, if we considered every occasional feeling or opinion expressed by them, as being permanently indicative of their characters. All are capable of " second thoughts," and these may correct first impulses. If we live to learn, we may live to grow better too. Time is required, and should be given for both. And so indeed we are told it will, even " to the eleventh hour."

LIX.

Every thing is mixed, and so mixed, that it is often out of our power to analyse the mixture. We are therefore struck, partial judges as we are, with the most prominent parts of it, which we mistake for the characteristic qualities of the whole. It may, perhaps, like other analogies, have one with the chemical mixtures, which have their affinities and opposites, and are rendered more or less simple or compound,

salutary or mischievous, by them ; and are capable of being neutralised or made useful, by the addition of some other ingredient, which is often within the reach of human contrivance, and shews that there are few evils for which a remedy may not be administered.

LX.

The true enjoyment of life does not consist in any excitement by external causes : it is in the mind itself, and is shewn in an equanimity which is preserved in the most important as well as the most trifling concerns ; in our moments of leisure, as well as in those of occupation. It is secured by acquiescence and contentment in our present situation, whatever it may be, and, above all, by looking up to that Almighty Power on whom we depend, and by fulfilling the duties which He has prescribed to us. Horace's

"Æquum mi animum ipse parabo,"

shews how little he was sensible that his dependence on his own efforts, itself depended on the protection of a higher power ; if he had felt that, he could not have satisfied himself with

"Det vitam, det opes," &c.

LXI.

"Sua est cuique sententia," may be said as well as

"Trahit sua quemque voluptas,"

for if a man's opinion is not the mere suggestion of

his own mind, he will have made it his own by duly considering the opinion delivered by another, before he adopts it: a precaution which he may not always take with his own suggestions. The same may be said of "*voluptas*:" for "equal is common sense and common ease," to those who possess and avail themselves of them.

LXII.

If a man feels himself really interested in the suggestions of his own mind, he may be sure that others will be so too: for "*quod magis ad nos pertinet*," is a common concern. However, we should guard against our vanity, in communicating our productions to others.

LXIII.

If there is no future life, the best and wisest men have employed the whole of their lives and abilities, and sacrificed the greatest part of their earthly enjoyments, and even life itself, in persuading themselves and others of the truth of what at last turns out to be imaginary. Well might St. Paul say, that in such a case they would be "of all men the most miserable." But the severity of the trial itself proves the truth of the object of it, of which the first Christian martyrs must have been well assured. But we want no other assurances than those given us in the Gospel, to which our reasoning can add little more than the accordance of its dictates with those assurances.

Frederick of Prussia says, that "as we were nothing before our birth, so we shall be nothing after our death." What! shall our existence have been begun, and may it not be continued? May not the Power who first gave it to us, continue it when given, and in what mode He pleases?

"Who gave beginning, can exclude an end."

True, Frederick, we cannot prove it; and if our hearts are hard enough, and our understandings perverted, we may disbelieve it: but our consciences will neither have been consulted nor listened to.—Without a reliance on the promises of the Gospel, however, how is it possible for the human mind to satisfy itself perfectly (difficult as that satisfaction must be, in proportion to our desire of obtaining it) of the truth of what we are totally unable to conceive? Would Cicero otherwise have made his reservation, "*si in hoc erro*," &c.? Would he have placed the alternatives (delusive as the suggestion must have been) of "future happiness or annihilation," on the same level? No, no. Neither philosophy nor common feeling will warrant that: we must wait, supported by faith, yet in awful suspense, and with an ardent, but trembling hope, for an event which it would baffle the utmost efforts of Stoicism to meet with insensibility, however capable the mind may be of availing itself of the workings of pride, resolution, or despair,

"Hope still survives;"

and this is the trial which it has to undergo ; a trial which the fulfilment of that hope will be a most ample compensation for the severity of.

LXIV.

The more sensible we are of our duties, the more we feel the imperfection of our performance of them. In this sense, it may be hoped, that we grow better as we grow older. The love of pleasure may prevent this in youth ; but the love of ease will induce it in old age ; that is, when the necessity of ease of mind is felt, as well as that of ease of body.

LXV.

In tracing natural effects to their natural causes, we find ourselves obliged at length to stop, being unable to go any farther ; and if we do not choose to solve the difficulty by referring to the agency of Divine power, at least we have no right to attribute it to the common course of nature, unless it is in the sense which Young gives it,—

“ The course of nature is the art of God.”

Art directed to the wisest and best purposes.

LXVI.

The knowledge of ourselves will be, as far as it goes, the result of self-examination. But the eye, thus turned inward, must be a clear one, to enable us to judge fairly of the qualities we possess.

LXVII.

A narrow and bigoted spirit may, for any thing we know, if sincere, be as acceptable to God as a more candid and liberal one, which is certainly more amiable and estimable in the sight of man. But he to whom "all hearts are open," will require no more than he has given; and if the narrowness of mind is not accompanied with pharisaical pride, if we are not disposed "to thank God that we are not as this publican," (for the sin must probably have been in the personal comparison,) the satisfaction that we feel in the consciousness of our spirit of devotion, may not (will not, we may presume,) be imputed to us as self-exaltation. But our piety must be accompanied with humility; and a comparison of ourselves with the model of perfection in Jesus Christ will be very sufficient to make it so. That comparison will itself suffice as an abasement of all human pride, and as an excitement of gratitude and the sense of dependence; as well as to make us sensible of the high importance of "looking up to him."

LXVIII.

The great acquirement of life is in forming a just estimation of things: mere knowledge of the world, and even quickness of apprehension, is not sufficient for this; the latter indeed may sometimes mislead us; and both together may only be useful for the purposes of conversation. How superficial these are,

a little experience and reflection will shew ; for what is the level that they raise us to ?

LXIX.

There are two traps for human pride ; the praise of men, and the comparison of ourselves with them. Both of these have the same remedy : the comparison of ourselves with that model of perfection which we are told to look up to.

LXX.

When the age of reflection is come, (for youth is generally too volatile for it,) there are few of us, I believe, who have not more or less reason to be out of humour with themselves ; for there are few, if any, who have not some faults of their own to regret, and to guard against. The habit of doing this, whether from policy or principle (happy when both coincide,) will make it cease to be an effort ; for we shall do it in a manner involuntarily ; being induced to it partly by a regard for ourselves as well as for each other. Thus we shall fulfil one part of the commandment, in “ watching ;” if to this we add “ praying,” the fulfilment will be complete. There are other dangers indeed to guard against, arising from ill example, and the temptations of the world : these also require “ watching and praying.”

LXXI.

The happiness of old age must depend upon the

enjoyment of the present, and a preparation for the future, (*i. e.* that end to which it is an approach,) which is the best security for that enjoyment, at least to those who think and feel. Horace's

“ *Lætus in præsens animus, quod ultra est
Oderit curare, et amara lento
Temperet risu,*”

would hardly be sufficient, without some thought of the “*quod ultra est,*” however averse he might be to it. Perhaps his efforts were continuous, and the effect momentary.

LXXII.

Precepts must be founded upon abstract principles, however these may be beyond the reach of practice : the standard of rectitude will otherwise be lowered to the level of expediency.

LXXIII.

It is difficult to draw the line between too great a severity in judging of men, and a liberality which approaches at least to indifference ; or, thirdly, a general distrust of mankind, which ranks them all on the same depreciating level, and which is no unfrequent result of a commerce with the world.

LXXIV.

It is not by making illiberal comparisons of one rank or condition of life with one another, that men

are to be judged of, but by seeing what human nature is subject to in any state of life.

LXXV.

Those who argue in favour of, or against religious belief, opposite as are the sides which they take, are in some respect influenced by the same motive, viz. a desire to confirm themselves in the opinion they have embraced, and to gain the concurrence of others. But the first are as much encouraged by the support both of their reason and their feelings, as the *latter* are discouraged by the want of it. *Their* chief support is in pride.

LXXVI.

“ Hope humbly then ; with trembling pinions soar ;
Wait the great teacher death, and God adore.”

This is a very comprehensive address of Pope's to his fellow-creatures. A humble hope well becomes those who must depend far more on the mercy of their Creator, and the merits and mediation of their Redeemer, than on any merits which they can plead of their own, mixed as they are, and alloyed with frailties and imperfections ; and as that hope must be a “ trembling ” one, so must the “ pinions tremble,” when the elevation of our thoughts sometimes makes them “ soar.” In the mean time, the adoration of our Maker, obedience to his commands, and reliance on his word, as given through Jesus Christ, are the best encouragements both of our hopes and aspirations ; and the best sedatives of any anxious doubts that

we may occasionally feel : for the deficiencies of the reasoning powers are often best supplied by the natural desires of the heart. A "wish" that is "father to a thought," may be its best nurse too.*

LXXVII.

When our serious feelings are most strongly excited, there is sometimes the greatest war in our bosoms, from the almost involuntary comparison that we make, between our feelings at that time, and those which we have experienced at others, or those which we know ourselves to be liable to.

LXXVIII.

Comprehensive as our Lord's Prayer is, it could not be expected in so few words to enter into a particular detail of duties, or of our neglect of them. That is left to the feelings of the self-examining Christian, who will pray that each sin which he has committed may be forgiven him, and that he may have the will and the power to correct whatever evil propensities he may have observed in himself, and that he may have faith in the promises of the Gospel.

LXXIX.

A man may sometimes save himself a good deal of trouble and uneasiness in acquiescing in the opinion that he is "an odd fellow:" and it may be some security to him to be considered as such. It is true

* Still, however, reason must not be lost sight of. Away, then, with "new lights."

that his vanity may require some compensation for the sacrifice of credit which he makes ; and perhaps he will find that compensation in the diversity of exhibitions which the great drama of human life affords.

LXXX.

Our desire of attaining ease of mind sometimes leads us into strange modes of seeking it.

LXXXI.

The conduct of some men's lives seems to be a continual vacillation between the extremes of confidence and distrust ; as they have no previously formed principle to regulate them, their determination follows the impulse of the moment,—

“ Quocunque rapit tempestas deferuntur.”

LXXXII.

“ Our desire of immortality is a sure proof of our capacity for it.”—*Southey's Colloquies*, vol. ii. p. 32.

There can be but two more proofs ; absolute knowledge, and actual enjoyment : one is incompatible with the trial of our faith and practice, and with our attachment to that life in which the trial is made : the incompatibility of the other with all that regards this life, or its connection with the next, needs no demonstration : as little need the reasons why this desire has been given to us, (for given it assuredly has been) be detailed to the mind which can think and feel.

LXXXIII.

We know not what the trial of patience is, till the enjoyments which we value most have met with their severest disappointment. Submission then is our only resource, and there cannot be a stronger proof of the truth and importance of religion, than our finding that to be our best consolation. It brings home to our feelings what our reason had before perhaps given but a cold assent to. What Mr. Paley calls a "taste for devotion," may as justly be called a taste for true happiness ; for what else can be the result of submission to Almighty power, and confidence in supreme justice and benevolence ?

LXXXIV.

This world, when viewed in a certain light at least, is a scene of trouble and discord ; inhabited by creatures who are more the slaves of passion and prejudice, than the followers of reason and truth. It is well that there is something to counteract this, and to produce that harmony which it is so much at variance with, and which is in such continual danger of being disturbed.

LXXXV.

Pope has two encouraging lines in his beautiful description of Virtue in the Essay on Man, where he speaks of it as a state in which

——“ No wants, no wishes can remain,
Since but to wish more virtue, is to gain.”

This must mean that the inclination to virtue is the same, or nearly so, as the attainment of it. In the same spirit Young, in the *Night Thoughts*, (Nt. 4th) among the real enjoyments of life, mentions

“ Pleasing reflections on parts well sustain'd,
Or purposed emendations, where we fail'd,
Or hopes of plaudits from our candid Judge,” &c.

Whether Pope's idea is carried too far, to what is called “ stretching a point,” I cannot say: but as we all consist of two opposite principles, the encouragement of the good, and repression of the bad, may sanction the hope that our “ heavenly Father” will reward our imperfect endeavours, in making the “ just perfect,” in another and a better world. In this mean while we have to “ watch and to pray.”

LXXXVI.

A due sense of the imperfections of our nature must tend to repress presumption, and to beget humility: this, with the conviction that we are at the best but “ unprofitable servants,” (for what else can we be, creatures as we are of an all-powerful Being?) must prevent our attaching any substantial value to any good works that we can perform; or our placing any reliance on our disposition to will and to do them, independently of the source from whence that disposition must be derived, and of the incitements which

He has given us to the exercise of it. Dr. Doddridge says, that "a sincere faith must necessarily produce good works." Then are not these the test of that sincerity? and can we be supposed to have it, unless we demonstrate it by the good works we perform? Is it not, in this world at least, by our works that we are known? To make these really good, must not the motives be good also? And is not the best motive a desire to obey God's commandments? Thus religious faith becomes the source, though not the mere substitute, of good works, which are so far united with it, as they are the necessary consequence of it. The intimacy of their union may make it more easy for us to confound, than to distinguish them as cause and effect.

LXXXVII.

Good and worthy people (comparatively so, at least,) may be sometimes disposed to regret the want of an opportunity to become acquainted, and to form an intercourse with others of the same description; but the motives of this regret themselves afford a compensation for it, in the hope of meeting them in heaven; if indeed such a minor consideration can be supposed to add any thing to that "fulness of joy" which they are taught and encouraged to expect hereafter, and which probably will all be contained in one great and all-comprehending object. But as Young says,

"What heart but trembles at so strange a bliss?"

Mercier indeed says,

" J'ai le courage d'être immortel."

Shall we believe this lively Frenchman ?

LXXXVIII.

We may presume that the full measure of righteousness (if that can be supposed) will be rewarded, as the full measure of iniquity will be punished, by a removal from this into another world. But how dreadfully opposite are the two cases !

LXXXIX.

The sense of our ignorance, or at least of our limited knowledge, may be itself a preservative against scepticism ; for it should teach us to confine our conclusions within the limits of that knowledge ; and to make the evidence that we can comprehend the ground of our belief of what we cannot.

A pious but self-distrusting mind will pray that it may be disposed to see things, especially those which concern itself the most, in a light favourable to its own peace ; and that the mercy of God, the mediation of Christ, and its own weak efforts, may encourage and justify it in so doing.

XC.

We are continually vacillating between an endeavour to account for the vicissitudes of human affairs by natural (as we call them) causes, (in which we are

guided by the records of history, as well as by our own observations and experience,) and a reference to the inscrutable decrees of Providence; but our incompetency, or at least the difficulty of doing the first satisfactorily to ourselves, throws us upon the latter resource, certain as we are that it is founded in truth.

XCI.

Detached thoughts seem to have this recommendation,—that they leave us more at liberty to form our opinion upon them; a continued train of reasoning, if it does not draw us into an involuntary acquiescence in the opinions on which it is built, may make the examination more perplexing, though indeed it gives us more matter for it.

XCII.

If Horace was really entitled to say,

“Æquum mi animum ipse parabo,”

he must have been as much a master of himself, as he has been said to shew himself in his writings, “a master of life.” But shall we give him credit for the power “*animum regere*” to that degree? Some of his confessions do not warrant his being so far “*sibi imperiosus* :” these and similar passages are rather exhortations, than exhibitions of his own example. And is “peace of mind,” the result of self-government, so attainable? If it is, why do we pray for it?

XCIII.

How often are we impelled to say,

"O curas hominum! O quantum est in rebus inane!"

That is, *rebus humanis*: in *divinis*, certainly not.

XCIV.

Shall I say, "*premit atra comes*," &c. ? No ; these desultory thoughts will shew that I am not altogether *curæ fugax*. I cannot say that they are "noted down for wisdom:" nor yet is there enough of that in them to prove that "I know myself to be a fool." To do that, we must, as Pope says, "sink into ourselves;" but we may be allowed to emerge from this now and then, and even to "soar," but "with trembling pinions."

XCV.

The interests of this world may be sufficient to make "*Honesty the best policy*," and righteousness the best rule of life; but they are not sufficient to necessitate these: and if higher purposes were not the ends of our existence here, we might well wonder that this world was made the stage for it.

XCVI.

I have sometimes been tempted to think that Handel was almost inspired. This idea, however, ought not to be carried too far; but that he was highly

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his self-government, and conscious as he is of the greatness of those imperfections, will pray that his weakness may be supported, and his unworthiness pardoned.

CV.

If human knowledge is so far progressive, as to make it impossible, as some suppose, for it to be thrown back into barbarism, that progress must continue, as it should seem, for nothing in this world is stationary; and to what will this progress ultimately tend? Does not Christianity throw a cheering light on the prospect? But, alas! is it not darkened by the clouds and storms of our passions? What a strength of mutual interest must there be, to ensure a mutual agreement! and how insufficient would reason be, if she were the only guide and controller of our passions!

CVI.

I cannot help being impressed with the idea, that those who give the strongest reasons in favour of an opinion which they have adopted, well founded as it may be, often do it as much to confirm themselves in that opinion, as to gain over others to it: and this perhaps will be truer, when applied to deeply-thinking minds, and on the most important subjects: and what subject can be more important than that of religion? Ignorance is the parent of doubt: and every accession of knowledge will tend to remove the latter; and if knowledge admits of improvement,

it must be by the exertions of reason. But the highest degree of knowledge that we can arrive at must be very limited, unless divinely inspired, which in these times may be more easily imagined than ascertained, or even reasonably supposed. Persuasion then must often supply the place of certitude; persuasion founded on probability, and strengthened by the united efforts of reason and feeling; the necessity of their union proves the insufficiency of each when left to itself.

CVII.

Perhaps there are many questions in which the human mind has too much ability to reason on both sides, to allow it that of making an absolute decision between them. To attempt to do this, might be

——“ *æternis minorem
Consiliis animum fatigare :*”

The defects which this implies in our reason, are, when necessary, made up by our feelings, which may also prevent the abuse of reason. And how many subjects are there, on which we can form but imperfect ideas ! and how often may these be sufficient to guide us in our practice ! For the rest, we throw ourselves upon Him, in whom the attributes of wisdom and benevolence are equally combined.

CVIII.

“ *Ne dubitare quidem sciunt, quibus omnia con-*

temnere et nescire satis est.”—*Southey's Colloquies*, Vol. ii. p. 91.

Doubt “may be a state of suspense resulting from a want of the power of acquirement:” contemnere et nescire, must be a mixture of pride and indolence, the one being generative of the other.

CIX.

Men who are accustomed to think much, will be led by a train of reasoning, or perhaps by an intuitive perception, from one idea to another, the connection between which will not strike those who are less in the habit of thinking, till they have considered the subject in all its bearings; and, even then, they may be obliged to go through a considerable series of reasoning, before they can perceive all the links of the chain that connects the two ideas.

CX.

The love of God, abstracted as the idea of Him is from all power of actual perception, must be in the love and admiration of the qualities He possesses, in our observation of his works, in the sense of our dependence on Him, and in the necessity of attributing to Him all the qualities that constitute perfection. The manifestation of that love must be in our obedience to his commandments; but the “perfect love that casteth out fear,” must, I think, require almost as great a confidence in ourselves as in Him; for where is then the “fear and trembling,”

which is to "work out our salvation?" We may make that love the object of our desire, but can it be that of our attainment? Let the reasonable Christian answer this, and let him guard against the errors of enthusiasm.

CXI.

The enjoyment of life must consist in our regard for the objects it affords us of that enjoyment, which must depend on the choice we make of them, and on the regulation of the regard we pay to them. After all, however, that they can afford to us, we shall find that, as Young says,

"Patience and resignation are the pillars
Of human peace on earth."

To these, indeed, may be added fortitude, but that is included in patience; as the greatest courage is required in bearing the ills of life, to which the greatest dangers that we can encounter can do no more than subject us. Horace's

——— "quocirca vivite fortes,
Fortiaque adversis opponite pectora rebus,"

has the same meaning, and is perhaps more reasonable than the "heroic lesson" which Young would have us "learn,"

"To frown at pleasure, and to smile in pain."

This is the height of Stoicism, and seems to make "resignation" almost unnecessary. For what other resources should we want, if we were to have such powerful ones within ourselves?

CXII.

“ Though bodies of men have a general sense of honour, they have no general sense of conscience.”—*Southey's Colloquies*, vol. ii. p. 120.

“ A sense of conscience” then is founded on a refinement of principle, which can neither be measured by the rules of this world, nor modified by its allowances. So are the two worlds “ at variance” with each other. The real interests of this, however, cannot but be connected with those of the other, as indeed Mr. Southey has shewn, in speaking of the “ impoverishment of the Church.” I fear the interests of our lay, and other impropiators, will be a sad obstacle to any effectual ecclesiastical reform. Is not this one of our “ Augean stables?”

CXIII.

What we call caprice, and even what we reproach ourselves with as such, may sometimes arise from the difficulty of fixing opinion, uncertain as all human affairs are. For this, in candid and judicious minds, a proper allowance, as well as a just discrimination, will be made.

CXIV.

“ There are many devices in a man's heart ; nevertheless the counsel of the Lord, that shall stand.” Prov. xix. 21.—*Southey's Colloquies*, vol. ii. p. 129.

Of this we may be assured, if we have any belief in

providential agency; but what the "counsel of the Lord" is, or how far its stability admits of the temporary or partial successes of the "devices of men's hearts," we, "*æternis minores consiliis*," as we are, must be wholly unable to comprehend. If "Providence works always by human means," men are only its instruments as far as is consistent with their free agency, and with the extent (little indeed as it is) of their reasoning powers.

CXV.

The pious Christian, however disposed he may be to believe in the doctrines of the New Testament, will not perhaps be satisfied with the extent of his belief; but he will be convinced that there are more mysteries in it than he can possibly understand, and he will feel the force of the evidence that vouches for their truth. He will consult his reason with that degree of humility which is not only consistent with, but is indispensably necessary to the due exercise of its powers: and he will end with saying, "Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief."

CXVI.

Goodwill towards man should have no bounds but those which justice prescribes, without a due regard to which, no real goodwill can be shewn to man; or, if shewn in the intention, its end will be defeated in the execution; for a false compassion, besides the encouragement it gives to the vices of others, will

probably be an injury to the very object to whom it is shewn. On this perhaps is partly founded the proverb, "Save a thief from the gallows, and he will cut your throat:" that is, if he is a determined and inveterate thief, his practices will probably lead him to cut either yours, or the throats of others; thus heaping one crime upon another. The good of society then requires the sacrifice of individuals, when other means of correction or prevention are insufficient; and, when that is necessary, compassion can only be shewn to the victim in using the utmost endeavours to save him from the punishments of another world, by his confession and penitence. In that world we cannot suppose that the Almighty Judge is influenced by any regard to example, which He must surely have other means of providing for: it is impossible, therefore, for us to say how far His justice may be tempered by mercy.

In human affairs, I think it may be said, that national interest is intimately connected with, if it is not the basis of justice; for the good of society is involved in it; therefore, "*Salus populi suprema lex.*"

CXVII.

The acquisition of wisdom, and the use of it in the reflections which it suggests, are not perhaps of themselves sufficient to complete the enjoyment of life, as old age advances upon us; the reason of which appears to be, that we cannot make the full use of them

in this life : they must then be intended for another, for which they are calculated to prepare us: we must wait for that state, of which Cicero says, "*Mihi quidem nunquam persuaderi potuit—tum animum esse insipientem, cum ex insipienti corpore evasisset ; sed cum, omni admixtione corporis liberatus, purus et integer esse cœpisset, tum esse sapientem.*" If this expectation is not to be fulfilled, we shall, as Young says,

"Dying, leave our lesson half unlearn't."

Besides the multitude of other powerful arguments which his sublime poem enforces upon us, in proof of the reality of a future life, and which, as they are in accord with, so they are confirmed by, the Gospel. "Hope," therefore, "trembling" as it is, "travels through, nor quits us when we die."

CXVIII.

Pope's description of man, as,

"Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurl'd,"

is surely just; for his liability to err, "whether he thinks too little, or too much," must extend to all subjects that are too deep (and what is not ?) for him to fathom, too complicated for him to analyse, or, in what relates to futurity, too dark for him to see into. All that is necessary is within the reach of his knowledge, though not all that his curiosity requires ; and his ignorance is probably equally necessary, as

the awe and incertitude in which it keeps him, makes him look up to that higher Intelligence on which he depends, and is part of the trial which hope enables him to sustain: hope, more or less uncertain, but strengthened by a well-founded persuasion, and a trust in the promises given by Him, whose "eyes" are too "pure" only to "behold" hardened "iniquity."

CXIX.

The proper use of time may sometimes consist more in encouraging a general seriousness of thought, in which the mind will of course make use of its own powers, than in attention to any particular objects, for which indeed it will prepare it, when they are worthy of that attention: and those objects will frequently present themselves.

CXX.

"The doctrine of obedience for conscience sake, is the Christian doctrine, and that upon which alone the peace and happiness of society can rest."—*Southey's Colloquies*, vol. ii. p. 184.

There seems to be more of truth in this, and deserving of more enforcement, as the expediency, and even the justice of an hereditary monarchical authority may be, and has been made matter of doubt and discussion; and therefore requires the sanction of a higher authority to secure its reception and its stability; under certain modifications indeed, with-

out which the "peace and happiness of society" could hardly be, in the contest for power and for liberty, which is so apt to agitate the minds of men, made permanent; which indeed the condition of human nature, and the varying passions and interests of men (their temporary interests, at least,) will hardly allow it to be, beyond a certain degree. If it is true, as Pope says, that as

— "all subsists by elemental strife,
So passions are the elements of life,"

it seems to be for the good of society that its institutions should be formed upon an opposition of the passions to each other, and a balancement between them, which, if it really tends to secure the peace of society, might be likely to meet with the concurrence and support of the majority of the individuals who compose it. "Wisdom" is to be found in a "multitude of counsellors:" not in a faction, which is founded on a partial union of interests, and particularly the acquisition of power and dominion. If the maxim, "Divide et impera," is at all to be regarded, it seems to be as far as it has in view the "opposition and balancement" above mentioned, leaving, however, one common interest inviolate, in which all are really, and the great majority may be expected to feel themselves, united.

CXXI.

In this world, superiority of intellect is too often

shewn in the superior art which is used, not in the pursuit of what is right, but for selfish purposes; in the management of it, however, that may be excused by the plea of self-defence. Thus,

“What reason weaves, by passion is undone.”

Passion, which reason itself is perverted to justify the indulgence of. So apt is self-love to deceive itself. How little will all this accord with the rule of “doing to others as we would they should do by us.” But how difficult is it often to judge in cases which admit of so much “fending and proving!” The proverb, that “Charity begins at home,” may sometimes be a little at variance with the extension of it to others. But the want of that extension will always revert upon ourselves.

CXXII.

“Is it for thee the lark ascends and sings?
Joy tunes his voice, joy elevates his wings.
Is it for thee the linnet pours his throat?
Loves of his own, and raptures swell the note.”

Pope's Essay on Man.

The sounds uttered by every animal, when not excited by pain, fear, or anger, are expressive of the pleasure which it takes in its existence, and the enjoyments that accompany it, and are a kind of return of thanks and “praise” for those enjoyments. Man, as being of a higher order, has the perception of all these, as well as of all the beautiful and wonderful works of his Creator. He knows what and whom to

attribute them to, and he feels, or ought to feel, the enjoyment of them, and the thankfulness which that enjoyment should inspire him with. His reason is given him to exalt what in animals is only excited by instinct. These, and the benevolence from which they must naturally proceed, are the feelings which are intended for man, but which he is too apt to pervert into passions that brutalize his nature, and spread misery and devastation among his fellow-creatures.—*Exmouth, April, 1830.*

CXXIII.

“ When every particle of fancied desert is eradicated, and our forfeiture and danger stand fully revealed to view, then comes the greatness of the rescue with home appeal to our bosoms.”—*Roberts's Portraiture of a Christian Gentleman*, Sect. 3. Thanksgiving, p. 26.

“ Fancied desert” must indeed be imaginary, but there must be a difference of feeling between the different degrees of guilt, or of freedom from it. Any sense of guilt, or of deficiency in righteousness, (and who has not that?) must beget a sense of danger, a desire of deliverance, and a thankfulness for the promises given of it, and of the assistance which we must so much feel the want of. Perhaps these feelings may make us too apt to find excuses for our demerits in the general weakness of our nature, which indeed seems to give more room for the exercise of the Divine mercy, although that certainly should not

be depended on, as a matter of course or of necessity. The natural desire of happiness must make the want, or the destruction of it more deeply felt, sometimes perhaps to the exclusion of better feelings, though it should rather prepare us for the admission of them.

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CXXIV.

“ That Divine justice is perfect, and therefore incapable of falling short of its accomplishment ; that it must have satisfaction ; that to give scope to his mercy, without impairing his justice, was an achievement only within the compass of his own wisdom.”—*Roberts, &c.* Sect. 5.

And therefore utterly incomprehensible by us ; although the conviction that we must have of the perfection of each of the attributes of the Supreme Being, will tell us that none of them can trespass on, or “ impair ” any of the others ; but how they are reconcileable is far beyond our conception ; we must, therefore, believe the “ stupendous sacrifice recorded in the Gospel,” on the strength of the evidence that vouches for it.

CXXV.

How apt are we to rest our self-satisfaction upon the feelings of the moment, whereas it is only from the permanency of the influence of those feelings upon our minds, that any real satisfaction can be derived ; and even then, it must be the feelings themselves, and their object that must give it, and not any credit that we can assume to ourselves.

CXXVI.

Swift says, "God's mercy is over all his works; but divines of all sorts lessen that mercy too much." There may be some truth in this, if it is not applied as an excuse for our trespassing, or presuming too much on that mercy. The best determination of the question must be, in consulting "what is written," "above" or below which there can be no true "wisdom." It may indeed be allowable to make a fair (and cautious) examination of the reasons for the severity of some of the declarations of the Gospel, which are probably meant to keep us in awe, and to give us a proper sense of our own condition, and on what we are to depend.

CXXVII.

What a bold attempt is Milton's to personify chaos! To concentrate, embody, and organise confusion! His success in it may shew the power of imagination, to create and reconcile impossibilities.

CXXVIII.

What makes a strong impression on our feelings, especially an agreeable and useful one, we can hardly bring ourselves to criticise. The mixture of the "utile dulci" of Horace, is the "omne tulit punctum," that precludes all examination of the means by which it is effected.

CXXIX.

The want of mental satisfaction, which is alluded to in No. LXXX, and is perhaps more or less felt by most of those who think much, may lead us into mistaken, if not improper, means of attaining it. The best prevention of this, I should think, is in making our reason the judge both of our own opinions and those of others.

CXXX.

Our belief or disbelief of a thing is perhaps generally determined by a partial attention to the evidence for or against it ; and our choice of this is influenced by a previous bias, which may make the "*audire alteram partem*" more a matter of form, or at least of constraint, than of inclination. This probably, however, will only apply to what we take some degree of interest in, and the sense of it will often make us suspend our judgments, or at least will induce us to make a proper distinction between opinion and decision.

CXXXI.

The doctrine of "new lights" appears to be an attempt to supply the deficiencies of human knowledge and human capacity by the assistance of the imagination, and the adoption of that doctrine must be founded either on the contempt and abandonment, or the perversion of reason. The dread of incurring the

reproaches of our consciences for a wilful perversion of our reason, may induce us to seek a refuge from it, in the adoption of what it is neither capable of comprehending, nor can approve of. To avoid the violation of our reason, we endeavour to soar above it, in the vain flights and dreams of imagination. But the contempt or abuse of the highest faculty that our Maker has given us, are equally foolish and reprehensible.

CXXXII.

Those who have no opinion of their own, are perhaps the most likely to adopt a wrong one, or at least it is an even chance whether they do or not; for being incapable of forming an opinion of their own, they are equally so of distinguishing between the good and bad which they meet with in others; and this incapacity leaves them no resource but in an obstinate adhesion to the opinion they may happen to have adopted.

CXXXIII.

“What is required of thee, O man, but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God.” To “do justly,” that we may be as free from guilt and from self-reproach as our nature will allow; to “love mercy,” that we may be encouraged in the hope of finding it ourselves; and to “walk humbly with” Him, whose pardon, assistance, and protection, we have so much need of. To follow these three

precepts to their utmost extent, is perhaps beyond the power of man ; but we may trust that our Maker and Sovereign Judge will be satisfied with the intention, if it is accompanied with the efforts that will in part atone for the defects of our performance. There may be persons who think themselves capable of fulfilling what is above mentioned ; but perhaps their sanguine temperaments may cause them to mistake the inclination for the power of execution.

CXXXIV.

Perhaps the imperfections of our belief may proceed in part from the sense of our inability to comprehend fully what it is that we say we believe. " Help thou mine unbelief," is an expression of solicitude, from whatever cause it may flow. The idea of " new lights" is a mere self-delusion. It is fanaticism, if not hypocrisy. Reason, sound reason, must decide.

CXXXV.

The love of mankind for the marvellous, has been urged as a reason for impugning the belief of what is marvellous, however it may be attested ; but we should be on our guard against the errors that scepticism may lead us into, as well as against those which may follow our credulity. The " humanum est errare" will apply to both.

CXXXVI.

The similarity which, in some degree at least, has

subsisted between the events of one period of the history of mankind and another, and between the causes which have produced them, seems to make one age as it were the type of another, and shews that all are meant to lead to one final result. When we can understand why mankind were created, and why that chain of similar events, and yet of progressive changes, is carried on, we shall also understand what is the final result which they will all lead to.

CXXXVII.

When we consider how complicated are the objects of our attention in this world, and how incompetent language is to give them their full expression, we shall find that there is much danger in too much simplification, which, I think, is instanced in the way in which pride is understood by some enthusiasts. What will comprehend every kind and degree of attachment and interest, is by them narrowed to self-conceit and arrogance.

CXXXVIII.

"The wooden guardian of our privacy
Quick on its axle turn."

That is, "shut the door."—*Pope's Martinus Scriblerus.*

If every amplification, however ingenious it may be, was reduced to plain English like this, how many examples of the "bathos" might be given!

CXXXIX.

"There are but two materially opposite descriptions of mankind," as the old Chevalier de St. Louis said to me at Toulouse, "the good and the bad." The rest indeed is but "leather and prunello." For what do the most brilliant talents or acquirements amount to, if they do not mark the distinction (which they rarely do) between "worth and the want of it?" Solid worth indeed is itself an acquirement, or rather something higher.

CXL.

We are apt not to go far enough back in examining the merits of a case in which we are a principal party concerned.

CXLI.

We are sometimes so misled by our opinion of what is due to us, that we overlook, or at least undervalue, what is due to others. This we may lay, amongst other faults, to the account of pride, which, like "charity, begins at home." If it "stirs abroad," it will not leave its insignia behind it.

CXLII.

The best effect that the enjoyment of life can produce, is in its being the preparation for our tranquil resignation of it. A resignation for which "patience" will best prepare us. But what have we to subdue, before we can so "possess our souls?"

CXLIII.

Where there is fear, there must be more or less of hope also ; for the total extinction of hope can leave no place but for despair, which indeed extreme fear nearly approaches to. How valuable then must be the hope of mercy that still remains to it !

CXLIV.

As opposite extremes are found to meet at the same point, so the extreme of scepticism, *i. e.* pyrrhonism, becomes decision, in rejecting what is the object of that scepticism ; and our ignorance is most absurdly made a ground for forming conclusions which are at variance with all the dictates of reason and feeling, because we find those faculties are insufficient to give us that conviction that our minds require, to obtain that degree of ease and satisfaction which, in fact, however they may pine after it, they are not capable of receiving. Patience and resignation must supply the defect.

CXLV.

In heaven alone true joys are to be found. All the approaches that we can make to them on earth, must be more or less connected with, and corroborative of, what another and a better world will afford. If our feelings are of the right kind, there will be few moments in which they will not make us sensible of that.

CXLVI.

We naturally, and I may say necessarily, conclude that every thing, except the reconciliation of absolute contradictions, (and even those may be the result of laws which He has established, and may revoke,) is possible with God. We, therefore, look up to his omnipotence for the fulfilment of the ends of justice and benevolence, such as our reason impresses us with the rectitude and necessity of, by means, of which we can have no comprehension whatever, fully as we are persuaded that those ends will be fulfilled, to the extent which all the ideas that we can form of the attributes of the Divine nature can reasonably suggest to our minds. But how imperfectly do our feelings accord with all that our reason can suggest to, and enforce upon, our minds! It seems to afford only a momentary refuge from the troubles and afflictions which the uncertainties of life render us continually liable to. With what imperfection of feeling do we often say, "Fiat Dei voluntas!" Imperfection, which the feeling that forces the expression from us is itself a proof of.

CXLVII.

One great cause of our indignation against the "evil doers," appears to be our inclination to throw upon them the blame of the uneasiness which the troubles and vicissitudes of life give us. This feeling is exemplified in various parts of the Psalms, and it is

the more to be guarded against, as we are parties interested in the cause which we judge, and are therefore more liable to be prejudiced against those whom we thus sit in judgment upon, and “deem” (whether justly or not,) the “foes” of our Maker as well as our own. In the Psalms, indeed, the vindictive spirit which this feeling excites, is counteracted by self-condemnation. The “*muris aheneis*” may be “*nil conscire sibi* :” but who can boast of that shelter ? We have, therefore, another given to us.

CXLVIII.

The stronger the sense of our duty is, the stronger also will be that of our not performing it.

“*Nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum.*”

Et cui nihil agendum superest ? Felix igitur, qui bene agere et potest, et vult. Felix etiam, cui retrospicere gaudium, prospicere spem affert. Spem vero metu temperatam.

CXLIX.

It is not so much when we contemplate the majesty and the perfect purity and brightness of the Divine nature, that we feel the awe and terror which that view would give us, if our “mind’s eye” could consider it fully ; which, dazzled and confounded as it is by it, it can no more do, than our bodily eyes can bear to take a full view of the sun : but it is when we turn our eyes inwardly upon ourselves, and compare

what we find there, with the little that we can see, and the much more that our feelings impress us with the idea of, in the perfection of the Divine attributes; and what terror would not that comparison overwhelm us with, if we were not soothed and encouraged by the hope of mercy which is given and confirmed to us, by the great atonement which has been made.

CL.

If Christianity is not founded in truth, then we may say, that truth is not true to itself, that it acts the part of falsehood, and is its own destroyer. For never was moral excellence carried to such a height of perfection as in the precepts of the Gospel; never was the practice of it so exemplified as in the person of Christ; never was its truth and sanctity so attested as by His sacrifice of Himself, and by that of the martyrs, his followers. If truth is any where to be found, it must be in that religion which has the stamp and seal of it. The question of the unenlightened Pilate was the natural enquiry and doubt of a mind which had no guide but its own suggestions, in the search of "what was truth." The question, however, does not seem to imply a denial of its existence, for the enquiry must then have been precluded: curiosity, in its different degrees of intensity, must arise from both a supposition of, and an interest in, the existence of its object. If not fully satisfied, it may require "help," which the feelings will in part supply. And what says reason? It speaks the lan-

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guage of Scripture, in saying that "all must rise again, those who have done well, unto life eternal; those who have done evil, to a life of proportionate punishment;" and with Young it says, that without the "prospect" of another life, nothing would remain but

" A trembling world, and a devouring God.
Earth, but the shambles of omnipotence :
Heaven's face all stain'd with causeless massacres
Of countless millions, born to feel the pangs
Of Being lost."

And it would ask,

" If human souls, why not angelic too
Extinguish'd? and a solitary God,
O'er ghastly ruin, frowning from his throne?"

And it would conclude, with Young, that

" If man's immortal, there is a God in heaven."

For without the prospect of another life, most awful as that is, what would there be to raise our thoughts to Him? Young, therefore, makes them correlative truths.

CLI.

Religious feelings cannot rise too high, if guided and sanctioned by that reason which, when properly used, must convince us of the proportion that ought to subsist between them and their object. And what bounds can the elevation or expansion of that object have? We may be sometimes puzzled by the difficulty of reconciling the goodness of God with the evil

which exists in the world: but, independently of that evil being considered as the consequence of original sin, the difficulty is overcome by the many instances that we see of benevolence, and by the feelings which, in our happier moments, are awakened in our breasts: and, it may be added, by the necessary connection that must subsist between omnipotence, wisdom, and benevolence; which latter, even in the Manichean system, is made the necessary counteractive to the evil principle, permitted, as that may be, to have its sway till the final consummation of all things.

CLII.

In youth, the flow of our animal spirits hurries us on, without leaving us time or inclination to consider the sources of our enjoyments, or to dwell at all upon them. As age advances, we reflect more upon our present sensations, we compare them with those we have experienced at different times; if they are agreeable, we are, or ought to be, grateful for the pleasure they afford us, and still more for the hopes with which they brighten our prospects of futurity, and make us look up to Him who gives this sunshine to our breasts, in correspondence with that which now illumines the beautiful face of nature.—*Near Minehead, Somersetshire, May 13, 1831.*

CLIII.

Pope says well, that

“To enjoy is to obey.”

For there can be no true enjoyment without a sense of what we owe to the giver of it.

CLIV.

Increase and strengthen in me, O Lord, I beseech thee, the good thoughts which my reason suggests and sanctions, and dispose and enable me to regulate my conduct by them.

“ Teach my best reason, reason ; my best will
Teach rectitude, and fix my firm resolve
Wisdom to wed, and pay her long arrear.”

CLV.

Few, perhaps, are the circumstances in life, when the mind of man experiences a higher enjoyment, than when the social feelings are mixed with the pleasure which the contemplation of nature's beauties affords. The smile of complacency which then shews itself in the “ human face,” renders it really “ divine,” as are the feelings which are displayed in that smile ; and the communications between two persons who are actuated by those feelings must be, more or less, a tribute of praise,

(“ The only tribute man has power to give,”)

to the great Being whose bounty gives to man those enjoyments, for which his gratitude and obedience are the only returns required : gratitude, which is best shewn in his sense of enjoyment, and obedience in doing his duty to God, his fellow-creatures, and himself.

CLVI.

It seems to me to be a strong proof of the conscious dignity of human reason, as well as of the ardent sensibility of the human feelings, that they both aspire after a certitude of knowledge, especially on the most interesting subjects, of which religion is undoubtedly the chief. This is not pride nor arrogance, but the desire of ease and satisfaction, which is so natural to the human mind. If it cannot obtain it, it seeks for a compensation in the sense of its own weakness and imperfection, and in the hope and persuasion of that support which, as it so much wants it, it will be confident of finding in the mercy of its Creator.

CLVII.

Bigotry is the resource of weak and narrow minds; enthusiasm the elastic spring of ardent and aspiring ones. One halts behind reason, the other outruns it.

CLVIII.

If "happiness" is "our being's end and aim," yet not attainable here on earth, farther than is "meant" by "God" to be given "to all men," independently of "externals," how justly do we suppose that the perfection of it is reserved for another state, if not forfeited by our conduct in this: and that it is our being's end and aim, is surely evinced by our ardent desire of it.

CLIX.

We cannot always, if ever, trace the connection between the events of this world and the will of Him whose ways are inscrutable ; but the ultimate reference of those events to His will is the necessary consequence of an acknowledgment of his Being and his attributes, and must be deduced from them by a chain of reasoning, of which the links are inseparable.

CLX.

A man ought to think and act from principle ; and the principles upon which he thinks and acts ought to be founded in truth : if they are not, his adherence to them may entitle him to the credit of consistency, but that consistency will only be perseverance in error. What principles then are founded in truth ? That we should fear God, and keep his commandments ; that we should “ do as we would be done by ;” that we should “ do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with our God ;” that we should pay a proportionate veneration to those who are governed by these principles ; that we should regulate our opinions by the dictates of our reason, and by the precepts which are given us in the Gospel.

CLXI.

The comparison of ourselves with others, will sometimes (perhaps too often) make us excuse ourselves at their expense, and sometimes it may induce

us to overvalue them, from our not seeing in them the imperfections which we are conscious of in ourselves, but which they have the prudence to hide, or the virtue and resolution to repress, conscious as they may be of the evil propensities of their nature.

CLXII.

From what is said in the last number, I think it will follow, that the truest knowledge of human nature must be derived from our own consciousness; that is, from where our responsibility is also placed. That responsibility must in this be exercised in rendering an account to ourselves, previous to the awful and final account in another world. The justice and mercy of God (so astonishingly shewn in the atonement which has been made) has given us both the excitement and the means of fulfilling our responsibility, which, indeed, there are various modes and degrees of doing, as well as of neglecting or violating it. Mercy, however, is extended even to the "eleventh hour," but with an awful admonition against the delay of seeking it. But at what hour has not each of us to say, "Eneantem, miserere mei!"

CLXIII.

I knew a man, who had many virtues, but an unfortunate propensity to scepticism, which made him, in opposition to the scriptural doctrine of sin, and to all just observation of human weakness, assert that he knew men who were as near angelic perfection as

could be imagined. How little did he reckon upon the better knowledge which they had of themselves !

CLXIV.¹⁰

Perfect proof requires perfect comprehension ; what we can only partially comprehend, we can only have partial proof of ; because the full proof must be adequate to the thing which is to be proved, so that both will be incomprehensible by us : but if the proof of a thing in itself incomprehensible by us, rises as high as our comprehension can reach, we ought to attribute the deficiency of proof that may be necessary for our perfect conviction, not to the defect of probability (capability of being proved) in the thing itself, but to our own incompetency to receive the full proof of it. To defective intelligence, then, proof proportionately defective will be sufficient to make a thing probable ; that is, such as may be proved.

CLXV.

How often does eloquence, like poetry, amplify more than it explains ! and involves in obscurity what, when expressed in plainer terms, would be sufficiently intelligible to common sense : all beyond that is little more than "learning's luxury, or idleness." The feelings, however, may be usefully worked upon through the medium of the imagination, but still reason ought not to be lost sight of. If it is, no impression can well remain.

CLXVI.

Metaphysics may perhaps be termed the efficiency of nature's operations ; but the means made use of can be the only objects of research : the primary cause which directs and puts them in action must be more recondite than metaphysics itself. Who can tell where and how the *fiat* is pronounced ? What explanation can be given of " Let there be light, and there was light ? " The existence and the agency of the universal cause must be equally out of our sight. All that we can see are merely effects, of which, indeed, we may judge in some measure of the final causes.

CLXVII.

Men sometimes fancy they exhibit the sublime, when they substitute the obscure for it : instead of a new creation, they produce nothing but darkness and disorder : however, if they give us nothing to admire, we may have something to laugh at ; if disgust will allow it.

CLXVIII.

There appears to be a reciprocity of action between the mind and the body ; but it may be very difficult, if not impossible, for us to determine the mode in which it is carried on, or how it begins, which, indeed, I should think, must, generally at least, be by the action of the physical part of our frame on the

moral. If the attack is a slight one, the diversion of the mind's attention will probably enable nature to exert successfully her efforts to restore health and spirits with it, by lightening or throwing off the load she has to sustain : if it is a severe one, other remedies must be resorted to.

CLXIX.

I have said, in No. XCVI., that Handel appears to have been almost inspired ; and if the utmost height, as far at least as our feelings enable us to judge, of musical expression may be a proof of it, the supposition is not an unreasonable one. The solemnity, depth, sublimity, and simplicity, (the latter being perhaps the union of all these, as the prismatic colours are united in a ray of light,) in " What though I trace each herb and flower ;" the pathetic tenderness of " Angels ever bright and fair ;" the change of air and expression in the song of Jephthah's daughter ; and the wonderfully varied melody and expression many of his other songs, chorusses, &c. place Handel far above all other musical composers. But refinement of composition requires some degree of refinement of feeling to judge of it ; and to perceive, for instance, the effect of the prolongation of the same note on the word " power," in the first line of " What though I trace," &c. expressing the—exertion we must not call it, for infinite power must probably be always equably, though variously displayed—but the sustainment of it : while an ordinary composer would

perhaps have dropped a note lower on the second syllable of the word "pow—er." The effect also of the repetition of the same melody, successively rising or falling, in the words "How vain," ending with ascending notes (frequent in Handel's cadences) as a sort of climax at the end of the song as now sung, perhaps improperly in leaving out the other part. The beautiful pastorage of "He shall feed his flock;" the sublime and impressive simplicity of "I know that my Redeemer liveth;" the deep pathos of "He was despised and rejected;" and of "Return O God of hosts," of "Father of heaven,"—the soothing and encouraging tones of "Comfort ye my people;" with the animated opening of the air that follows, "Every valley," &c.; and to descend to music expressing feelings of a lower kind than the sacred ones, the beautiful trio in *Acis and Galatea*, in which the tender strains of "The flocks shall leave the mountains," &c. are so strongly contrasted by the passionate base of Polyphemus's "Torture, fury, rage, despair," &c.—of these, and other expressions of sense by sound in Handel's songs, some have, I think, been too severely ridiculed as "*puns*," by critics who have been more inclined to censure than to sympathise, and to be offended than moved by the studied accord of musical expression with verbal meaning, harmonious as the former may be in itself, and agreeable to the utterance that would be given in common discourse, when any interest is excited. If Handel has carried these attempts, natural as they

are to genius in his profession, rather too far, he surely has as amply atoned for them as Shakspeare, or any other eminent genius can have done, for any errors or inequalities they may have shewn: and Handel's "puns," like Shakspeare's, are never misplaced.

Music may be called a divine art, as poetry (measured and addressed to the ear as that also is,) is by Homer called the "language of the gods:" and we have good authority for supposing the most exalted expressions of celestial feeling and adoration to be so uttered. We may believe that the angels in heaven "serve the Lord with gladness, and come before his presence with a song," as well as we on earth, who "are his people, and the sheep of his pasture;" more nearly approaching His presence than our perceptions enable us to do here, but not perhaps more nearly than we may hope to do with those angels hereafter.

CLXX.

The general uncertainty of life seems to prevent, or lessen at least, the sense of it in individuals. It is a common case, and each of us says, Why should I not live as long as such or such a one? This comparison, indeed, though founded in selfishness, may be of some use in exciting emulation among individuals; for the wish to live should have some purpose in view.

CLXXI.

We live between uncertainties and possibilities,

which our hopes or our fears often magnify into probabilities, certitude being appropriate only to omniscience, excepting that of death, which we know must happen to us all. The resurrection after it may be as "sure and certain" as "hope" can make it, with the assurances which encourage that hope, and the reason and feelings with which it so closely accords. These are what are given us, to supply the want of conception, which would not be compatible either with the enjoyment of this life, or the fulfilment of that responsibility which must be tried by incertitude: a greater degree of certitude would have too strong a hold both on our hopes and fears, to leave us the full possession of our free agency.

CLXXII.

"Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief," is at once an expression of the ardour of feeling, and of the incompetency of reason to keep pace with it. How much reason have we to wish (a wish that would fain elevate itself into a hope,) that these starts of thought, which are produced by the occasional or accidental excitement of the moment, may be of substantial and permanent avail to us! But after all, why not hope it? Have we not encouragement?

CLXXIII.

I have just been reading a very good translation; by Sir English Dolben, in Latin hexameters, of the "Te Deum laudamus," and it makes me feel ashamed

of the want of novelty to attract my attention to what, familiar as it was to me in its English dress, was so worthy of it before I saw it in its new one.

CLXXIV.

I think it may be said of physiognomy and craniology, that, as sciences, their chief, if not only merit, is in affording new and amusing opportunities of observation. This, indeed, in physiognomy, may as often give occasion for prejudice as for useful caution: craniology may, perhaps, be not unlikely to turn the brains, or at least pervert the intellects, of those who fancy they can trace intellectual and moral qualities to their source.

CLXXV.

One of the evils, as far as it is one, of deafness, is the being obliged to give others as well as ourselves, by their speaking louder, and our increased attention, the trouble of enabling us to hear what at last we find not to be worth the hearing, but what the social principle, &c. that stirs within us, makes us uneasy at being debarred from the common participation in, however frivolous it may be. It may be convenient enough to turn a deaf ear sometimes, but it is by no means agreeable to be always obliged to do so. If folly "is shut out at one entrance," so is "wisdom" too. *Experto crede.*

CLXXVI.

Sublimity and simplicity (that simplicity which is

so impressively and elevatingly displayed in Handel's sacred music, as well as in the prayers of our Church,) are nearly allied ; and well may they be so, for such simplicity is an approach to the unity, from whose awful, mysterious, and inexhaustible nature and essence, have emanated such "wonderful works," which are "all made in wisdom," and all conducive, more or less, in various ways, to the happiness of the creatures with which "He, who worlds created," has peopled them : but all subordinate to that final state of consummate happiness, for which their imperfections, alloys, and vicissitudes, render them a preparation and a trial. That they are a preparation for it, is fully evinced by the sensation which Young truly says that a well regulated mind experiences in anticipating—

"Heaven given above, for heaven enjoyed below :"

a sensation never more strongly felt than, when with humiliation on our knees, and prostration of our minds, we address ourselves to Him, whose "pity" we hope that our "pious orgies, pious airs," our "decent sorrow, decent prayers," will "move," and will, as we humbly hope, "regain his love." For this, the same simplicity is required, in a sincere heart-felt sorrow for the "offences" which the too great indulgence of "the devices and desires of our own hearts" has made us commit against His "holy laws:" losing thereby that "health" and peace of mind, which a penitent sense of our own unworthi-

ness, a trust in His mercy, and a faithful observance of the conditions on which it has been promised, can alone restore.

“ *Meliora*” hæc “ *video, proboque;*”
Deteriora “ *nollem, sed metuo velle*” sequi.”

The good my heart approving sees, the bad
 I fain would shun, but fear I yet may follow.

If, however, I am impelled to say with Paul, “ Who shall deliver me from the body of this death ?” may I not also say with him—

Weak though I am, in thinking right unstable;
 To feel like him desirous, but unable—

May I not say, “ I thank God, through our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ ?” Or will the “ unbelief,” which so much requires “ help,” still keep me vacillating in the “ belief” that should strengthen the hope of receiving it? O unreasonable reason, that sighs after a knowledge which it cannot have! O cold and sluggish feelings, that are so slow to give reason an impulse which it so much requires! O unruly passions, that will suffer neither reason nor feeling to have their proper sway!

CLXXVII.

How pleasing is the sound of that neighbouring church bell, (Park-street Chapel,) which calls the people to assemble in one great cause, in which all have a common interest; particularly in this great town, in which their varying passions and worldly

interests are productive of so much jealousy, hatred, and discord. All these are lost in the place to which this bell summons them, and in which there can be no rivalry, but in the effusions of the best and kindest feelings of their nature. If ever the voice of peace and harmony speaks, it surely is in that sound, accordant too, as it is, with the present state of the atmosphere.—*London, Sunday, June 6, 1830.*

CLXXVIII.

What would men be, without those intervals of reason and feeling, in which the passions are calmed, and the affections excited and awake !

CLXXIX.

Interest unites men ; interest, variously as it is felt and understood, separates them. What wonder, then, that interest should be the common bond of union in another world, where all will be united under the protection of one Almighty Being ? For what is interest, but that which has the strongest sway over the feelings of our nature ? It may be the mammon of this world, but it will be the Almighty Ruler of another (for “ in heaven ” we know His “ will is done, ”) to whom it is our best interest to look up in this.

CLXXX.

Death would require no preparation, if it were the final end of our being : the more unprepared we met

it, the better it would be for us, if there were no previous or protracted suffering. All preparation must be for a change from one existence to another : and the best preparation must be in deserving, as far as we can, the favour of Him in whom we “ live and move, and have our being ” in this world, and who designs us for another.

CLXXXI.

That we are “ unprofitable servants ” is certain, for an omnipotent Being might well have dispensed with any services that we can perform : but though unprofitable to Him, we may be profitable to each other, which is one of the duties that we have to perform, and one that we may be sure will give satisfaction to our Maker.

CLXXXII.

To what I have said in No. CLXXV. I may add, that another consequence, certainly not a desirable one, of deafness, is our being impelled by it to speak louder than is either agreeable to others or to ourselves, unless to those who are fond of hearing themselves talk, which indeed is generally necessary to make us sure of being heard by those whom we speak to. Thus loquacious persons have a double enjoyment, which however to their hearers may sometimes be rather an annoyance, which garrulity must always more or less be. The prevention of this, by the effort required in deaf persons, may be considered as a

compensation for their infirmity. But they must generally be contented with a negative approbation and regard from those with whom they associate, which, after all, is as much as most of us can expect, equal as our claims are (except in particular cases,) to that common fellow feeling that our common nature dictates and requires. This bond of union (one of the strongest) can only be equalled (or rather exceeded) in its benefit to us, by the resources which our Maker has implanted in ourselves, with whom we still may “commune.”

CLXXXIII.

What is the best qualification for, and recommendation to, social intercourse, especially such as requires any degree of confidence? Simple good-humour, rooted in good-nature, and secured by modest discretion and good sense.

CLXXXIV.

The goodness and the mercy of God must design for all his creatures an enjoyment of as much happiness as they are capable of, and must intend them to be “as blest as they can bear.” To qualify the rational part of them for this, their dispositions must be good, and, in some measure at least, similar to His own: for an evil or immoral disposition is incapable of the enjoyment of true happiness, which would certainly be destroyed by the indulgence of that disposition; so true it is, that—

"Peace, O virtue, peace is all thy own!"

and that

"Virtue alone is happiness below."

God has "joined" these, and no man can "put them asunder;" nor can any other alliance be formed, than what subsists between them. This we shall be convinced of, if we consult our own feelings, or recollect what they have been at different times. A certain degree of self-approbation, then, is necessary for the enjoyment of real happiness, whether we are conscious of it or not, as a certain degree of self-reproach is sure to destroy it. The indulgence of the passions may give a temporary gratification, but cannot confer real happiness; for what can give peace to a mind which is at war with itself? Man cannot be good, in the highest sense of the word, for his passions forbid it: but he may be so in a limited degree, by the prevalence of his good over his bad qualities; this will make him as good and as happy as he is capable of being. Perfect happiness, as perfect goodness, belongs to God alone; and as He possesses, so He can confer it. A man's happiness, or at least his consolations, consist partly in the mutability of his feelings; the pleasurable ones of one moment compensate the painful ones of another; thus, "Heavenness may endure for a night, but joy cometh in the morning." The mercy of God cannot surely be denied where it is most wanted; but by whom is it wanted? By those who feel and express that want,

in the prayers which they offer up to Him, whose "mercy reaches unto the heavens;" and the greater the want of that mercy is, the greater must be the extension of it, to those who are capable of receiving it, and whom God has not abandoned to the hardness of their own hearts. Few, surely, are the breasts in which no drop of the milk of human kindness remains; and though few are worthy of being "chosen," few also, we may hope and trust, will be wholly "cast away."

CLXXXV.

It is as impossible to say what degree of happiness the human mind is capable of, as it is to conceive what "the eye has not seen, nor the ear heard," &c. Our feelings will assure us of the first, as the still higher authority of the Gospel has of the last.

CLXXXVI.

A man who is too much of a casuist, may be in danger of becoming a caviller: so much is to be apprehended from extremes.

CLXXXVII.

Nothing is more licentious than wit; and it may well be so, if it employs itself, as it is its nature to do, in the approximation of opposite ideas.

CLXXXVIII.

Our reason sometimes dictates truths to us, which

we cannot refuse nor yet can we give our full assent to, because our feelings require more to satisfy them, than our reason has to offer, incompetent too as it is to give a perfect satisfaction to itself, in those cases in which we have only our feelings to supply that want of comprehension which must be the consequence of the defects of our reason. We, therefore, remain in that state of mind which is expressed by "I believe, help Thou mine unbelief." Our feelings are a spur to our reason; our reason is, or should be, a bridle to our feelings; unequal as they both are to the task they have to perform. This state is an anxious, and a painful one; and we are inclined to be angry with those who awaken our sense of it, by avowing what passes within themselves: but it is surely uncharitable to attribute this avowal to a perversion, a want, or even an insufficiency of feeling.

CLXXXIX.

Fear may arise from the consciousness of guilt, and yet be consistent with perseverance in it. This is not "godly fear;" and it may be in this sense that "the fearful" are said to "have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone."—*Rev.* xxi. 8.

CXC.

As we are constituted, the rectitude of our conduct seems often to depend more on impulse than on reflection. It may sometimes require an extraordinary

clearness of head, and readiness of conclusion and action, as well as watchfulness over the influence of our passions, to secure us from falling into error, either in thought, word, or deed.

CXCI.

Perhaps one of the most earnest of our supplications at the throne of grace, should be against our giving way to self-delusion. "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." Certainly: but we may deceive ourselves by excusing our sins, as well as by denying them: the difficulty of self-examination may expose us to this. "Correct me, but with judgment: not in thine anger, lest thou bring me to nothing." Has not the word "judgment" here a little too much the appearance of dictation? Can we suppose the Supreme Being ever to act otherwise than with judgment? If it means mercy, the term seems an improper one; the "wrath" of God cannot make him lose sight of justice.

CXCII.

The more reason a man has, or thinks he has, to be pleased with himself for any thing that he has done or said during the day, the less reason he has to fear that any act or sense of humiliation which his mind impels him to, will diminish the pleasure that the recollection gives him; for that humiliation will only substitute thankfulness in lieu of self-gratulation;

and the reason for his having pleasure in the recollection of the deed or words will still remain, if they are worthy of it: and the pleasure of thankfulness will be insured by the religious feeling which must accompany it, and which may still leave room for as much self-approbation as reason will allow of.

CXCIII.

If, as is said, the lowest savages have a sense of the existence of a Supreme Being, I think it must be, in a great measure at least, instinctive; and perhaps the instinct may be given them to form their responsibility.

CXCIV.

What we take for sincerity, especially in ourselves, may sometimes (shall I say often?) be little more than the indulgence of humour.

CXCV.

Men are governed by their habits, their prejudices, their hopes, or their fears. The two first are the most powerful, as being the earliest planted and deepest rooted; the two latter are purely speculative, and in a great measure dependent on constitution, whether it is sanguine and bold, or cautious and timid. Much also will depend on their powers of reasoning and of observation, for which there is a very wide field, in observing all the bearings and dependences, all the connection between theory and practice, and how far

they are compatible with each other, which is only to a certain degree, though all practice, to be good, must be founded on good theoretical principles, otherwise it cannot last long in a sound state, however it may accord with men's passions and interests, mutable as they are, in common with the events of the world. If good fundamental principles were not necessary, vice and selfish principles would prevail still more than they now do, counteracted as they are by better agents. Practice must then be reducible, more or less, to fundamental principles, and a "new portion of health" (to quote the great Lord Chatham's words,) be "infused into it," with which the minds of men will be capable of according. Without this, all will gradually if not speedily deteriorate, and Horace's prophecy be everywhere verified,

" *Ætas parentum peior avis tulit*
Nos nequiores, mox daturos
Progeniem vitiosiore."

But we may surely reckon upon the corrigibility, though not the perfectibility, of human nature, and sufficiently to answer the end required.

CXCVI.

The auricular confession of the Roman Catholic Church might have its advantages, both as a check and a solace, if it was not abused; which the discretionary power given by it to the confessor renders it more or less liable to be. It is indeed a subordinate engine of the power of that church, which knows both

how to wheedle and to awe, and the assumption of it, in this instance, is an evident perversion of St. Paul's "mutual confession," which probably rather (such are the human substitutes for divine authority) means an ingenuous acknowledgment of our faults, than any application for relief. The best application is to God and our own consciences; that is, to the check and solace which they unitedly form in our minds. For what else are our consciences given to us?

CXCVII.

The principles of morality are much the same in all religions, as the observance of them to a certain extent is necessary for the stability and peace of society; but the superiority of Christianity in enforcing and extending them, when in its pure state, can only be known on a fair examination, which, therefore, it is incumbent on all, who have the power and the means, to make. The mysteries are far above the comprehension of our reason, but are disgraced by no absurdity, and sullied by no impurity. The belief of them is best promoted by the due exercise and estimation of the power of reason. It is the abuse, and not the use of that faculty, that leads men into error: if the pursuit of truth was not uniform, how could our reason guide us in it?

Can these truths be too often repeated? or can the modes of expressing them be too much varied? In what point of view can truth be represented, in which she, and she alone, is not made manifest?

CXCVIII.

There are parts of the Bible that we may be puzzled with, parts that we may cavil at, and parts that we may, if we will, treat ludicrously: but the disposition to do this bespeaks a light and thoughtless, if not an unfeeling mind, or, at least, a vain and self-confident one; for the whole of the Scriptures is far too weighty, too much connected together, too strongly vouching for its own truth, and, therefore, too sacred not to be considered as of the highest importance to man, and entitled to his highest respect, as involving all his most important concerns. I think that a German author, of the name of Lessing, says, that God has given to man three keys, none of which opens the real secrets of the universe, but all to a certain degree attractive and worthy of man's regards. This he has put into the form of an apologue, indicating by it, that as the whole truth was not to be revealed to creatures who probably would not have been capable of comprehending it, therefore a degree of deception was necessary to satisfy their minds, and to influence their conduct. Truth, then, is by him considered as unworthy the regards of the Fountain of it, and a belief is required of man, which such profound philosophers as Lessing may lawfully question the grounds of, and may treat with a sort of contempt that faith which is required of a being who must be sensible of his own limited powers, but at the same time of their competency to understand the

evidence which vouches for the truth of what he cannot comprehend, and gives him a very sufficient reason to justify his faith in and belief of. Imperfect, indeed, as this must perhaps be, he will lay that imperfection at the foot of the throne of the Almighty, in saying, "Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief."

CXCIX.

I believe that every man's judgment is influenced, and, in a great measure, determined, by a previous bias, which, whether it results from the moral or physical part of his nature, is distinct from, and independent of, that part of his character on which his responsibility rests, and also from the use of his common sense, which probably is acquired by his concurrence with the general opinion of mankind. This bias is, perhaps, what is meant by the common saying, that "every man has his twist;" and it may be what God "has given" to each individual, and on his regulation of it, as far as lies in his power, he may fulfil what is required of him, and what he will finally be judged by. Granting that the influence of this bias is as great as we can reasonably suppose, it by no means justifies the doctrine of the Calvinists; for the free agency of man, as far as he has the power to use it, must determine his responsibility. What God has given him, only forms the extent of that free agency, which it gives him sufficient room for the exercise of.

CC.

Those who are the most determined freethinkers in the early part of their lives, when their feelings are softened and the pride of their reason, which is so apt to overrate its own powers, is humbled by age, find themselves obliged to acknowledge the perfection of Christ, and in so doing they cannot but acknowledge his divinity.—Yes, (but the Sceptic will say) may not divine perfection be itself a gift? as we are told that “the just will be made perfect in heaven.” Cannot the supreme Disposer impart something of his own nature to a mere creature? Perhaps, probably if you will, he may: but that perfection must surely vouch for the truth of the words spoken by our Saviour, in which he assumed to himself a right to be considered as divine, “equally” and intimately with God himself: words which are attested as well by historical records, to the extent of the meaning I have given them, as by the blood of the martyrs, who died to witness the truth of what they had themselves, many of them, a perfect knowledge of.

CCI.

Horace’s “*affigit humo divinæ particulam auræ*,” may be applied to the influence which the state of the animal spirits has occasionally upon that of the mind, which cannot well elevate itself when they are depressed. But let not these different parts of our nature be confounded on this account: let not the

jailor and his prisoner be considered as on the same level: the prisoner feels the independence he is made for, and knows at what price the liberty to which he looks forward is to be gained. He knows whose "service is perfect freedom."

CCII.

The difficulty of satisfying ourselves, makes us overrate the difficulty of satisfying others, in our intercourse with them. There is a mixture of pride and humility in this, so strangely amalgamated are the ingredients of our nature.

CCIII.

Simplicity is nature and truth, and is equally opposite to affectation and vulgarity, both of which are the proofs of the want of right feeling.

CCIV.

If we look around us at our fellow-creatures, we are puzzled; if inwardly at ourselves, we are humbled. If the first begets humiliation, it must be from an assimilation of ourselves with others, as we are, individually, "the epitomes of all mankind."

CCV.

God has made us, but we too often mar ourselves.

CCVI.

There is a "balance," in which no one can

“weigh” himself, or know how much he may be found “wanting” in it.

CCVII.

Hypocrisy is sometimes a severer name for inconsistency, which is a milder, and perhaps juster, substitute for hypocrisy: and let no one blame the substitution of the milder for the severer term, till he has ascertained that we have a right to sit in judgment upon our fellow-creatures.

CCVIII.

The reception which one man gives to the addresses of another, may often depend upon the sense which the former has of his own superiority, or at least of his sufficiency, which, if rightly founded and supported, will exempt him from jealousy or suspicion. If he substitutes an overweening vanity for this, he will only expose his own folly.

Confidence is founded in a natural bias, or in early impressions and habits, and is sometimes increased, at least the shew of it, but as often diminished, or at least corrected, by social communication.

CCIX.

It would be well, sometimes, if those who object to any thing without having properly considered it, would prevail on themselves, not only “audire,” but also, agere “alteram partem:” that is, in considering what they would propose, in lieu of what they object

to. But these are "second thoughts," which are seldom, or, at least, too late consulted.

CCX.

What is possible, is within the reach of proof, either direct or collateral: though Mr. Hume asserts that a high degree of improbability (of which he makes himself the judge) precludes all evidence. But the things which are "seen" will vouch for the truth of those which are "unseen;" and reason requires no more.

CCXI.

One check to the communication of opinion, or feeling, is in the difficulty of finding people whose imaginations or intelligence are active enough to enable them to perceive the connection of the ideas which you may express to them. If they are deficient in that, they will not perceive, or at least will not feel the force, or truth, of what you communicate to them. They will not comprehend analogies, which must be more or less immediate or remote; the one or the other must imply some connection.

CCXII.

The substratum of our minds has perhaps as much influence on the superstratum (I should rather give them the more intelligible distinction of the heart and the head,) and its produce, as that of the earth which yields us its fruits: and the growth of the seed

which is sown "in the heart," depends as much upon that substratum, as that of the seed which is sown in the earth does: and both upon the vivifying and fecundating moisture which is necessary to favour their growth.

CCXIII.

The course and changes of life afford strong proofs how necessary experience is to guide and determine our judgments. In youth, the spring of life, all appears gay to us, all animates our hopes, with the confidence attached to them, not of a continuation of the natural spring, nor yet of its maturity in summer, but of the continuation and maturity of the joyous feelings which glow in our breasts, and secure us in our present enjoyments, and in that of each season, as it returns, and make us look forward to further and increasing enjoyments. When we have passed the "feverish summer of manhood," and are advancing in years, we look back upon what is past, we revise our opinions, we correct our errors, and we reflect on the short duration of each revolving season, and also probably on the disappointment which our hopes have met with, we anticipate as short a duration of what is to come; we observe the fall of the leaf, and sympathise with the decay of nature, a decay which we feel in ourselves: but we are still alive to the enjoyment of nature's beauties, and not satisfied with the impression which they make on our senses, (which perhaps was all that we felt in our youth,) and insti-

gated by the feelings which autumn inspires, we look through them up to their great Author ; and, all conscious as we are of our own weakness and unworthiness, we hope, from His goodness and mercy, and on the strength of the promises which he has given us in the Gospel, for a consummation of those enjoyments which our best feelings excite us to look forward to, when a new spring shall arise, and the storms of winter shall be buried in the silence of the grave. The present sense of this hope is an earnest of its future accomplishment : what the “ eye has not seen, nor the ear heard, nor yet the heart of man conceived,” that heart may still desire, and will not desire it in vain. If this hope is, as it must be, a trembling one, it will gain strength and firmness from the supports on which it has every encouragement to rely.—*Swinton Park, October, 1830.*

CCXIV.

In youth we act more than we think, excited as we are by all the objects around us ; in old age we think more than we act ; the mind dwells more on itself, for even garrulity must be supplied by its own recollections, if indeed they deserve the name of thought : and however it may be soothed by social enjoyments, it still sighs for a repose, which it can only expect to find when the journey of life is over ; “ in cœlo quies.” The “ atra comes,” care, must leave us then, whatever else it may give place to ; and is it not within

the scope of mercy to gratify the smallest expectation of it; and perhaps even to soften obduracy?

CCXV.

The impossibility of our reconciling the Divine attributes of justice and mercy with each other, seems to oblige us to look up alternately to one or the other, according as the disposition of the moment, or as the general temperament of our minds incline us: and this, with the consciousness we have of our well or ill doing, subjects us to the continual vicissitudes of hope and fear. The state of our animal spirits, too, has a great share in this; but that cannot be the sole agent, in a being endowed with reason and reflection.

Man's highest state of mental enjoyment is, perhaps, when all his faculties are alive to the free and unimpeded exercise of his reason. Such, at least, I feel to be the probably passing sensation of the present moment. Is this moral or physical? Both, probably.

CCXVI.

Truth is simple and uniform: the suggestions which it offers to the mind must in some respects, and those the most material, be so too.

CCXVII.

With all the aspirations of the human mind, with all its unsatisfied desires, its "longings after immor-

talities," we are so attached to the enjoyments of our present "pleasing anxious being;" so unwilling to leave "the warm precincts of the cheerful day," clouded as that day may be, and all the endearments of social and parental affection; so unprepared for the astonishing change that we have to undergo after our passage through the "subterranean road of the grave," that a degree of even the "dumb forgetfulness" of insensibility may be necessary to supply the deficiencies of our hope and trust in the mercies and promises of "our Father which is in heaven," and to overcome or deaden the feelings which make us say, with Young,

"What heart but trembles at so strange a bliss?"

But the goodness of God can calm these feelings, and can smooth the bed of death to our minds as well as to our bodies.

CCXVIII.

The "*γνωθι σεαυτον*" cannot probably be carried to a very great extent, from the difficulty, if not impossibility, of our discovering the secret springs of our actions and opinions; but it may be sufficient to enable us to observe, and be upon our guard against, our impulses, and to consult our second thoughts.

CCXIX.

Does not the first impulse to anger arise from a sense of injury, however mistaken it may be, from

the suggestions of our pride, which furnishes an excuse for the passion it excites? But the greatest injury done to us, may be by ourselves. If we reflect upon each case that occurs, we shall draw rules from it, that will apply to every future occasion: we shall be, as Cicero advises, "*severi sine acerbitate*:" that is, without the bitterness of wrath, on which we shall not "let the sun go down."

CCXX.

Man is liable to err, whether he deceives himself, or is misled by others, fallible and imitative as he is. He has therefore to guard against both.

CCXXI.

A state of doubt is, I think, that in which a being must necessarily remain, of whom "*errare*" and "*nescire*" are equally characteristic. One indeed is the consequence of the other: "*errat homo, quia nescit*;" and, above all, "*quia nescit dubitare*." But such a state does not preclude opinion, though it is incompatible with absolute decision, which belongs only to perfect knowledge: a state of doubt is a state of trial; and the assistance and guidances that are given to us, to direct our reason in the formation of our opinions, are our best consolations and encouragements in supporting that trial; and the consciousness of our very limited knowledge excites us to look forward to a future enlargement of it. Those who trust to their enthusiastic notion of "new lights,"

or to the suggestions of their erring reason, I believe, do it equally at their own peril, whatever they may plead in excuse for it. Both the one and the other opinions are founded in presumption.

CCXXII.

Familiarity may sometimes bring contempt, but probably oftener indifference: if contempt, it may revert on the person who feels it; for what room does it leave for either candour or modesty? The proverb, therefore, is a caricature.

CXXIII.

If a virtuous conduct is to be secured by the moral sense, and not by a calculation of its utility, (as Cicero justly says,) why should not the former be the regulating principle of religious belief also? If it is wanted in the first to prevent perversion, it may be equally so in the second to supply the want of comprehension, which is the only excuse for a disbelief or even doubt of a doctrine so pure in its morality, so strongly attested, and in all that is within the reach of our comprehension, so accordant with reason and feeling, as Christianity. To reason and feeling, therefore, its divine founder appealed, to enforce our reception of it.

CCXXIV.

There are things which, if we do not see, we ought to feel: and such feeling, when sanctioned by rea-

son, the proverb rightly describes as being "the truth." If we have not that feeling, we can have no perception of them : truth itself will be lost upon us.

CCXXV.

The conviction that we know nothing completely, makes us undervalue what we know in part only, but sufficiently for the purposes which are only partially developed in this our earthly and first state of existence.

CCXXVI.

The consciousness of our want of certain qualities sometimes makes us display that want more than we should otherwise do, even to taking a pride in it. There is an apparent absence of duplicity in this, that may gain us more credit than we really deserve.

CCXXVII.

It is certainly a privilege, for which we have reason to be thankful, that we not only take a pleasure in what we are actually enjoying, but also in the recollection of it afterwards, provided it is innocent, and still more if it is useful. If we feel any pain from the fear that we have not taken sufficient advantage of the opportunity given us of being useful, it may operate as an excitement to further exertion. The attribution of all this to a divine source must arise from a sense of religion, of the truth of which it is one of the strongest proofs that our feelings can give us.

CCXXVIII.

What is trite loses its effect upon us, however important it may be; as what is beautiful does, if it is common. We may, however, be influenced by the one, and exhilarated by the other, without our being conscious of it.

CCXXIX.

In old age we feel more strongly the value both of bodily repose and of mental activity, to which the continuity of loco-motion, and the change of external objects, are equally unfavourable: they do not leave the same room for the recollections and suggestions of a reflecting mind.—*Scriptis W. D. A.D. 1830, ætat. 78.*

CCXXX.

The human face divine, as it has been called, has traits in it which are expressive of those qualities, where they really exist in any degree, which the greatest painters have failed in their attempt to represent in the portraits of our Saviour, in whom they existed in the highest degree.

CCXXXI.

I know not what writer says, that it is not necessary to believe what we cannot comprehend. If carried to its utmost length, this would go to countenance atheism. But it may have been suggested

either by a disregard of the thing itself, or by a sense of dissatisfaction with the conclusions of the mind. It shews, however, a want of attention to the necessity which the mind has of a stimulus, to excite it in the trial which it has to undergo. Without that stimulus there would be no exertion, as has been manifested in the efforts that have been made in all the arts and sciences, to arrive at unattainable perfection.

CCXXXII.

The proof of a rational and active mind, is in its extent of thought and power of expression. The latter is the instrument with which it gives shape and substance to its materials, of which there may be a store for

Unfinish'd works that yet remain behind.

CCXXXIII.

If we had more knowledge, we should probably have too much: too much for our responsibility, for our feelings, for our enjoyments: our hopes or our fears, our presumption or our depression, might be too great for the present or future purposes of our existence: the increase of our responsibility might increase the call upon the justice of God, to the injury of His benevolence: if He knoweth whereof we are made, and that "we are but dust" and worms, the more we are the object of his pity: the more the smallest speck of goodness that is in us, if it pro-

ceeds at all from ourselves, may arrest the arm of that vengeance which cannot but be tempered with mercy: for otherwise it could only characterise an "all-devouring God," and earth would only be "the shambles of omnipotence:" the Manichæan himself would have no room for his two principles; for the evil one would alone have the sway, and the whole fabric of creation would be founded in malevolence, injustice and tyranny, and would only have destruction for its end; vengeance would have prepared its own food, without a drop or an atom of mercy or benevolence to sweeten it: or whatever there might be to make the "bitterness of our cup" more palatable, would prove in the end the deadliest of all poisons.

But "this cannot be:" we are as sure of the benevolent purposes for which our existence is here given us, as we can be of the reality of that existence; as sure as we are that man exists, so sure are we that "there is a God in heaven;" that we are His creatures, and the "images of Him" in our best qualities; the supreme of which is, as He is, "love."

CCXXXIV.

The highest degree of enthusiasm that feeling can excite, and reason countenance, may be expected on such a subject as that of the "Night Thoughts." An equal degree of feeling in the reader with that of the author, will sustain his admiration of what is sublime, and at least assist his intelligence of what is obscure. I know not whether any fault may be found

with the boldness of Young's expressions, as quoted above; but it is to be considered that his object was, if he could, to force the belief of the immortality of the soul upon those whose reason was perverted by their habits and propensities; which he could not do better than by representing the consequences of an opposite belief, and the character it would give to the Deity, whose justice and benevolence are so strongly manifested in the future retributions which are announced in the Gospel. I bless the day when I began to read Young's Night Thoughts; they have taught me to reflect more seriously than I fear even the Scriptures did; simple, strict, and concise, and sometimes obscure as they are, they want a paraphrase, which the Night Thoughts may be called; and the latter have the charm of poetry to engage the imagination as well as the feelings, and with all the force of reasoning that can be adduced; other paraphrases indeed are addressed both to the reason and the feelings, but both must be prepared to receive and to profit by them, which, I think, they are by the Night Thoughts.

CCXXXV.

Language seems both to expand and to restrict thoughts: one idea, when expressed, begets another: but expression is required to make it do this: without that, the unexpressed idea must itself remain in embryo, or at least must be unproductive: and expression must have its limits: half, or imperfect

ideas, however, may still remain, to be perfected, we hope, hereafter.

CCXXXVI.

The actions of men would be of very little importance in this life, if they were not of much greater in the next.

“ Life has no value as an end, but means ;
An end deplorable, a means divine.”

CCXXXVII.

The Confession at the beginning of our liturgy must be a great disburthenment to many, and indeed to us all, if it is the expression of our real feelings. And can it well be otherwise ?

CCXXXVIII.

If we attribute to God all the qualities that constitute moral perfection, our veneration of these must necessarily be a veneration of Him also : the one must imply and be inseparable from the other : and we may say, in the spirit, though not the exact words, of Young—

“ If virtue's real, there's a God in heaven.”

The existence and the qualities of supreme perfection are correlative terms ; if we reject one, we must reject the other also.

CCXXXIX.

Evil men are the scourges of God ; good, the in-

struments of punishment of the evil, sore as themselves may be with the wounds which the latter have inflicted. The actions of evil men are indeed often their own punishers,

— “ neque lex est justior ulla,
Quam necis artifices arte perire suâ.”

CCXL.

In the early part of our lives we compare earthly things with one another, in reference to our enjoyment and opinion of them, which then is much higher than when we become satiated with them ; and, as we advance in years, have a nearer prospect, indistinct and uncertain as it is to our absolute knowledge, of what we may expect in another life ; not uncertain as to the reality of that life, but as to what will befall us in it. Our best encouragement under this feeling is what we find in the Gospel.

CCXLI.

Our duty to God supersedes, or rather comprehends, all our other duties.

CCXLII.

The truth of Pope's sentiment—

“ Honour and shame from no condition rise,
Act well your part, there all the honour lies,”

is oftener acknowledged, than acted upon.

CCXLIII.

There is something savage in the nature of man, (for he, like the beasts, has his passions,) which is softened by gentler qualities, and sometimes corrected by his reason ; and his character and disposition are better or worse, as the one or the other prevail : and are the best of all, when exalted and purified by the love of God.

CCXLIV.

A man should be something of a philosopher to write a good play, whether tragic or comic ; for it requires a knowledge of human nature, which is a material part of philosophy.

CCXLV.

“ *Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien.*”

Yes, and not only in making the attempt at amendment the means of deterioration, but also in preventing our enjoyment of the “ *bien*,” by exciting our desire of the “ *mieux*.” So difficult is contentment, or rather, so difficult it is for us to know with what we ought to be content. Perhaps we seek to be at peace with ourselves, by directing our dissatisfaction to other objects. Must we then have a vent for this feeling !

CCXLVI.

There are some conclusions that solve every thing

without explaining any thing. Such is our reference to supreme wisdom and power, to supply our want of knowledge of efficient causes, and our inability to reconcile apparent contrarieties. But the reference is a sure one.

CCXLVII.

If good principles are made general, (universal I fear they cannot be,) the violation of them will be attended with more danger, the observance with more security ; which is probably all that can be attained in human society.

CCXLVIII.

What in one man's mind is dissatisfaction with his own powers of belief, in another may be a disbelief of the thing itself, or, at least, an inclination towards it: we should be cautious, therefore, in declaring our opinions, to prevent a misconstruction, or an undue advantage being taken of them.

CCXLIX.

A proper estimation and acknowledgment of the difficulties of an abstruse question, are, perhaps, the best means of producing an agreement between persons who entertain opposite opinions upon it. It is an appeal from their prejudices, or their biases, to the standard of reason and common sense.

CCL.

How trite is Horace's

"Ira furor brevis est," &c.

become! and yet how admirable it is! Is this an exemplification of the proverb, that "Familiarity breeds contempt?"

What a lethargy would our minds fall into, if our feelings did not now and then awaken them! Passions indeed do more: for the "furor brevis" may shew itself in different shapes.

CCLI.

How often do our prejudices and our habits supply the place of real opinion! and what strength do they add to it, when they are sanctioned by it! The very sense of our ignorance, increase as it will, may make some adherence to them necessary; for what else would there be for the varying needle to point at?

CCLII.

If Pope's

"Alike in ignorance, his reason such,
Whether he thinks too little or too much,"

is true, what is to supply the deficiency in man's power of acquiring knowledge? what, but the concurrence of his reason and his feelings, in judging of the information given to him, and in limiting his conclusions to what *that* enables him to make?

CCLIII.

If the objects of our "self-love" are "nigh" to us, we cannot wonder that they have an immediate influence over us, superior to those of "reason," which are "at distance," and "in prospect." But our recollections probably assist in bringing these to our nearer view, and in making them also the object of our self-love, which reason may be expected to be favourable to, if conformable to it.

If self-love is, as Pope makes it, the *primum mobile* of our affections, it must have a primary influence over our thoughts and opinions, as well as our actions: it is *that*, then, which we should first attend to, in forming and regulating them; our reason, with the information it has received, will enable us to do this.

CCLIV.

If a full assurance of, and confidence in, the power and mercy of God, gives such happiness as it well seems capable of, we cannot wonder or complain that it requires such pains to obtain it. The "*crede quod habes et habes*," must be a belief founded in certainty. But this does not authorise the persuasion of particular visitations, highly improbable as those are, except in particular instances.

CCLV.

Horace's description of his rustic acquaintance, "Ofellus," of whom he says,

*" Integris opibus novi non latius usum
Quàm nunc accisis,"*

may be considered as a model for those who wish to prepare themselves for an adverse change of fortune ; but if it is carried to an extent beyond what personally regards themselves, it will be a culpable neglect of the means they have of making a beneficial use of what they possess. Part of " Robin of Doncaster's" epitaph will be applicable to them—

" What I kept, that I lost."

CCLVI.

Sincerity and consistency are most to be expected and relied upon in those who respect themselves sufficiently to adhere to those virtues. Such, of whichever sex they may be, will be "*Justi et tenaces propositi*;" and the best security for this, with higher assistance, is in a desire to do that which is right, and in a well-founded consciousness of doing so. But how often have we to say, both of others and of ourselves, "*Alas ! poor human nature !*"

CCLVII.

If we write down and publish our thoughts, they will at least excite others to judge of and compare them with their own, if they are of sufficient importance to make it worth their while to do so. If they are trite or common, the attention to them will be either unnecessary, or will want no other excitement than that of habit, or frequent occurrence : though

there are few things of which we may not want to be reminded now and then. Even the advice to "warm our pocket handkerchiefs before we use them," (vide Dr. Hunter's "Men and Manners,") may be of some utility. *Experto crede.*

CCLVIII.

"Παντῶν δὲ μάλιστα αἰσχυνέο σαυτον."—(*Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ.*)

Respect for ourselves is respect for the God within us, who speaks to us through the voice of our conscience.

CCLIX.

I have heard persons ridiculed for saying their private prayers aloud, as if they thought that necessary to make them heard by the ear, which is ever open to sincere ones, inaudible as they may be by others. But it should be remembered, that in any earnest addresses to our fellow-creatures, we often speak loud, to engage their attention; and as the immediate effect of our prayers is on our own minds, (which indeed has been very foolishly made a reason for doubting their having any other,) the loudness of our utterance of them both expresses and increases that effect, and may obtain the hearing of our Heavenly Father by the sincerity which both accompanies and is added to them. "*Leves dolores loquuntur, ingentes silent,*" is not applicable to those pains which are alleviated by hope. Our prayers, therefore, will be expressive of what they excite.

CCLX.

The Unitarians must acknowledge the doctrines of Christianity, even in the confined sense which they give to its mysteries, to be above the comprehension of their reason; should they not, therefore, raise their belief of them to a higher standard than what the mere suggestions of their reason, or rather of their pride, afford? What height can exceed that which is presented to our view in the character of our Saviour? Should we have no diffidence in judging of the source of that morality which our utmost efforts cannot bring our practice to a level with? Christ would not say, "Be ye perfect, as I am perfect;" but he did say, "If ye love me, keep my commandments:" can the love of God rise higher than this?

"No," the Unitarian will say, "but Christ was commissioned."—Has he given us no reason to think still higher of Him? Is not the imitation of Him that of God himself?

CCLXI.

The omnipresence of the Deity must surely imply and be accompanied by His omnipotence; for where an Almighty Being is present, nothing can happen but with His permission, if not by His immediate ordination. In all circumstances whatever, therefore, we have to pray, that His "will may be done."

CCLXII.

In the gloom of winter, or of the approach towards its greatest depth, we console ourselves with looking forward to the enjoyments of spring, and with contemplating the provisions that nature has made for it: in like manner we console ourselves in the winter of life, with the prospect of another and a happier life, promised as it is to us: both these consolations are necessary to cheer our depressed minds; the truth of one we know by experience; the same necessity will vouch for the truth of the other, which we cannot have experienced: the authority of the Gospel, therefore, was wanting to give certitude to it. Thus we catch at every twig that meets our eyes, but we cling fast to the tree of life in the Gospel.—*Swinton Park, December, 1830.*

CCLXIII.

Obscurity in writing is attractive, as it shews thought, ingenuity, and invention; but these are worth little, without taste and judgment.

CCLXIV.

Life has its pleasures; but the only real ones are those which are doubled on reflection; and they are most felt in the encouragement they give to hope for more.

CCLXV.

Life is an ordeal trial; but the furnace of Nebu-

chadnezzar had only power over those who lit it for an evil purpose.

CCLXVI.

We should love our enemies, as our duty to God enjoins us; and this is, as Pope makes it, the expansion of self-love :—

“ Is this too little for thy generous heart ?
Extend it, let thine enemies have part.”

But friendship requires congeniality: “ inter bonos.”

CCLXVII.

He who has power over the natural world, has the same power over the moral: the effects of one are periodically, repeatedly, and quickly shewn: those of the other are the result of a trial, and though more distant, are sure and permanent.

CCLXVIII.

Who that has proper feelings—and all others are little better than caprice, or passion, or sensual excitement—who but must be deeply sensible how fast he, or she, no matter which, is “ tied and bound with the chain of his sins,” how much he is the sport of his humours and propensities, and how earnestly he has to pray to his Heavenly Father that “ the pitifulness of his great mercy may loose him,” for the sake and through the mediation, and “ for the honour” (if that is the right term for the tribute paid)

of our blessed Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ," the only recorded model of humanised perfection, and our only Mediator and Advocate.

CCLXIX.

When we say that we are happy, we speak either from comparison, or from momentary feeling; when we say we are contented, we speak from previous determination, or from constitutional or habitual influence: for a feeling mind will always have a sense of its capacity (proved by its desire) of higher happiness than it does or can enjoy here: a sense which is increased by actual enjoyment.

"Nihil est ab omni parte beatum."

CCLXX.

It would be well if every one had the same recollections and the same feelings that Horace had when he wrote his "*Causa fuit pater his.*" We have, however, to look to a higher "Father" for any blessings we enjoy. I have both: but not with equal gratulation to myself: not even with Horace's "*ut me collaudem.*"

CCLXXI.

A reflecting mind will not be engrossed by any particular feeling, however strong its impulses may be. This absorption is probably reserved for another world, where alone resides the beauty of perfection. In this—

"All subsists by elemental strife,
And passions are the elements of life."

All is therefore discord, resolution (not always into harmony,) and contrast. Did this suggest to Rousseau the idea that the perfection of music consists of sounds in unison? It is possible, indeed, that he may be right; for to urge the effect of harmony upon our organs, imperfect as he says they are, would be begging the question. Harmony may be resolved into simplicity, from which all emanates: unless, indeed, we are to call it the highest possible degree of concentration. Do not men's characters become more estimable, as they are more simple? For what is simplicity, but truth? And where are we to look for that, but to the source of perfection?

CCLXXII.

We may sometimes be unwilling to acknowledge a feeling, from our not being aware or not considering that it is common to all mankind, and that we cannot assume to ourselves an exemption from it, unless we are more or less than human. Pride, indeed, may possibly lead us into this error, or at least into the appearance of it, and perhaps a fear of ourselves.

CCLXXIII.

In Green's poem on the Spleen, a remedy is given for it in this witty allusion to David's killing Goliath—

"Throw but a stone, the giant dies."

This comprehends the "age quod agis:" the mind, as well as the arm, must be employed in it.

CCLXXIV.

Trite thoughts may sometimes have an importance given to them by expression. I know not whether this is the case with mine.

CCLXXV.

Horace seems to have felt that his interesting description of himself, and his daily habits, to his friend and patron Mæcenas, in his 6th Sat. lib. 1. required no apology for its egotism. He felt the

— "sume superbiam
Quæsitam meritis,"

and that he might well say,

"usque ego posterâ
Crescam laude recens,"

though he looked no farther than to the

"dum Capitolium
Scandet eam tacitâ virgine pontifex."

What the

"Annorum series, et fuga temporum"

will do, yet remains to be seen: and who will see it?

CCLXXVI.

A tête-a-tête between a loquacious and a silent or meditative person, must often exhibit a contest between folly and spleen. Good nature and good sense

must be the mediators; and self-command the guarantee.

CCLXXVII.

I have said that a state of doubt is a state of trial; which it surely is; for hope implies incertitude, and hope is founded on faith, which must rest on information. Still, however, the mind has an ardent desire of more certain knowledge, destructive as that would be of its enjoyments in this "middle state." The vicissitudes of life are on a par with the waverings of the mind, and the preponderance of good or bad in each may determine the degree of happiness or misery that we enjoy or suffer in this life, and what we may expect in the next.

CCLXXVIII.

With the pressure of remorse that we must sometimes feel, and which the slightest deviation from rectitude must give to a sensitive mind, what would be our state if we were not told, that "when the wicked man turneth away from his wickedness that he hath committed, and doeth that which is lawful and right, he shall save his soul alive." But what is the "lawful and right" required? An earnest endeavour to do our best. But how often may we be reminded of the mercy of God, by the consciousness how much we stand in need of it!

CCLXXIX.

Rational enjoyments are doubled when they are

meditated upon : more indeed than doubled, for they raise our minds to the fountain from which they flow, and which itself issues from the rock of our salvation.

CCLXXX.

It has been said, and I believe truly, that man would have no reason to complain, considering the advantages he has over the rest of the creation, if he had not had the hope and the promise given him, on certain conditions, of another and a happier life. This, then, shews the bounty of God, which so much exceeds the demands of his justice. But, it may be asked, will not his mercy admit of claims that cannot be made upon his justice ? We should take care not to lower our estimation of ourselves so much as to make the majesty of God incompatible with any regard to us His creatures ; as was done by that foolish philosopher, the King of Prussia, under the suggestions, perhaps, of his own conscience. But are not the advantages enjoyed by man, let him be what he will, balanced by the sufferings he is liable to ? Is not a compensation hoped for, balanced too as that is, by the fear of our not meriting it ? Well, then, may the mercy of God “ reach unto the heavens.” But what a dreadful claim must there not be upon his justice, when his mercy is forfeited by the violation of its conditions ! When impenitence has passed “ the eleventh hour !” Happy may those be, who anticipate it ; anticipate it, from the fear of its arrival ; or from the better motive of their love of God.

CCLXXXI.

Natural religion may be considered as the stock on which Christianity is engrafted. Natural religion is, perhaps, the fruit of instinct: revelation appeals to reason: reason properly used.

CCLXXXII.

It is very seldom that the mind is in a proper state of calm: its duration is very short, and we are more sensible of it, than able to trace it to its causes. General equanimity may be partly constitutional, partly the result of effort, and confirmed by habit.

CCLXXXIII.

In the proneness of humanity to err, we may reasonably hope that a greater allowance will be made for it, than the sense of our unworthiness will now permit us to be assured of. This sense, indeed, is probably one of our best securities for it. The God of Mercy will grant it to those who feel and acknowledge their want of it.

CCLXXXIV.

Nothing can add more to the expression of our feelings than laying our hand on the arm of him to whom we are expressing them. It is an *argumentum ad fratrem*, a kind of animal magnetism, an electric chain, that conveys the fluid to the breast of him whom we are addressing ourselves to, if he has feel-

ings to receive it, and if the address is worthy of exciting them. It disposes him to sympathise with us, and to listen to us with the same confidence that we seem to place in him ; accordingly it is introduced into the conversation between Yorick and the Mendicant Friar, in the “ Sentimental Journey,” and it is much more interesting to me to recollect it in one whose example I most wish to follow, and whose memory I have the most reason to respect ; my own father. This expression of natural feeling is surely among the most pleasant that can be given, received, or recorded : and if all that accompanies it is in concurrence with it, we cannot well doubt of its sincerity. It has the feeling of truth, and should only be expressive of it.

CCLXXXV.

When we consult our reason, its deficiency of comprehension, and our sense of its power over us, may make us hesitate in assenting to what is “ beyond the reaches of our souls :” when we consult our feelings, and fairly examine their accordance with our reason, they will, if they are of the right cast, make us sensible of what it is both our duty and our interest to acquiesce in, and we believe and trust to it. Reason has, amongst its other powers, that of fixing its attention on whatever object it chooses, and of fairly exercising (without which it would not be reason) its powers upon that. This will be with a due mixture of feeling, which will make us sensible of what most concerns us, and will bring that home “ to

our breasts and bosoms." If reason diverts the attention from these, and judges of its objects solely by its own powers of comprehension, the sense of their deficiency will make it hesitate in giving its assent: but when it adverts to all that is connected with the object most interesting to us, it feels a new impulse and assistance in the influence which is forced upon it. The concurrence of our reason and our feelings, the sense of our duty and our interest, will no longer permit us to doubt of the conclusion we are to draw, supported and enforced as it is by authorities that we cannot reject.

CCLXXXVI.

Besides the danger of comparing ourselves with others, in order to excuse "what we have done," and "what we have left undone," there is this further objection to such comparisons, viz. that no one knows himself sufficiently to be fully able to make them. We are, therefore, as little able to "judge ourselves" as to judge others. Both are reserved for a higher arbitration, to which we see that St. Paul himself left it. This should serve to keep us in awe, as well as in excitement; to impel, and to restrain us.

CCLXXXVII.

We are "the temples of God," and He is "within us:" for He is "not the God of the dead, but of the living," both here and hereafter. Happy, then, are they who feel, even in this sublunary state, the pre-

sence of Him, in whose presence they live, invisible as He is to them. Within ourselves, therefore, as His temples, our prayers must be first addressed, first heard, and first attended to.

CCLXXXVIII.

Men's passions, when they are strong, keep them continually at variance with themselves, as being more or less in opposition to their reason: and the mutability of their humours, inflamed by that opposition, requires a correspondent change in the objects which are calculated to divert them. Novelty is essential to this. But when one predominant object engrosses the mind, all the passions become subservient to the pursuit of it; and the desire and incertitude of its attainment supplies the place of novelty, which itself is no more than a revolving circle of vicissitudes. When the engrossing object is attained, satiety or disappointment generally follows, and a void is left, which no further novelty can fill. Well therefore says Young,—

“ Why is a wish far dearer than a crown ?
That wish accomplish'd, why the grave of bliss ?
Because, in the great future buried deep,
Beyond our plans of empire and renown,
Lies all that man with ardour should pursue ;
And He who made him, bent him to the right.”

Can we, then, doubt of what ought to be the paramount object of our desires and pursuits ? No satiety

or disappointment need *then* be feared, for the value of the object must be fully adequate to the difficulty of its attainment: and that difficulty we shall surely be assisted in overcoming.

CCLXXXIX.

The enjoyments of life become in time so familiar to us, that we are apt to consider them as matters of course, which, constituted as we are, we could not have done without. But we should consider, that we might have been differently constituted, so as to have done without them, and at the same time have been precluded from the pleasure they now give us, and which calls so loudly for our gratitude to the Great Being from whom we have received them. His benevolence is equally shewn in fitting us for the enjoyment of them. The want of more is the realisation of the fable of the dog, which dropped the bone in catching at its shadow. The discontent which impelled us, and the loss and disappointment which followed, are our punishments: our regrets may be an anticipation of something more, which, however, when properly used, they may prevent.

CCXC.

To the instances which I have quoted from Pope, in No. CXXII. of the songs of the "Lark and Linnet," we may add that of the blackbird,

"Whose bolder note is heard from far,"

and the lower, and rather garrulous note of the thrush, both, different as they are, pleasingly expressive of the happiness of the animal, and of its attention to its mate during her incubation ; and, still more, the harmony with which the black-cap (*motacilla atricapilla*,) and other birds of passage fill the woods in the spring : all expressive of the same feelings, but all yielding in sweetness to the nightingale, which, “ most musical, most melancholy ” as it is, by no means justifies Virgil’s

“ *Qualis populea mœrens Philomela sub umbra
Amissos queritur fœtus,* ” &c.

nor yet his calling it a “ *miserabile carmen.* ” For the songs of birds must express very different feelings ; those only of the happiness they enjoy, the interest they feel, and the praise they give to their Creator for it ; while

——“ *Man superior walks
Amidst the glad creation, musing praise,
And looking lively gratitude.* ”

For he too has an ample share of the general enjoyment : what then should be his gratitude, for this anticipation of a far higher happiness hereafter, when all the “ fulness of his joy ” will be centered in Him, in whom he hopes and trusts ! and what would that hope and trust be, if they were not confirmed by the promises of the Gospel !

CCXCI.

When a spaniel crouches at the feet of the master who has just beaten him, we give it the opprobrious name of fawning. It is indeed a demonstration of humble subserviency to the being to whom he is attached, and on whom he depends, and perhaps also of the sense of his having merited the correction he has received; for if that has been carried too far it will produce nothing but fear. And let us stigmatise this fawning as much as we please, and as we may think it deserves, is it not more than balanced by the fidelity that accompanies it? If the animal was impelled by any other motive, would it not subject him to a caprice incompatible with that fidelity? In how many things beside that, have we not to imitate the animal who lies at our feet, in our obedience to a Master who is so infinitely superior to us in all the qualities that demand our attachment; and who never corrects us but for our good, which we are sensible of, if we think and feel. In our fidelity to Him, we ought to follow (in spirit, though not in fact,) what is recorded by Mr. Mason, I believe, in the following very pleasing lines, inscribed in a gentleman's garden in Yorkshire, over a dog who had given a very remarkable proof of his attachment.

"Fidelity lies here; whoe'er thou art,
Stranger, that deign'st to view this humble shrine,
Go, and transplant the virtue to thy heart;
'Twas once a dog's, be proud to make it thine."

CCXCII.

Life is feeling, for thought is feeling ; and what is life without thought ? He, therefore,

——“ who made man, has bent him to the right.”

This bent may undoubtedly be perverted, and both thought and feeling may be banished from the mind, and selfishness, or the madness of impulse, substituted in their stead ; but if both these will not ruin us here, neither of them will benefit us hereafter : and even here there can be no true enjoyment of life without feeling, and the charity which it inspires : charity in giving, charity in forgiving and forbearing : of giving, we may say with “ Robin of Doncaster,” (giving judiciously, for thought is required here too,) “ That I gave, that I have.” But the latter is not to be purchased but by giving both time and attention, as well as money, otherwise the motive must be a mere selfish one, to obtain what cannot be so obtained. We live not for ourselves only, but for others also ; and, above all, we live for the service of our Maker. If we serve Him truly, we shall not have been “ unprofitable servants ;” at least to our fellow-creatures and ourselves.

CCXCIII.

All qualities, whether good or bad, are incidental to human nature : the application of either must depend on the knowledge and discretion of those who

consider them ; and of the suggester of them we may say, that—

——“ his satire like a wild-goose flies,
Unclaim'd of any man.”

But I am afraid that the search after the ill qualities (and I hope the good ones too) is not always “ a wild-goose chase.”

CCXCIV.

All is so subordinate to, and so necessarily flows from one great source, that all our ideas, when carried to their utmost extent, must terminate in a reference to Him.

“ Tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis,
Principium, vector, dux, semita, terminus idem.”

BOETHIUS.

CCXCV.

The “ many mansions,” which our Divine Master has told us, there are in “ His and our Father’s house,” and the “ few” or “ many stripes” with which the rebellious children, who are perhaps excluded from it, are “ beaten,” plainly indicate a state of rewards and punishments, of which the highest of the former are far above our sight, and the severest of the latter, so shocking to our feelings, that the horror of it in a manner forces us to substitute annihilation in their stead, which no doubt is in the power of the supreme Disposer, but for which we have no authority given us in the sacred writings,

which speak only of what is most calculated to excite our hopes and our fears, and to induce us to the observance of the conditions on which the promises of mercy are given. How far the justice, which must be one of the Divine attributes, may be tempered with mercy, we cannot know : but the tender and sympathizing mind naturally shrinks from the idea of the extremest of all sufferings, and seeks its resource in a total cessation of all that can give either happiness or misery to fellow-creatures, void as they may be of tenderness or sympathy themselves.

CCXCVI.

The good that Christianity has done, may not be apparent to every mind, or even to common observation, mixed and alloyed as it is with the evil inseparable from the influence of the human passions: and we can only judge of any present amelioration from a comparison of it with the state of society as it was before the introduction of a religion, whose effects we may be too apt to attribute to other causes: but it is impossible that a system so excellent in itself, and so enforced by the most powerful evidence as Christianity is, should not have been productive of good, when offered to a rational creature like man, although a sceptical observer may not distinguish fairly between the good which it has, perhaps indirectly, done; and the evil that has, in spite of it, subsisted in human affairs, and has even been aggravated by the abuse and perversion of its doc-

trines. It tells us itself that the "kingdom of God" is yet to "come:" but it has prepared the way for it, and given a warning voice to those who are told to expect what must be necessary for the completion of a system of universal justice and benevolence.

CCXCVII.

A proper respect for oneself includes all the virtues; a want of it admits of none. Without prudence a man can neither be just nor generous; without fortitude he can neither protect others nor himself; without charity he can have no real benevolence; without temperance no equanimity. Finally, a failure in any one of these deprives him, at least, of a part of his self-command: for if he does not defend all his posts a breach will be made, at which his great enemy will enter. But so frail is his nature, so inadequate are his forces, that he cannot do this without assistance; he must, therefore, "watch and pray."

CCXCVIII.

A proper pride is self-respect: an improper, self-conceit. Those who reprobate all pride, seem to forget that we have two opposite principles within us: we must set one in opposition to the other; we must respect and confide in one, distrust and struggle against the other. He who formed us with both, will assist us in the struggle: Him, therefore, we must look up to, and rely upon, in respecting the good principles in our nature, which He has made

it both our duty and our interest to cultivate and follow.

CCXCIX.

It is in the moral, as in the physical agency of man. In both we are liable, more or less, to contract impurities, and in both it behoves us to avoid them, and, when contracted, to cleanse ourselves from them as much as we can. "Wash you, make you clean." *Isa. i. 16.*—"Cleanliness," says the proverb, "is next to godliness."

CCC.

Mercy, as indeed all judgment, must be preceded by a trial; and there can be no trial, where there has been a predetermination to acquit or condemn. Does not this set aside the Calvinist's pre-election? Prescience there must be; otherwise the knowledge of God, with respect to futurity, would not exceed that of his creature man, who can calculate upon probabilities: but prescience does not imply predestination, though we cannot distinguish between them: but we may be sure that some degree, at least, of free agency is necessary to responsibility, the sense of which is equally necessary to ensure the moral conduct of man, and to justify his acquittal or condemnation. Thus we have certain knowledge to guide our opinion on one side, and only a deficiency of it to create doubt, or to justify a variety of opinions on the other. Perhaps it will be said, that He to whom "all hearts are open," must know what will be the

fruits of their dispositions : and this knowledge is probably necessary to regulate His mercy : but this cannot, surely, be incompatible with the free agency of man : and what must be the train of reasoning that could throw any doubt upon the attributes of God, especially (perhaps) His mercy ? That excluded, where would be the use of prayer, which is so strongly enjoined to us ?—But—how much do our doubts betray our ignorance ! Well is it, when they do not lead us into presumption.

“ Not deeply to discern, not much to know,
Mankind was born to wonder and adore.”

“ And to adore, assuredly, for ever.
The feelings that attended us through life
We shall not lose, when death has ta'en us hence :
No ; they will be immortal as ourselves ;
This hath the voice of reason whisper'd to us,—
And what she said, Religion has confirm'd :
The ear has heard it, and the heart received it.”

CCCI.

Writing our thoughts is a pleasant, and may be a useful way of “ communing with ourselves :” it is a revision of our opinion, or, at least, lays a foundation for it. Will all this, and all that is relative to it, end with this life ? No, surely not : what we thus “ sow,” we shall “ reap.”

CCCII.

What dissipates must, more or less, interest : for how else is it to divert the attention of a preoccupied mind ? An unoccupied mind requires no dissipation,

which there cannot be, where there has been no collection.

CCCIII.

Some characters may appear to us in a worse light than they deserve, from a pride, or false shame, that obscures their best qualities. Others, from vanity, attempt to make a display of more than they really possess. The first is the failing of elevated minds; the second the mark of little ones.

CCCIV.

Let a thinking man converse with others as much as he will, and accommodate himself to them as much as he can, his best and most interesting conversation, though perhaps not his most satisfactory one, will be with himself.

CCCV.

Life is a lot of good and evil; we may modify the one, and make the most of the other, but they are often so connected, that we cannot get rid of one without losing the other also. All that we can do, is to make the good a counterpoise and an antidote to the evil.

CCCVI.

General confessions, such as those in our liturgy, are necessary to supply the want of a more particular knowledge of ourselves than we can obtain. "Who can tell how oft he offendeth?" We may, however, have some knowledge of our chief propensities.

CCCVII.

Want of comprehension would be a strange reason for disbelieving a thing, as that very want deprives us of the power of choosing between reception and rejection, unless there are other substitutes for the comprehension wanted. A negative proof may be as valid as a positive one, where we can examine either side of a question, which we must be able to do, to give us the power of judging between them. If one side is highly objectionable, can we hesitate in our choice, supposing it necessary that we should make it? and supposing also that our reason and feelings are both of the right kind.

CCCVIII.

To alleviate the anxiety and the fears which the severity of some of the parables and declarations of the Gospel gives us, it seems necessary to suppose that they are meant to be applied to extreme cases: as that of its being impossible for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven: that of the talents, in which the holder of one talent had it taken from him, for having neglected to use it profitably, &c.—This may alleviate our anxieties, but cannot entirely remove them, as our natural indolence, or our evil propensities, must be attended with the consciousness of our indulgence of them, and of the power they have over us: and the confession of “what we have done, and what we have left undone,” and

the prayer for the forgiveness of it, must be ever in our hearts and on our lips, whether our heads are on the pillow, or our knees on the cushion.

CCCIX.

“ Paul may plant, and Apollos may water, but it is God that giveth the increase.” How simply, how plainly, how pointedly, and therefore how powerfully, this is expressed ! It is the genuine language of truth.

CCCX.

“ The Lord loveth him whom He chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom He receiveth,” may alarm those who have passed, if such there are, a prosperous and untroubled life ; but perhaps the terror, or, at least, the anxiety they feel, may itself be considered as a chastisement, and may serve the purpose of adversity, or any other scourge, by the salutary awe in which it keeps them. Where there is sensibility, this awe must be felt ; where there is not, no real happiness can be enjoyed : the same sensibility will make them equally susceptible of pleasure and of pain ; and a total want of sensibility shuts the door against every virtue, and opens it to every vice that the passions, or a brutal self-indulgence in lieu of them, (for mere sensuality hardly deserves the name of passion,) can give rise to. Idiotcy alone can make insensibility and innocence compatible with each other.

CCCXI.

There may be a strong persuasion, and even conviction, where there can be no certain knowledge: and this I apprehend to be the case in religious belief, which is founded on a due mixture of reason and feeling, each of which acts in its proper province, and within certain limits: if there is a deficiency, or a perversion of reason, fanaticism is the consequence; if of feeling, scepticism, and perhaps something still worse. I think we cannot repeat that passage in Scripture, "Surely there is a God who governs this earth," without being sensible that the assurance is derived from a mixture of reason and feeling, which would not have been made to concur, if the action of each had not been necessary, as an aid to the other. When one is neglected, or too much trusted to, error must be the consequence: and, I think, we may reasonably attribute to this, in part at least, Rousseau's saying, that "if he had even seen the miracles of our Saviour performed, they would have confounded, but not convinced him." True; they would have confounded his reason, which had objects brought before it, through the medium of the senses, which it had no power to account for: he could not disbelieve his eye-sight, but he could draw no conclusion (which is an act of the reason,) from what he saw, but that it proceeded from a cause which his reason could have no cognizance of, and which was as much above human power as human comprehension. His

reason would not have allowed him to attribute it to dæmoniactal agency, as the Jews did, and as they still do, prepossessed as they were, and are, with their ancient opinions and expectations, and blind to the moral excellence which proves the divine origin, and the benevolent purposes of Christianity, in addition to, and confirmation of, the many other proofs by which it is supported.

CCCXII.

Compensation—retribution. How loudly do they proclaim that there is “another and a better world!” and how strongly does the Gospel give us the assurance of it! If we had more intelligence, this life would not be such a state of trial as it is, and we have knowledge enough given us to afford hope to the good, and terror to the bad. “Patience and perseverance,” those “pillars of human peace on earth,” soften the severity of the trial, and life still attracts us by its enjoyments. The hope of futurity, stimulated as it is by desire, never fails; the terror may not always prevail, and, where it does not, its failure may seal a sentence of condemnation that a sensitive mind shrinks from the contemplation of.

CCCXIII.

The real equality or superiority of one individual to another, can only be shewn in the respect which each pays both to himself and to the person whom he addresses himself to. All improper pride or arrogance

therefore is incompatible with this, because it is so with justice.

CCCXIV.

If a man is honest himself, he will distinguish and feel the value of honesty in others; that is, if he is simple without being a simpleton. If he is not honest, he may see and approve of that quality in others, but it will be in spite of himself; his approbation will be a forced one, embittered as it is both by envy and hatred; no kindly sympathy will be excited in him.

Indeed, in neither sex (such is our nature) is there a willingness to give credit to others for what we do not possess ourselves; as for example:—

A SCENE.

Cet enfantillage vous plait-il donc?—Oui; car j'aime la belle nature.—Mais comment belle?—Ne la trouvez-vous pas? Comme vous êtes injuste! Ah! Je vois que vous êtes jalouse: eh bien, je tacherai de vous appaiser, en vous mettant au nombre des belles natures.—Quelle impertinence! Et croyez-vous que je vous tiendrai compte de la sincérité de votre compliment?—Je commence à croire que rien ne peut vous satisfaire; restez donc dans votre jalousie.

CCCXV.

Of all our dangers perhaps the greatest is in prosperity, which takes away the stimulus of necessity, and leaves us exposed to all the temptations of idleness, “the root of all evil.” The void left by the

removal of necessity will be filled up by some of, or all, the passions. Perhaps, however, it will be said, that the ill dispositions which prosperity, with its attendants—ease and affluence, brings into action, would have shewn themselves under opposite circumstances, for envy, ambition, and other passions, may be felt in a low condition of life, though an active and daring mind is more required in that to supply the want of other encouragements. The mode, indeed, in which those passions are displayed, and their influence on society, may be different, as are the means of making that display. Those means, which are the qualities of our minds, and our situation in life, may be reckoned among the “talents” which we are responsible for the use of. Exertions may be produced by necessity, but the direction in which they are made must be determined by the qualities and the situation of the individual. For the former we must perhaps go back to the early habits implanted in him by education and example, and particularly by his mother, and also to what was given to him by nature, or, more properly, by the great Author of it. On this is founded the doctrine of Calvinism, which, however, it does not justify in all its conclusions.

If the passions are strong, they will shew themselves in the actions they produce, in one state as well as another, and the mode in which they shew themselves will depend much on the preponderance of good or bad qualities in the individual. The only difference will be in the diffusion of the effects which

they have on society : the good or bad example, or influence, of the poor man cannot be equally felt with that of the rich, nor of the weak-minded with that of the strong. The responsibility attached to each must be determined by a far higher knowledge than we can have of the human heart, even in ourselves. Our individual responsibility must depend on the knowledge and power which we have over ourselves, and in this respect, as in others, it may be said that "knowledge is power;" for our control over others ought, at least, to be equalled by that over ourselves: we should be "*sibi*," plusquam aliis "*imperiosi*." If we give up the latter, when we may avail ourselves of it, we do it knowingly and voluntarily; we are aware of the sacrifice we make, and are reminded of it by the remorse we feel.

CCCXVI.

The interference or non-interference of the Creator in the affairs of his creatures must be altogether voluntary. He may leave causes and their effects to their natural (as we call it) course of action, or He may determine it by the immediate interposition of His power, as He thinks fit. From hence, probably, arose that foolish idea of Voltaire's, expressed in one of his letters to the King of Prussia, that "there is a supreme Governor, but that his power is limited." Yes, it is limited and determined, but only by His own will in the exercise of it, which is probably regulated by the trial which He means to make of the

creatures among whom the good or evil prevails, which must subsist either by His ordination or permission.

“ Dieu tient en main la chaine, et n'est pas enchainé,”

says Voltaire, more properly, elsewhere. Yes, every link of that chain depends on Him, and is alterable or removable at His pleasure.

CCCXVII.

It is when we endeavour to penetrate into the causes of things, that we are puzzled: a simple proposition may be self-evident, but when we examine all that is connected with it, we are so embarrassed by the perplexities we find, that it even begets a doubt in our minds of the truth of the proposition itself.

If, however, we had no doubt whatever arising from imperfect knowledge, respecting the mysterious doctrines of our religion, an excitement would be wanting of our endeavours to prove the truth of them. Our faith, therefore, and our mental abilities, are both tried, and what better use can the latter be put to, than in the cause of religion and virtue? Whoever would separate these, can have no firm adherence to either. They would have nothing but a broken pillar to lean against; and the only object left for them to worship, or respect, would be the idol which their own vanity had set up.

I think it appears, from what I have said above, that mental exertion, especially on so interesting a subject, must be excited by the want of satisfaction, as well as the desire of satisfying others as well as ourselves. This is a necessary stimulus to the spirit of investigation, the exertion of which increases our attachment to the object of it, which is ever in our view, but never within the reach of our attainment; for who can deny, that the perfection of morality is exhibited in the Christian system? or the model of it in the character of our Saviour? And who can hope to raise himself to a level with that model? When the practice is so unattainable, can we wonder that the mysteries are equally incomprehensible? and do they not both teach us a lesson of humiliation?

How audacious are the Unitarians, in attempting to break the connection which subsists between the faith and the doctrines of the New Testament, and to separate the parts which that connection proves to be so necessary for the support of each other!

CCCXVIII.

Analogy, which Young justly calls "man's surest guide below," I think, strongly corroborates the idea that there must be different degrees of intelligent beings (perhaps angels and archangels,) above us, as a continuance of the gradation which we see prevails upon the earth. Perhaps some of those superior beings are the immediate messengers (ἄγγελοι) of

God, and also His subordinate agents with man ; we justly, however, consider the Deity as omnipresent himself. (So Young, Night Thoughts)—

“ My prostrate soul adores the present God :
Praise I distant Deity ? He tunes
My voice (if tuned :) the nerve that writes, sustains !
Wrapt in His being, I resound His praise :
But though past all diffused, without a shore,
His essence, local * is His throne, as meet,
To gather the dispersed, as standards call
The listed from afar : to fix a point,
A central point, collective of His sons,
Since finite every nature, but His own.”

This may be considered as being as descriptive as an indescribable thing can be made : the meaning and the spirit are apparent ; the fact cannot be made so. We may farther suppose that “ central point ” to be actually the focus of light also ; as it does not seem probable that the source from which all light emanates, should itself be placed in, and surrounded by darkness ; when the Psalmist says, that “ Light and darkness to Him are both alike ; ” he must mean the presence or absence of our solar sun, whose light was the only one that he could conceive : but a far superior light must surround the throne of the Eternal ; and the glories and beauties of the creation must there be eminently conspicuous. The mode of perception of them by spirits of the highest order, we can form no idea of : but we may well suppose that

* Perhaps rather a moral, than a physical locality.

their highest enjoyment is in bending before the throne of their Creator.

“ And shall not praise, not human praise be His,
When heaven’s high hosts on hallelujahs live ?”

Granting, as I think we may well do, that there probably are beings of a higher order between us and the Supreme, the next question is, whether man may expect a higher elevation, and this is best answered by the desire he has of it, and the encouragement given him to hope for it: dreadful would be the repetition of earthly enjoyments, the miseries that life is subject to, and the pains that accompany the approach to death, if it were not for this hope; the value of it is best appreciated by those who most need it, though observation and reflection may impress it on those who have not themselves felt the want of it.

CCCXIX.

The ascension and resurrection of our Saviour, “ the first fruits of them who sleep,” is surely no small corroboration of our expectation of a future life; and its incomprehensibility by us is no argument against it, lost as that incomprehensibility is among the numerous others that surround us. It may be incomprehensible to our reason, but it is not to our feelings, and both have been given us: given us to assist each other.

CCCXX.

“ The Lord my pasture shall prepare,” &c. Is not

“shall” somewhat too peremptory here? Would not “will” equally express confidence? He will—I know He will—I know it, because he has promised it, and because his will is directed by mercy and benevolence. If I have any doubts, they must arise from the sense of my own unworthiness; and how is that to be supplied, but from the Fountain of all goodness?

CCCXXI.

There must, I think, be a lowness of conception in, I will not say all, but certainly in too great an assimilation of human feelings to divine; of the *amor humanus* to the *amor divinus*. The former, I believe, cannot be entirely spiritualised, though the more it is so the better. The best refinement of the *amor divinus* is, I think, in tempering it with awe, as it surely ought to be; and the knowledge of ourselves must produce this.

CCCXXII.

One of the encouragements, and perhaps not the least, of our hopes of future happiness, is the sense of the mind's capacity for it, as evinced by its desire of it. This, then, should make us wish for the acceleration of it; but it seems rather to have a contrary effect, in making us wish for a continuance of the state in which we enjoy the pleasure of looking forward to it. This hope, then, has the singularly opposite effect of preparing us for future happiness, by

giving us a desire of it, and attaching us to our present enjoyments, by making that hope a part of them. Were it otherwise, indeed, self-preservation (for which, however, we have other motives) might be less an object to us. For this reason, too, the hope is balanced by incertitude, arising from different causes, and it "turns us o'er to death alone," for that "ease" which in this life we cannot enjoy.

CCCXXIII.

A general sense of their own weakness and imperfections, and a general trust in the mercy and benevolence of God, are the feelings of those who think seriously. To these are superadded the belief of the doctrines of Christianity; a belief which is partly the result of education and habit, confirmed by the examination of reason, unsatisfied as that is with having been taught, as a lesson, what it finds very sufficient grounds for adopting as its own choice. So Young says, (Night Thoughts)—

"Wear I the blessed cross, by fortune stamp'd
On passive nature, before thought was born?
My birth's blind bigot? Fired with local zeal?
No: reason rebaptised me when adult;
Weigh'd true and false, in her impartial scale:
My heart became the convert of my head;
And made that choice, which once was but my fate:
On argument alone my faith is built," &c.

This decision of reason must be formed on a just regard to its own powers and duties. Incompetent

as the first are to the solution of all difficulties, they will both authorise and require it to say, "I believe, help thou mine unbelief." Nor will they suffer it to lower its belief to the standard of its own comprehension.

CCCXXIV.

"Vanitas vanitatum, omnia vanitas," is as humiliating, and at the same time as consolatory a conclusion, as any reflections on ourselves or our fellow-creatures can bring us to. Humiliating, as it deprives us of all individual merit, and sinks our importance into nothing; consolatory, as it brings us *in formâ pauperum*, into the only court in which the plea of "guilty" will thoroughly avail us, in which the nature and extent of our guilt will be fully known, and where no counsel will be wanted in our defence but the mercy of our lenient Judge, whose "fidelity and justice" in forgiving our sins, and in "cleansing us from all unrighteousness," will be fully excited by the sincere confession of "a broken and contrite heart,"—broken into contrition by the sense of its own unworthiness, but soothed and encouraged, and even enlivened, by its trust in the promises of Him, whose "mercy is everlasting," and whose "truth endureth from generation to generation." As therefore we are to "go into his gates with thanksgiving, and into his courts with praise," so may we "serve him with gladness, and come before his presence with a song: for we are his people, and the sheep of his pasture."

In the hours of prayer and penitence, when all hearts are prostrate at the throne of mercy and of grace, they are all on the same level, for all have sinned, and are liable to temptation, however we may think ourselves secured from it by "new lights," which are contrary to reason and common sense, as a disordered imagination can make them, or by a fancied "regeneration," which, indeed, is held out to us as the proper object of our endeavours here, but which can never be within the reach of our complete attainment: for it is only in heaven that "the just are made perfect." Let us not then deceive ourselves: assuming a merit in the notion of a fancied communication, is much the same as if we took it to our own credit; one is not less the suggestion of our vanity than the other. Let us also guard against paying more regard to the distinctions of society than a due respect to ourselves admits of. Prospects of a higher kind, with hopes and assurances, are given to us, and on these we may lay a firm hold: but the mercy which is final, and the truth which is eternal, can only be evinced and consummated when the trial, severe as it may be to us, is over, and when time shall be lost in eternity.

CCCXXV.

What is eternity? Duration without succession. What idea can we form of that? None whatever: exist, however, it must, in Him who is himself eter-

nal, and to whom "a thousand years are but as one day."

CCCXXVI.

"Thy nature, immortality! who knows?
And yet, who knows it not? It is but life
In stronger threads of brighter colour spun,
And spun for ever," &c.—*Night 6.*

This life, then, is a portion, and a beginning, of what has no bounds, and will have no end.

"From old eternity's mysterious orb
Was time cut off, and cast beneath the skies:
The skies, which watch him in his new abode,
Measuring his motions by revolving spheres!
That horologe machinery divine," &c.—*Night 2.*

So far, then, analogy helps us: or rather antithesis: the opposition of time to eternity: of temporary succession to uninterrupted and endless duration.

CCCXXVII.

The mind's exertion of its own powers is very sufficient to shew that there is much beyond them; and the glimpse that it catches of this is as sure a proof that it is within the reach of higher intelligence.

CCCXXVIII.

What is really worth the mind's attention, both admits of, and requires it. It is always in our sight,

and can never be out of our power, at least of our consideration.

——“ in the great future buried deep,
Lies all that man with ardour should pursue ;
And He who made him, bent him to the right.”

CCCXXIX.

How much of our happiness depends upon the thoughts which occupy our minds, and upon the suggestions which those thoughts gave rise to ! And how much may be added to these, by social communication.

CCCXXX.

The sense of interest, combined with, and strengthened by habit and example, seems to be the chief bond of union in society. If that sense is founded on good moral and religious principles, sanctioned by reason, it will be permanent in itself, and in its effects upon our minds, in disposing us to do our duty to God, to our fellow-creatures, and to ourselves.

CCCXXXI.

What is meant by a “ sure and certain hope ?” Is it not a contradiction in terms ? Certitude can only be attached to possession, though the continuance of that on earth may, and must be, more or less uncertain. But, as far as regards feeling, hope may have as strong a hold on the mind, and perhaps stronger, in the animation it gives to it, than certitude itself; and

upon the strength of this feeling, the idea of a "sure and certain hope" is probably founded. The feeling itself must go hand in hand with religious belief.

"What future bliss he gives thee not to know,
But gives that hope to be thy blessing now."

ESSAY ON MAN.

CCCXXXII.

Christianity may be said to have added to our information, but not to our knowledge ; that is, not to the knowledge which requires an increase of our mental powers to make any addition to it. It has informed us of mysteries which are far above our comprehension, and which, therefore, we must believe upon trust in that information : and our ideas of a Supreme Being remain much the same, in the eye of reason at least, as are expressed by Virgil's

"Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum."

Or Lucretius's

"Os homini sublime dedit, cœlumque tueri
Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus."

This, however, Lucretius seems to have considered as no argument against his Epicurean system : a proof that a revelation was necessary to convince mankind of the agency of a First Cause.

Lucretius's poem is an instance of the vanity of our endeavours to hide our ignorance by giving names to what can have no real meaning, however ingenious

the attempt may be. We see the Creator only through his works, which we attribute to an agency worthy of them, however abstracted that agency is from all our powers of conception.

“ Os homini sublime dedit, cœlumque tueri
Jussit,” &c.

Quis jussit ? Quis, nisi Deus ? omnipotens, æternus
Deus. Causarum prima, et sola.

CCCXXXIII.

Belief of moral truths must depend greatly upon the moral inclinations of those from whom the belief is required ; for by these the reason will in good part be influenced ; and what nearer connection is there, or can there be, than between morality and religion ? “ I believe, help thou mine unbelief,” is the language of a heart already gained : and, “ muovere è vittoria.” And, we may add to this, that it is the language of reason also ; for the enthusiasm of a heated imagination would not be so expressed.

CCCXXXIV.

There will always be an incompatibility in the claims of the different orders of society ; for though all are equal in the sight of God, by whom real worth alone is estimated, the distinctions of society will not allow them to be so to each other, at the same time that they feel an equal right to be so, as fellow men, and indeed will be so, as long as they observe that regard which is due, both to others and to themselves.

But the incompatibility above-mentioned arises from the influence of the passions, which will not allow men to accommodate themselves to their situations in life, and which “undo what reason has weaved,” and what nature has designed, who gives her sanction to nothing which has not that of truth, which must subsist in the necessary relations which things bear to each other.

CCCXXXV.

Respect is often paid to rank and situation in society, when not personally due ; but appearances, at least, must be kept up, to authorise it ; where they are not, avoidance is the necessary resource in lieu of that respect which cannot be personally paid without a violation of what is still more incumbent upon us. This avoidance will be the more felt, as it accords with all the duties which Christianity prescribes to us, and is a tacit reproach for the breach of them.

CCCXXXVI.

In all cases of personal attachment between the sexes, the less sensuality there is the better ; for whatever degree of sentiment may be mixed with it, it is still the part that draws the human nearer to the mere animal nature ; and not the less so for the sentiment that may be mixed with it ; for the comparison must be made between the two ; Moore’s—

“ O the heart that has truly loved, never forgets,
But as truly loves on to the close,”

ought to be, and will be true, if that love has its proper seat in the mind. And, look we not forward to a far higher love than any that the excitements of this world can inspire? Young most truly says,

“Virtue alone entenders us through life :
I wrong her much ; entenders us for ever.”

For virtue must be immortal. Nothing that is really good, can be lost ; for it must have come from God, and will return to, and abide in Him.

CCCXXXVII.

If the mind of man is continually in search of truth, every suggestion of his reason and feelings united, must have a tendency towards the perception of it.

CCCXXXVIII.

The aims of man are almost always beyond his strength ; and, if he fails in the attainment of them, disappointment follows of course, which indeed it will do, even if he succeeds, at least, if the object is not a really valuable one : for Young truly says,

“Why is a wish far dearer than a crown ?
That wish accomplish’d, why the grave of bliss ?
Because, in the great future, buried deep,
Beyond our plans of empire and renown,
Lies all that man with ardour should pursue ;
And He who made him, bent him to the right.”

If my reader cries, “This is a beaten track,” I may answer, with Young,

——“ Is this a track
Should not be beaten ? never beat enough,
Till enough learnt the truth it would inspire !
Turn the world's history,” &c.—*Night 8.*

We were created by an Almighty Being, who has given us faculties and affections: the first of the former is reason; of the latter, love. This He has enjoined us to feel and to shew towards our fellow-creatures, as to ourselves: but, above all, to love Him who made us, “ with all our hearts, our souls, and our strength :” our love of our fellow-creatures is to be the consequence of that, as an obedience to His great command.

CCCXXXIX.

The mind of man is in so much want of exhilaration, in this scene of troubles and cares, this “ vale of sorrows,” that it is hard to say what degree of seriousness is consistent with the real enjoyment of life, serious as that is in its future prospects. Much will depend on the power of self-command, which ought to be exercised by a creature endowed with the faculty of reason. For this, fortitude and exertion are required; but as we are all, more or less, subject to the vicissitudes of our animal spirits, as well as to the misfortunes which occasionally afflict us, or those with whom we may sympathise, we want something more to enable us to bear up against these “ assailing” evils, and we shall find that our best resource is in religion, and in the “ patience and resignation” which

that recommends and enjoins, as "the pillars of human peace on earth."

There are, indeed, some whose buoyancy of spirit or levity of mind seems to exempt them from the sufferings of mental affliction, as Voltaire says, whether truly or not,

" Le ciel a fait les hommes légers et vains,
Pour les rendre moins misérables."

And there are others, and those perhaps the most numerous, who depend on their social communications, or on the pursuit of some particular object, to preserve them from mental depression; and these sometimes (too frequently) use improper or immoral means to effect their purpose; so much does Providence leave in our power, by the use or misuse of our agency, to attain the enjoyment, whether real or fancied, more than the true and laudable purposes of our existence. These men may often put a fair outward semblance on their conduct and demeanour, but are generally, if not always, more or less liable to their own self-reproaches, and to the discriminating judgments of others. They will be "known by their fruits."

CCCXL.

Men's passions are always at work, producing the same effects by different means, and in different degrees, as circumstances impel them: these passions are counteracted by their habits, their prejudices or

principles, their reason, or by their other passions. When the passions which are at variance with the peace of society rise to a certain height, they break out into action, and the mischiefs they produce make men sensible of their errors, though not sufficiently to guard them against any future impulses of their passions: for it will continually happen, that

“What reason weaves, by passion is undone.”

CCCXLI.

Perhaps the best reason that we can have for distrusting the authority of great men in their judgment of human affairs, is, that they are apt to be too much influenced by abstract principles, the application of which to practice must be determined by experience, which they will not wait for. A great mind will have a system of its own, formed upon the highest notions of rectitude, and suggested perhaps more by their wishes than by their judgments.

CCCXLII.

General health is general freedom from sickness, and general strength in the constitution to preserve itself from it. If an individual is attacked by disorders, their variety and different effects upon the human frame, may urge the constitution to efforts that will gradually weaken its powers, and render it more and more liable to sink under its inability to resist those

attacks. So it is with a state; abuses introduce themselves, and gradually increase, till they provoke the attacks upon it, which the sense of those abuses, irritated by the freedom with which it may be expressed, and by the desires which it excites, gives an impulse and encouragement to.

CCCXLIII.

I know not whether the best way to prepare ourselves for the worst that may happen, is by anticipating it, for that would be to give room for our fears to suggest as a probability what we can only consider as a possibility, the infliction or prevention of which must depend on Him whose will is fate. As a possibility we must regard it, considering the mutability of all human affairs, and the apparently destined round which they are to take. Nothing can here be permanent: if it was, this life would not be a trial, preparatory to a state in which no changes can happen, and in which the supreme will alone is fully consummated. In our country, the remains of the feudal system are modified by a popular representation, the influence of which, favoured by public opinion, and by the preponderance of wealth over rank, seems to threaten the dissolution, or at least a material change, in our system, which will best be met by recurring to the principles on which the balance of its several parts is maintained.—*Hastings, February, 1831.*

CCCXLIV.

Perhaps one of the strongest proofs of the effect of circumstances upon our minds and the conduct of our lives, is in that effect being shewn in different, and sometimes even opposite directions; for a man may display opposite qualities at different times. If this is true, it follows that circumstances may be more powerful than habit, and possibly than nature herself, however true may be what Horace says of her,

“ expellas furcâ tamen usque recurret.”

The circumstances which I have alluded to are so various and so difficult to be traced to their primary source, that we can hardly say whether what we ascribe to nature, is not rather to be ascribed to them. This conclusion, however, would not be justified by a general observation of the characters both of men and animals, and we may not unreasonably cite the observations lately made by the craniologists, in proof of a contrary supposition; for character appears from them to have no small connection with the structure of the human frame. We may also cite the authority of Scripture, in its reference to what “ God has given to man,” as determining what “ will be required of him,” in the use which he makes of what has been given him. We are, in short, the instruments of Supreme Power: and to that instrumentality even our boasted, and often misused, free agency is itself subservient: and without the exercise of that supremacy,

we may say that God himself could not, as he so often does, make evil finally productive of good; productive of it even in the transient concerns of this world, insignificant as it is, when compared with what is eternal.

CCCXLV.

If in the examination of mysterious subjects, we adopt ideas that common sense cannot authorise, we run great risk, to say the least, of falling into error; for neither our imagination nor our feelings are to be trusted, unless they are sanctioned by our reason: our best security then, with the aid of Providence, must be in "thinking right, and meaning well."

CCCXLVI.

Our responsibility perhaps begins where the "humanum est errare" ends. Our chief security is in religion, which, accordant as it is with reason, will save us from such errors as I have mentioned in several preceding numbers.

CCCXLVII.

If we have contracted a habit which is in any way wrong in itself, we ought sedulously to avoid it, whatever excuses we may find for it, in our misconceptions, our mistaken feelings, or even the infirmities of our nature, against which we ought to pray for assistance, at the same time struggling with all our force against what we are convinced is wrong in itself.

If a married woman sacrifices appearances, she can have very little merit, or even excuse, in the eyes of the public, and if she should abstain from the commission of the crime itself, it cannot be from much regard for virtue, or for any part of her duty as a wife: she has sullied her reputation, and injured that of her husband, and given an example to others of what she may well be suspected to have practised herself. If both parties violate the marriage vow, they are equally guilty in the sight of their Maker, and neither of them can be an excuse for the other; both have committed adultery. The forbearance, indeed, of the wife would give her an additional merit, and would, perhaps, in more than one sense, "heap coals of fire on the head" of her husband.

CCCXLVIII.

What is our duty must necessarily be our highest interest, though we may not find that always fulfilled in this life, in which

"Virtue and vice are at eternal war."

The justice and benevolence of God must then be fulfilled in another state.

It is surely impossible that a state so imperfect, and so liable to changes and reverses, as that of human life, should not be succeeded by one more perfect and more permanent. How else are we to look for the full effect and supreme dominion of Divine benevolence? It is surely equally impossible

that man, who is subject to all the evils incidental to the first mentioned state, should not have a compensation given him, unless he has forfeited it by his immoral or irreligious conduct, or by a culpable neglect of his duty. If the troubles which he undergoes in this life are to be tranquillised only by the dead repose of annihilation, where is the compensation, which can only be made by a transference to a state exempt from the sufferings which he experienced in that from which he has been removed? That compensation, to be real, must be felt: and what feeling can there be in a state where all existence is at an end? No, no; the vivacity of our hopes, the acuteness of our fears here, sanctioned as they both are, cannot be the preludes to such a final consummation. But if the compensation may reasonably be expected both from the mercy and the promises of God, his justice also must be satisfied by a contrary retribution, where that justice demands it. That justice, we are assured, will be tempered with mercy, towards his frail and peccable creature man; but what mitigation, or even remission, of punishment it admits of, we are all unable to conjecture. The condition on which the sinner is encouraged to expect it, is in his "turning away from the wickedness that he hath committed, and doing that which is lawful and right." So shall he "save his soul alive."

CCCXLIX.

If we look around us, and find one breast in which

no drop of the milk of human kindness remains, we may then venture to say who is out of the reach of God's mercy. We may presume that the " hearts which he has hardened," were already far advanced in obduracy. Let us not, however, presume upon the small remains of virtue, that the indulgence of our vices may have left us ; it may prove, at last, like the man's house that was " swept and garnished," only to make room for the " seven wicked spirits to enter in and dwell there." Consciousness, confession, and repentance, are the best human means of preservation from sin.

CCCL.

If what is wrong is not too much of our own manufacture, we may be sure that all will be set right at last.

CCCLI.

Sensualists may, and do approach to the brute creation : they have, however, one advantage over the beasts of the field or the forest ; they can distinguish personal beauty and even mental expression : lust, therefore, has other motives beside natural appetite : reason itself is made a pander to it.

CCCLII.

Inscription for —, at —

Quod Deo debes, Veneri das : sed cave.

Probably, however, this would be *et risu receptum et dimissum* : unless, indeed, the classical ele-

gance displayed in the whole of this little seat of pleasure, beautifully as it is situated, the taste and judgment shewn in the furniture and internal decorations, &c. may encourage a hope that the owner and contriver of all this will apply it to a more creditable purpose than in making it subservient to mere sensual gratifications ; a perversion that almost precludes the hope of better things. For where is the “ life,” to afford a “ hope ?”

CCCLIII.

For what our tastes, judgments, &c. dictate to us, we are not responsible, for they differ, and “ sua est cuique sententia :” but for the suggestions of pride, envy, jealousy, or any other passion, we surely are, more or less. If we have passions, we have also reason to control them : and, if we are not entirely governed by selfishness or obstinacy, we shall, sooner or later, regret our not having consulted our reason in resisting our self-indulgence, or our impulses, in what regards a work, whether public or private, being “ done,” or “ left undone.”

CCCLIV.

The passions may be said to be the excess of feeling, if the latter term was allowed to the passions of hatred, envy, malice, lust, &c. But the different impulses, come from what source they may, must not be so confounded, nor will our consciences let them.

CCCLV.

We can commit no violation of what is right, without its recoiling upon ourselves. Self-correction, or sinking deeper into guilt and misery, are the alternatives between which we have to choose.

CCCLVI.

Whatever ennobles and elevates the character of man must be founded in truth: for the height to which his nature aspires, is the seat of truth itself; the fountain from which it issues. This is never more strongly felt than when men sacrifice their fortunes and their lives to the conviction of it: and when the sacrifice is sanctioned by reason.

CCCLVII.

The members of the Christian, and especially the Protestant Church, do not profess their attachment to it so much from any professional interest which they have in it, as from the sense of their duty to adhere to what we are told that "the gates of hell will not prevail against."

Interest indeed, and, if you will, self-interest, of one kind or another, governs us all: the only difference is in the narrowness or extent, the truth or fallacy of it. So truly says Young,

"Whate'er the Almighty's subsequent command,
His first command is this; man, love thyself."

For which social love and social charity are equally necessary. These feelings will make an "alter idem" of every object of compassion that we meet with.

CCCLVIII.

The mortifications and discouragements which we meet with in the impositions upon our charity, add a double force to the precept, "Be not weary in well-doing."

CCCLIX.

The effects of suffering from poverty, or from any bodily or mental affliction, are not so much shewn in the ability to reason upon them, plausible as it may be, as in a stronger proof given of the feelings of the heart. What cannot be expressed may be fully felt, and this distinguishes those who are real objects of compassion.

CCCLX.

Horace's

——"Nihil est ab omni
Parte beatum,"

may not only mean, that a being so variously constituted as man, cannot be perfectly happy in all his attainments, but that no one of them, subject as they are to alloys, can give him, even for a time, that degree of happiness that he naturally wishes for. There is, indeed, only one object that can. Hope, therefore,

——"turns him o'er to death alone for ease."

An ease which he is best encouraged to hope for, by having done his duty here.

CCCLXI.

The admonitions given by St. Paul (1 Cor. vii.) are not to be understood as being meant to be followed literally, nor perhaps is it easy to say to what extent they are so meant, and therefore they must be considered as a check to the excess of our attachment to the objects of this world, and as a counter-active to the desire of attainment, or grief for the loss of them, by placing higher objects in our view. Our hopes of happiness, either here or hereafter, must depend on our reliance on those objects.

CCCLXII.

Men cannot see that we are “unprofitable servants,” because they feel and are benefited by the services which we can render to them: but God sees it, who cannot be benefited by our services. His “praise,” therefore, can only be obtained by the obedience which we pay to His commandments: to serve, we must obey Him. This and gratitude form

“The only tribute man has power to give.”

Our Maker can have no other object in accepting our services than as they justify the mercy which His benevolence will incline him to shew to us.

CCCLXIII.

To Him, to whom all times are present, all actions and events must be known as if they were so too *. Successive observation belongs only to man. That we cannot conceive this, is no reason for our not believing it.

CCCLXIV.

Shall I be permitted to finish and to send this little book into the world? If I am, I shall owe it to the mercy of God, not to any claim or merit of my own; and whatever may be my views in publishing it, my most reasonable hope and expectation must be in the good effect it may have upon myself. The rest, in this age of levity, fashion, and discordance, I must leave to Him who knows, and at his will can govern all hearts.

CCCLXV.

Most of the commerce of this world is a contest of opinions, interests, prejudices, habits, pretensions, influence, &c. all dirty enough to be sure, and often disposing us to throw dirt upon others, but with more or less decency, and shew of urbanity: our observation of it through this veil does not, indeed, give us the most favourable idea of human nature, which, however, we should counteract with the "charity" which St. Paul recommends, and in the sense and description which he gives of it; enforced

* By immediate observation.

by the precepts of our religion, which tells us that we are all in want of a helper, mediator, and advocate, and that we should

“ Forbear to judge, for we are sinners all.”

Distinctions, however, we cannot help making, and indeed ought to do so, but only to know what we have to follow, and what to shun. And these judgments must not be final ; nor will they, if we consider the self-correction which others may make, and which we too ought to make ourselves : without this, it may be said of us,

“ *Quam temerè in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam !*”

CCCLXVI.

True liberality is guided by reason ; liberalism is governed by impulse : one has the passions in subjection, the other is a slave to them : one has the good of mankind in view, and would build on a solid foundation ; the other on a sandy one at best : one is a beneficent master ; the other a tyrant, made more so by the consciousness of its own tyranny, and revenging itself upon others for the pain which its own sufferings give it. Liberality, in short, is true wisdom ; liberalism, folly and madness.

CCCLXVII.

The “ door of mercy” may sometimes “ be shut on mankind,” in the maintenance of power, as well as in the acquisition of it. In the first, it may be excused

by the provocation given and resistance made, for which, however, a gentler remedy might have been found, if human fallibility had admitted it: for the second no excuse can be made, but the ambition which excited it, and which is its greatest crime.

“ By that sin fell the angels ; how can man then,
The image of his Maker, hope to thrive by it ? ”

Good, indeed, may come out of the evil produced by this sin : but can the perpetrators expect to share in that good ? He who permitted and ordained it only knows.

CCCLXVIII.

Men's actions do not always accord with their principles, but are often altogether at variance with them ; so much is the

——“ *video meliora, proboque ;
Deteriora sequor,*”

exemplified : and this variance will take a contrary direction ; for men may indulge in theories, which, if followed in practice, would lead them into excesses, that something within them prevents their imitating : what that something is we cannot tell, nor how its influence upon the inclination is determined, however confidently a Calvinist might ascribe it to the predestination of supreme power : but we know that in certain cases God may harden the heart, as He did that of Pharaoh, who rendered himself still more deserving of punishment, which he had already made

himself liable to ; and free agency, if greatly abused, may be entirely forfeited. That man is born a free agent, is indispensably necessary to his responsibility : the reconciliation of that free agency with the prescience of God is impossible by us, His finite creatures : but both must subsist, or else His power and man's free agency would both be incapable of exercise : the Calvinist's attempt, therefore, at a solution which he is incompetent to make, involves him in the admission of an absurdity. Man's responsibility must probably have a beginning and end, both in proportion to, and determined by what has been given him by the Power which knows no limit but those which the attributes of its possessor, infinite, or, at least, perfect as they are, contain in themselves. To that perfection, "first" and supreme, as the unenlightened (if unenlightened) Plato saw it, our intelligence cannot reach, though our conclusions cannot stop short of it.

CCCLXIX.

The pursuit of a train of thought is in following a chain of consequences : the end of this is the necessary admission of a problem, if problem it may be called, which we cannot solve. This, therefore, must involve a confession of ignorance. A train of thought must probably begin with a truism : the "major" of a proposition must be admitted, or the whole must fall to the ground ; and a self-evident truth is the best foundation of a superstructure that reaches to the

inexplorable heights I have mentioned. So high do the "pinions" of imagination, "trembling" as they are, "soar," when upheld by reason. Is not this a sort of mental "tower of Babel?" Harmless, however, surely, if accompanied with a sense and confession of blindness. A train of thought, however, if followed too far and too widely, may lead into error: if this is the case, the more concise and comprehensive a maxim is, if well founded, the safer and surer it will be. The "major" of a proposition, if admitted, must have its "minor" and its "consequence," which the reader will draw, if he knows how to reason.

Imagination may perhaps be sometimes called intuition: but for this it must, unless it is a "new light," bear the sanction of reason: it would otherwise be an instinct not meant for man, endowed as he is with reason, which these "new lights" cannot be a substitute for. I may see, or think I see, a thing immediately, and as it were intuitively; but the ultimate appeal must be to reason. And our Saviour has made it.

CCCLXX.

One mark of mental ability is the being able to make a thorough comparison of the different styles in which authors have written, and of their treatments of the subjects they have written upon. I must confess that I have been too much engrossed by my own thoughts, to allow me to do that: but a man who

runs may read, and perhaps as well as one who sits with a book in his hand in his study. If

“ The proper study of mankind is man,”

it is best learnt in the throng of the world, with a just observation of each individual in it. What I have most to reproach myself with, is my not having stored my memory with a greater number of passages from authors, to strengthen and illustrate moral reflections. But is not Horace sufficient for this?

“ Omne tulit punctum,” &c.

CCCLXXI.

Dryden observes, that Virgil even tosses about his dung with dignity :

“ Sparge fimo pingui,” &c.

But how will this appear in a literal English translation?

Spread with fat dung, &c.

Is it merely sound that covers and adorns the nakedness of sense? Sometimes it supplies the want of it.

CCCLXXII.

“ Tu, quamcunque Deus tibi fortunaverit horam,
Gratâ sume manu, neque dulcia differ in annum.”

Surely not; our “ daily bread” will be little enjoyed, if not immediately, and that enjoyment encouraged by hope, and supported by patience, resignation, and

reliance. Active we may be to a certain degree ; patient we must be, to what degree it may be required we know not, in this vale of sorrow, cares, and troubles—but of amusements too—ay, surely ; and they divert our minds from its attention to whatever might lessen the enjoyment of them. So is the “ bitter ” sweetened which is “ thrown into our cup : ” but the “ hope ” which

“ Predominates, and gives the taste of heaven,”

must come from, and look to, a higher object.

CCCLXXIII.

“ IT IS FINISHED.” These words affixed the last seal of truth to the greatest and most important dispensation that ever was made, or could be made, to man.—*Hastings, Good Friday, 1831.*

CCCLXXIV.

Whatever we may think of the immediate interference of Providence in the affairs of this world, it seems more reasonable to suppose that the Supreme Being has preordained a general chain of causes and effects, correspondent to each other, and that He neither directly orders, nor has predestined the particular doom which the Calvinists suppose. This is the more likely, as we see that the natural consequences of good or evil do not always immediately follow. The good, however, attracts the good, and the bad the bad ; the latter from interest, the former

from interest and sentiment united. The first comfort and encourage each other, the second make their associates worse, and consequently more miserable. The final consequences are reserved for the final consummation; the intermediate ones happen under the knowledge and general preordination of Him, to whose view all times are present: and thus it is in this world as it most probably will be in the next, when the happiness or misery of the moment will be that of all eternity.

CCCLXXV.

Probability prepares men's minds for events, imperfect judges as they are of it: but there is still a possibility which is independent of this; and with God all things are possible. Possibility remains, and hope with it, till life is extinct: but the hope which is founded on certitude, looks forward to another life, and has the sanction of Divine assurance, to those who fulfil the conditions on which it is promised. "*Invisibilia non decipiunt*," was the somewhat quaint inscription under a representation in Young's garden: but the invisibility is only to the corporeal eye, not to the eye of faith; of faith founded on reason. For as Young says,

" Reason pursued is faith; and unpursued
Where proof invites, 'tis reason then no more."

There is no real agency, that is not to us invisible; for visible agents are only the instruments of

Him who is invisible himself, but whose eye is over us all.

CCCLXXVI.

Truisms must be more or less obvious, but the consequences to be drawn from them may often require more consideration than many are disposed to give. A limited capacity, or an inactive mind, will acknowledge a truism, without drawing any consequences from it, or thinking any more about it. Such a mind, having nothing to find in itself, will have recourse rather to what will amuse, than to what will instruct it. Its only resource will be in the exercise of its "strenua inertia," whether in jockeyship, sporting, ("battues" particularly,) or in the ruinous pursuit of gambling, or in drinking, &c.

Let us oppose to these that calm cheerfulness, which is never more delightfully felt, unruffled as the mind then is, than in the autumn of life: the state of the mind at that time, and what ensures it, cannot be better described than it is by Young:

"Soul, body, fortune; every good pertains
To one of these; but prize not all alike:
The goods of fortune to thy body's health,
Body to soul, and soul submit to God."

With all these rational enjoyments, however, the weariness of life may occasionally be felt in all conditions of it, especially after a certain age, and is given to us as a preparation for our quitting it; and the desires and enjoyments that still remain, may as

justly be supposed to prepare us for another state, for which this life is a trial. This weariness is, in some degree, felt at our homes, attractive as the proverb describes them to be : the same repetition, and consequent satiety, attends us there ; and the effect of it is increased by the decay of our strength and animal spirits, which disposes us to a more serious use of our intellectual powers. But though even our earthly home does not impart to us all its former enjoyments, we still cling to it, and, if absent from it, feel a desire to return to it, partly from the wish for repose, and partly from a sense of propriety, as we draw nearer and nearer to the long and last home, for which we are to change it. Thus is the acquiescence of our minds made to accord with the conditions and necessities of our nature ; and we may surely presume, sanctioned as the presumption is by our reason and our feelings, and by the highest authority that we can refer to, that what is to follow after our death, will equally accord with the best feelings and wishes that we can experience or form during our lives. What our “ hopes ” or our “ fears ” suggest to us in our present state, supposing them to be excited by the sense of our good or evil deeds, will be realised to us by the justice of God, or pardoned by his mercy “ hereafter.”

True as all this must be, the incomprehensibility of it by our minds can only give way to the strength of the evidence for it ; and the awfulness and importance of the thing itself, should surely incline us to

resign our incompetency into the arms of implicit belief, or, at least, to say, "Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief."

CCCLXXVII.

There are some, of whom it may be said, that if they had learnt more, they would not have known so much, or, at least, not so usefully; for what they have learnt, may have confounded their minds, or if they have not "too much knowledge for the sceptic side," they may have learnt just enough to incline them to it: not the scepticism of ignorance, but of presumptuous confidence and self-conceit. It is better to be a

"Rusticus, abnormis sapiens, crassâque Minervâ,"

than such a scholar; and perhaps that is also better than to give way to the foolish fancies of a heated imagination; though indeed the idea of "new lights," may be more consistent with good intention than with reason, and therefore more to be excused by the "humanum est errare." But the best guide that we can have in judging of these matters, and of the information we have had concerning them, must be our reason, to which our Saviour himself appealed. If that is right, and rightly listened to, the heart will be right too, and both will dispose us to repeat, "Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief."

A man may lose himself in the multiplicity of his acquirements. The judgments which they lead

him to form will be influenced by his passions, prejudices, or habits. He can only judge partially at best, and should therefore, at least, do it with diffidence and self-distrust.

The most powerful minds are apt to overlook what lies immediately before them, and in the extent of their vision to lose sight of themselves, and of “*quod magis ad se ipsos pertinet* :” or, if they pay any attention to these objects, they see them in false lights, (whether “new” or not,) and with self-delusive views. If they entertain any diffidence of themselves, it is not by a comparison with those around them, for they estimate themselves in proportion to the applause they receive from others, and what they foolishly imagine that God has given them. Aware, perhaps too late, of the shortness of their sight, when it reaches the “vanishing point,” they then find that the more knowledge they have acquired, the more sensible it ought to have made them of their ignorance, and to have determined them to confine their conclusions to what their reason, and the information given them, authorised. *Sed quanta insipientibus verba !*

CCCLXXVIII.

The idea of “new lights” is the more presumptuous, as it excludes the belief of our subjection to a trial. What a false security does this entice us into, and how awful is the responsibility that it involves us in ! The more awful, as the idea excludes the

feeling of that very responsibility. Surely it is one of Satan's most wily artifices; for the best of us must "work out our salvation with fear and trembling." There seem to be no bounds to human errors; and it may well be so, when we are led into them by our passions, sometimes miscalled our feelings; the entire dominion of which is much more than the "*furor brevis*." But, if they are not criminally indulged, they are more within the reach of mercy, of which indeed we cannot know the limits: the instances, therefore, which we see of human error, ought not to lead us into too unfavourable opinions of those who fall into it; all that we may, and ought to do, is to

"Learn to be wise from others' harm."

Let us now examine another source of, and learn another lesson of wisdom from, error.

Some may be Unitarians from a spirit of perverseness, which makes them justify their unwillingness, from various causes, to believe in authorities which they are inclined, at all risks, to dispute; others from a spirit of independence, which they mistake for the dictates of conscience; which others again, and those, I fear, not the most numerous, are really actuated by. The causes of error are various, and it is well when they do not arise from the passions. For what, again I ask, is our reason given us? Many are disposed to form general decisions, forgetting that they can only be partial judges. We judge from biasses, and it is well for us when they are

innocent ones. Enthusiasts are more apt to be led by the ardour of their imagination and their wishes : but there will generally be a degree of self-conceit in all error ; for how else is self-satisfaction to be obtained, incomplete as that may be ? But where is the humility that befits the imperfect creature man ? Where the patience, that disposes him to remain in awful, yet hoping suspense ? A precipitate judgment is favourable to neither of these. The charge of precipitation may be retorted, it is true ; and so it may be in any case where absolute proof is not to be obtained. God alone knows our motives, and our trust in Him should be accompanied with distrust of ourselves. Brotherly love itself admits of self-conceit and self-attachment, of which the “ alter idem ” is only a transfer. Thus true self-love and social are the same.

CCCLXXIX.

We ought not to wish to be amused at the expense of others, which we are too apt to be when we see or hear of their faults. It may gratify our malignity, or, at least, our censoriousness, at the expense of our charity. We are, indeed, only to be trusted with the indulgence of the sallies of our imagination, when a discreet and well-prepared old age has taught us to restrain the headlong impulses of youth, enabled as it is to do it by the powers it has acquired. But licentiousness is still to be guarded against. We may be more disposed to censure others, from the con-

sciousness that we deserve it ourselves. From a similar motive we may endeavour to lessen the merit of others, from a consciousness of the want of it in ourselves. The greatest "fool" will make as "many" as he can, to keep him in countenance. Perhaps the best way of observing others is by keeping aloof from them. A man who does not mix in the race, may see the crossing and jostling of others, without being crossed and jostled himself. He needs no foul play : he may follow Horace's "vitium fugere."

CCCLXXX.

Whoever communicates his own self-examination to others, must, if they have any feelings, excite in them a desire to examine themselves also : and his own confessions will probably have anticipated theirs. They will feel that, if they have any merit, it must chiefly consist in their knowing how little is the share they have of it. We live to learn ; and for what do we live, if not to learn ? To learn, not so much for the transient and imperfect purposes of this world, as for the permanent and all-sufficient ones of the next. There is but one correcting hand : it corrects, sometimes perhaps, "in anger," but always "with judgment:" and the scourge which it uses is often that of adversity : but few, it is to be hoped, will be "brought" entirely "to nothing."

CCCLXXXI.

We may be of use to our fellow-creatures in the

most important concerns, and we may feel a satisfaction in being so, but not a pride ; for we must not forget that, after all, we are but the instruments of a higher power, who gives us both the will and the means to be so useful. He has foreseen, if not predetermined the effects which our weak endeavours will produce on others, and we are at best but the "vessels" which He has "chosen" to produce them. Happy, indeed, are we if so chosen ; and to Him we must refer our will and ability to "plant" and to "water," as well as the "increase," which must entirely depend on Him who cares for us all.

In the pursuits which He has formed us for, some are more favourable to, or more productive of, the social feelings, than others, which those of collecting pictures or books are not : vanity, and the desire of rivalry, is too much mixed with them, and it betrays its nature by its ridiculous excess : the mere encouragement of the art is little better than a pretext : "I have the finest Raphael, Rubens, Claude, Poussin, &c., the rarest edition of Homer, Virgil, Horace," &c.—even the possession of the Bible itself is an exclusive, or, at least, self-preferring object : and still more in all personal enjoyments, when the dear self is to be admired. So it is also in the more natural enjoyments of hunting, shooting, &c., which include a desire of paramountship, sometimes to the exclusion of other pleasures or benefits ; and they are also connected with the destruction of the works of the Creator : but the love of Him, His works, and

His creatures, is evidently shewn in the love of nature, and the desire of improving or embellishing her : others must benefit and partake in it ; the workmen we employ are brought before our eyes, and under our care ; in benefiting ourselves, we benefit our fellow-creatures also. The admiration of nature has the same source and effect ; in admiring her, we admire and adore her Author ; we “ hold converse ” with Him : we

——“ act upon His plan,
And form to His, the relish of our souls.”

His “ relish ” is in promoting the happiness of His creatures ; loving them, is loving Himself : He is the “ whole,” of which they are “ parts : ” man loves himself as a part, and that love is expansive to the whole. Self-love, therefore, is the source and spring of social in him : if there is vanity in it, such “ vanity ” is not “ given in vain ; ” the indulgence of it, if we do not compliment ourselves by it, is an acknowledgment of, and return for the gift : the self-love of God is the love of that whole which He Himself constitutes : the feelings of men begin from a point : if those of God do the same, it is because that point is itself INFINITY.

CCCLXXXII.

All professions or occupations ought to have one common tendency, that of utility, the different degrees of which will determine their different import-

ance; but, however great that may be, it will not justify the assumption of it by the person who has embraced the profession, for we are all upon one common level, that of being "unprofitable servants:" the general sense of this will, if rightly felt, regulate the common feeling and common sense of mankind, which will unite in reprobating all improper pride and arrogance. These, indeed, are not the times in which that meets with any encouragement: whether they have too much of an opposite tendency I will not pretend to say, but they at least shew the general conviction, that a man may be a fool in any station or condition of life: and good sense, on the contrary, will always secure esteem and respect.

"Worth makes the man, and want of it the fellow:
The rest is all but leather and prunello."

This too is a truism; but is it universally attended to?

CCCLXXXIII.

"Rex nobilem, Deus solus generosum facit."

The qualities that form the gentleman may be possessed in any station or condition of life; and they are best shewn by doing our duty in that station, to God, our fellow-creatures, and ourselves.

"Honour and shame from no condition rise:
Act well your part; there all the honour lies."

And honour and honesty are inseparably united.

CCCLXXXIV.

The highest stations in life will not place us above, nor the lowest beneath, the obligation of doing our duty in them, and the violation of that duty will equally expose us to punishment for it, if not here, at least hereafter. What the duty comprehends I have repeatedly said, in the relations which it bears to God, to our fellow-creatures, and to ourselves.

CCCLXXXV.

“ Cloth of gold, do not despise,
Though thou art match'd with cloth of frize ;
Cloth of frize, do not be bold,
Though thou art match'd with cloth of gold,”

was the motto to a dress composed of these mixed materials, and worn by a “ knight of low degree,” who had matched himself with a lady of a noble family. The same motto might be applied to many others, of both sexes, and all conditions, married or unmarried : for all human nature is composed of such mixtures : it has both “ cloth of gold and of frize” in it. In the same spirit Shakspeare says, “ Our lives are of a mixed yarn ; our virtues would be proud, if our vices whipped them not : and our vices would despair, if they were not cherished by our virtues.”

That is, the sense of one checks or encourages that of the other ; thus we are alternately elevated or depressed, in our opinion of ourselves.

CCCLXXXVI.

If a man acts rightly, he will have good reason to think that he has more credit given him for it than he deserves ; for men judge of each other by a comparison with their fellow mortals, not by that standard which we should all look up to.

CCCLXXXVII.

We may suppose that the rewards of the next world are measured by a regard to what human nature is capable of, or liable to ; and so of its punishments, which are, we may suppose, inflicted by the same measurement, but also by a comparison with the example given by our blessed Saviour ; an example which may mitigate the severity of the punishments, impossible as it is for human nature to follow it exactly.

“ Seest thou how Ahab humbleth himself before me ? Therefore not in his, but in his son’s days, will I bring the evil upon his house.” So is the mercy of God shewn, and his justice satisfied : by pardon to penitence, and by the punishment which sin required : that punishment too may be mitigated by the mercy which “ tempers justice.” Punishment is threatened, to keep us in awe ; inflicted, to requite the desert of it.

Repentance may come too late, but only for the pardon of sins which are not in themselves venial. And surely the distinction will be made ; but are we

qualified to make it, either for others or for ourselves ? As to others, we are so little acquainted with men's powers and opportunities, that there are few occasions in which we can safely say that they might have done what they did not do. For ourselves, we ought to make the trial, which alone can inform us.

Perhaps there cannot be a stronger proof that we are not meant to judge of men's merits in the sight of God, than that idiots are sometimes infected with vicious qualities: this seems to do away with the idea which the Turks have of the innocency of idiots; and of the certainty of their going to heaven : but the scriptural declaration, that what will be required will be in proportion to what is given, is equally accordant with the opinion of the Turks, with common sense, and with all our ideas of the justice of God. And the same may be said of the lowest of the savage tribes, who doubtless have " their own laws," and their own consequent responsibility. It is also a proof that reason, in subservience to and accordance with religion, is our great and necessary guide : those, therefore, who are deprived of it, are put under the guidance of others who possess it: the aberrations of it are allowed to continue under their own proportionate responsibility.

CCCLXXXVIII.

Taste, science, genius, judgment, are given in ample lots to those who can and will use them. If they do it properly, they will reap every advantage

which their nature, almost divine as it is, admits of; if they abuse or neglect them, the opposite consequence will follow. The proper use of them will add to the enjoyment of a prosperous life, and alleviate the sufferings of an adverse one. If they are denied the possession of these qualities, other and more important ones are attainable by them. The chief of which is, a trust in and submission to the will of God, who will require only in proportion to what He has given, and will reward the intention as well as the execution of those who obey his commandments.

CCCLXXXIX.

Strength of mind sometimes (we may hope not always) excludes strength of feeling, but not vanity; for vanity is selfish, and few minds are strong enough to be proof against self-delusion. A light mind neither thinks nor feels; a perverse one will not.

CCCXC.

“Charity begins at home,” with us all: if it stirs from it, it expects to bring back a return of interest, not in money, but in kindness; that is, in gratitude for the benefit received. And can we be required to bestow our favours for nothing? Virtue is its own reward, ’tis true: but the feeling will hardly be excited, unless others participate in it; and without that participation, would not the enjoyment of the reward be a selfish one? *

* The return is a proof of the participation.

CCCXCI.

Among the virtues which the experience of life ought to teach us, the observance of prudence is one of the chief: it is equally necessary to our temporal, our physical, and our moral and religious concerns: and, as we advance in age, it is often the more necessary, to atone for and to remedy the effects of the want of it in our youth: to give an example of it to others, to whom we should recommend it, if we have any influence over them, and we may have occasion to enforce it upon those over whom we have any control; as their animal spirits or activity of mind may make them both lose sight of it. As to ourselves, it enables us to exercise better the powers of mind, which often replace the decay of our bodily ones, and therefore it is attached to the old age which advances upon us; it prepares us for the awful period to which we are approaching; it still teaches us to guard against the dangers to which life is exposed, and gives us strength to meet those dangers when the hazarding, and perhaps even the sacrifice of life is required of us: this it does by disposing and enabling the mind to consider what the duties of life are, what reason and good sense require of us, and the very superior value of the concerns of that life to which this is a prelude. This consideration may often supply the want of physical fortitude, by the resolution which, when we have a right end in view, we may reasonably hope that our Maker will assist

us in exerting. He did so to St Peter, in the greatest of all his needs, and He will, we may hope, do so to us when those needs require it, as they may possibly do ; for the adherence to or denial of our faith in Christ may possibly be the test to which our courage will be put, and it will then be seen whether we fear more “ those who can only destroy the body,” or “ Him who can cast both body and soul into hell.” The repentant Peter was divinely assisted in his ultimate choice of this alternative ; but, in these Christian and more civilized times, the same reason, thanks be to God, for apprehending this test to be imposed upon us, as it was so dreadfully upon the martyrs, whose “ blood” was truly said to be “ the seed of the Christian Church,” and even the apprehension of that test by the “ honest” and temperate, but timid Erasmus, at the time of the Reformation, cannot well now take place ; the age of persecution is past, and that of religion, as well as reason, surely will not suffer it to return : we may safely be Christians here, in a well-founded adherence to the faith which the Protestant Church recommends to us, and in the equally well-grounded hope of meeting our Saviour and Redeemer hereafter. In that hope we may live, in that hope we may die.

CCCXCII.

Those who have lively and active imaginations, may be elevated by them to great heights, or sunk to

low depths: a good deal of this will depend on the state of the health and animal spirits; and this is, perhaps, the best interpretation, as being consonant to our nature, that can be given of the "heaviness that may endure for a night," and the "joy that cometh in the morning:" and what sources are there for that joy!

CCCXCIII.

How wonderfully constituted is human nature! and how different we are from each other! Some there are, whose minds are agitated like the leaves of a poplar, by every breeze of thought that blows across them, whether excited by external objects, or by some internal feeling, like the "ground swell" of a lake, whose surface is ruffled into waves when no wind blows upon it. These men are sensible of their own powers, but equally sensible, at least appearing to be so, how much they are governed by their impulses in the service of them. The agitation of their minds will hardly allow them time to observe the characters and manners of others, or if they do, their opinions of them will be influenced by the bias which inclines their minds to one side or the other; for they think too much to be agitated to and fro, by every wind that blows upon them. Their reason and feelings are too strong not to induce them to embrace a decided opinion in cases of importance, and to adhere to it, strengthened too, as it will be, by the habits they have acquired, and by the pride, common

as it is to us all, of independence and consistency. These characters, then, are fixed, and fixed, if their dispositions and principles are good, in the pursuit of what is right, which may be expected from the qualities above mentioned. But there are others of a lighter and more superficial cast, who have little of what is characteristic in them, except perhaps an obstinate adherence to the habits and opinions which they have embraced, sometimes by mere accident, sometimes by their imitation of others, or sometimes by their own self-conceit; for the weaker their minds are, the stronger often will be the vanity that governs them. This indisposes them from listening to the advice of others, little as they are able to judge of it, and therefore little inclined to consider it, which others, whose minds are of a stronger cast and more active turn will do, though they may be equally inclined to adhere to their own opinions, which the weaker mortals whom I have mentioned, do from inability or want of exertion to examine those of others. In these, however, as well as the others, the kindly feelings, which are the best counteractions of the selfish ones, may predominate; and if they do not always inform the judgment, may at least give a right direction to the will, and may prepare the self-love, which we all have, for its expansion into social. They will not secure us from vanity, for "all is vanity;" and, as Pope says,

"Not a vanity is given in vain."

CCCXCIV.

Every man has his own opinion, whether borrowed from others, or adopted, he scarcely knows why, and adhered to from pride or false shame: there are few, perhaps, who "live to learn;" and many who fear to change their opinions, as being influenced, if candour will allow of its being imputed to them, more by the "praise" or dispraise "of men," than by that "of God," or of the God within them, their own conscience. And are we rational creatures, is man, the "sole judge of truth" here on earth, so governed?

CCCXCV.

It is one thing to be diffident of our opinions, and another to be versatile in the formation of them. The first may secure us from the last, by the caution which it suggests; so good a guide is reason, when rightly consulted.

CCCXCVI.

I know two females, who are sisters, and who are as different in their intellectual faculties, as they are similar in their moral qualities. One, whether from habit, education, or innate propensity, makes much more use of her reasoning powers than the other, and is consequently more apt to be led astray by them, though not materially. The other acts more from instinctive impulse, which being supported by natural good sense, is almost sure, in material things at

least, to guide her right. Both are equally amiable and well disposed, and both, we may trust, equally fit to share in the mercy and goodness of their Maker.

CCCXCVII.

There are some characters whom, if there were any bounds to Christian charity, one would be tempted to shrink from the touch of the offered hand of, with almost as much horror as from that of Satan himself, whose agents in evil one cannot help considering them to be. But we must not forget that they have not yet arrived at the "eleventh hour," and that even such "lives" as theirs may still leave room for "hope," little as the natural part of them seems to promise any good in the moral, and little as is our hope that a continuance of their lives will produce any thing but a continuance of evil doing, which will extend itself to the commission of more than one crime: for one is seldom committed without producing, or being accompanied by another: thus they continue the series, are hardened by it, and either cover it with the detestable mask of hypocrisy, or shew it openly in a daring and impudent effrontery: one will be seen through, the other scorned and avoided.

How different are such characters from those before described! How proudly, like "Satan their master," are they "eminent in guilt!" "Dunces," as they prove, after all.

CCCXCVIII.

It is a mixture of the selfish and social principles, that begets inquisitiveness, impertinence, &c. It is their abuse that produces invasion of the rights of others, envy, hatred, &c. To what an extent are these abuses sometimes carried !

CCCXCIX.

The excess of pride is hardness ; for self must be the predominant, if not the exclusive object : but a certain degree of pride is both consistent with, and a proof of feeling ; for it shews anger at that feeling being excited, and by a softness of which it feels the infection. It almost makes the "tear start," which we "proudly strive to hide" under a burst of passion : nay, it may even "draw iron tears down Pluto's cheek." * Some address, therefore, to the more manly feelings, is necessary to open the hearts of most men. As it is with pride, so it is also with justice, the extreme of which is in the hardness of "summa injuria:" but, when it is tempered with mercy, each finds its proper level, and a most salutary mixture is produced : the more salutary, as it brings the nature of man nearer to the "nature and property" of God.

CCCC.

We are apt to evade the obligation of doing justice to

* And may leave a useful lesson to a survivor.

ourselves, by doing more or less than justice to others : if we praise them more than they deserve, it is to cover our own sins by the apparent charity which we shew to theirs ; if less, it is to palliate our own sins, by adducing examples of greater in them : we say, " O what an angel is such a one ! I wish I was like him (or her) !" or we say, " Such a one is not what he (or she) ought to be ; I hope at least I am not quite so bad." This is almost like the " Pharisee and the Publican."

I have heard it said, that we ought rather to seek after what is good, than what is bad. Certainly ; though it may chiefly be to give ourselves pleasurable sensations : but both are necessary, if only to make proper distinctions ; to learn what to follow, and what to shun.

*" Est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines,
Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum."*

Extremes meet, but not by mutual approach : the extreme of humility is pride, but the extreme of pride cannot be humility, however pride may be humbled. Man's nature, left to itself, may and will deteriorate ; but it cannot ameliorate, but by regeneration.

*" Facilis descensus Averni ;
Sed revocare gradum, superasque ascendere ad auras,
Hic labor, hoc opus est."*

The sons of Adam may begin well then : but the

taint of sin in their nature inclines them to sink ; a regeneration is necessary to make them rise again : for this, a new birth took place in Christ, who raised fallen man to his original destination, in the possession of that pure and unadulterated reason, the use of which made him the "image of his Maker," who made him after Himself, the great Original.

Reason, then, is the true "rectum ;" and,

" To give lost reason life, Christ poured his own."

If he, therefore, is not to be adored as God Himself, what he was, and what he has done for us, will still make him an object of our adoration : what bounds are we to set to that ? If our gratitude should know none, what ought to be our demonstration of it ? The words which he spake of himself, and what St. Paul, &c., said of him, approach so nearly to an acknowledgment of his divinity, as to make it very hazardous for us to consider him as being less than actually divine. He, to whom "all power is given," must at least be the representative of Divine Majesty.

This is not the language of enthusiasm, but of reason and religion : they bid us expect a future life from him who had power to promise it. Enthusiasm leads us astray in search of the means of procuring it. I am not sure that enthusiasm does not encourage hypocrisy : I am sure, at least, that it often produces inconsistency, which any thing at variance with reason, and proceeding from self-conceit, or self-delusion, may well be expected to do. "So use, as not to

abuse," says St. Paul. Can this be expected from a heated enthusiast? And, if we are not so heated, must we be "lukewarm?" The great Physician of our souls and bodies will not so decide. Young, indeed, seems to speak in favour of enthusiasm, when he says—

"Enthusiastic, this? Then all are weak,
But rank enthusiasts. To this godlike height
Some souls have soar'd, or martyrs ne'er had bled, &c.

Night 6.

But the "godlike height" which he means, is in the prospect of the "boundless, interminable joys" of a future life, contrasted with the "sublunary storms" of "time."

CCCCI.

Mankind, to be kept in order, must be kept in awe; in awe of each other, in awe of themselves; in awe of the laws, in awe of, or at least in respect to, superior rank and power in society; and, above all, in awe of the Divine Power; for without a sense of religion, and its duties, there can be no real goodness in man. This awe must not be attended with servility, though with a degree of humility, especially towards God; it must be regulated by reason, which it will be, if we have a due sense of what we owe to God, to our fellow-creatures, and to ourselves.

Our reason also tells us, that if any vice is equally bad policy in this world and the next, it is that of

gambling*: it is as selfish and ungenerous, as its opposite virtue in the abstinence from it, is noble and disinterested. The rich man cannot win of another, especially a friend, without as much, or even more regret than he would have felt, if he has feeling, at his own loss; and what loss can be greater than that of a friend? The poor man may make his fortune by it in this world, but he will ruin himself by it in the next; and he will add to his sorrow for that ruin, almost (quite, if he has feeling,) an equal sorrow for the ruin, or the injury, done to others, by which he may have incurred his own eternal perdition: the sense of this, indeed, will be his worst punishment. Shall I give his seducer and destroyer any advantage over me, if I add the execration of an oath, which I am tempted to do, to what I already feel? Is not this vice already consigned to Satan? And can I do more in damning it, damned as it is already, in its "hells" upon earth?—Yes, you may; you will add to the fault you commit, that of incroaching on the exclusive right possessed by the Supreme Judge, of passing his own final sentence. Let, therefore, your only curse be the avoidance of the vice and of its followers: leave to others its earthly punishment, and remember, that you have to save yourself from the temptation which you once had some leaning

* "——if trifling kills,
Sure vice must butcher," &c.—*Night 2.*

And what vice more murderous than gambling? "Soul, body, fortune," all fall victims to it.

towards, and that even now you may lean a little that way, in your being pleased with the advantage of winning, though but with a trifling sum in addition to it, of the person you have been playing with. But it is only when they are made the instruments of enriching one's-self by the ruin or injury of another, perhaps an "alter idem," that cards deserve the name of "the devil's books," short of which, indeed, they still are the tempters to sin, but venially, and perhaps a substitute for still worse sins.

CCCCII.

I find that the best preparation for writing my thoughts, is the excitement of them by conversing with those in whom they are also excited by it. This interchange has just taken place in a conversation with a near and dear female relative, on the subject of the preceding article : and it answers to Young's—

" As bees mixt nectar draw from fragrant flowers,
So men from friendship, wisdom and delight ;
Twins ty'd by nature, if they part, they die."

And,

" Thought, when deliver'd, is the more possess'd,
Teaching, we learn," &c.—*Night 2.*

CCCCIII.

Important as are the subjects of this and the preceding articles, I believe that any thing may be sufficient to employ a reflecting mind : the most common

pebble we can pick up, may interest us by its connections. De Lisle says of one he had found,

“ L’histoire de ce grain est l’histoire du monde.”

And an English poet says,

—————“ He

Who worlds created, forms the worm,” &c.

Sed “ paulo majora canamus.” Laurels may shade, but cannot hide our vices or errors: the “ fulmen” of public censure and of self-reproach will pierce through, and, if it does not inflict a mortal wound, it will gradually corrode our vitals, nor will any part of our public conduct be a complete atonement, tainted more or less as it will be by what it is meant to atone for; and no rank or honours will secure us*. The best, and indeed only resource, will be “ vitium fugere,” for which “ a clean heart and right spirit” must be “ made and renewed,” having been previously prayed for.

A man, indeed, may support his credit by a concealment of his bad qualities, and may “ lay a flattering unction to his heart,” but

“ It will but skin and film the ulcerous part,

While rank corruption, mining all within,

Infects unseen—confess yourself to heaven,” &c.

Is this meant for others? So it is for myself also: and though

* From the conviction of their being ill bestowed: or perhaps from still heavier charges than what we have deserved.

" My satire like a wild goose flies,
Unclaim'd of any man"—but those who take it,
And meet the shaft that was not thrown at them,

Yet I may say with Orlando,

" I will rail only at myself, in whom I know most faults."

Have I companions? Let them follow my example. When we determine to promulgate our opinions of others, or ourselves, we should be careful not to do it at our own peril. I hope mine is not very great.

" Sed—quod magis ad *republicam*
Pertinet—*agitemus*."

Events may be worse than our hopes, or better than our fears: the first are often suggested by our wishes, their "fathers," the second by our prejudices*. The "*vox populi vox Dei*," has, I believe, very little practical truth in it, but the *vox populi* may often indicate the *voluntas Dei*. We are very imperfect judges of the stability or instability of human institutions, any further than in being sensible that nothing earthly can last for ever. There is One only in whom eternity dwells, and from whom it can emanate.

It is happy for mankind that their want of unanimity in opinion is often owing to their prejudices, or fears, which give way to, or are quieted by experience; for few are so obstinate as to resist that; they will soon acquiesce in a change which they did

* Can we not learn to distrust our fears as well as our hopes? Can we be sure of the sources from which they flow?

not themselves contribute to, but of which they find the benefit. Such versatility is well suited to the imperfection of our reasoning powers; and, indeed, without it we should not "live to learn." Let us hope that it will have to shew itself upon the present occasion, and will be patiently waited for.

Political disputes may do no more than sharpen men's wits, or point their pens; they benefit the public cause by the discussion they provoke, and "truth" finally "prevails." No matter what breath is spent, or what ink is shed, if it saves the shedding of blood.

When a little matter is magnified into a great one, (which fear of danger sometimes does) the "mouse" is made to produce a mountain; but it generally ends by the "mountain producing a mouse." This is sometimes exemplified in a conference between "women and fools," which a "Falconbridge" may be wanted to "break off."

CCCCIV.

"A man who acts without any influence, acts without a motive, and for beings formed in and for society, social influence is the most natural," says Roberts, of Lincoln's Inn, in his liberal and judicious pamphlet on Parliamentary Reform. Social influence is the best, when supported by

—"thinking right, and meaning well."

Sat erit patriæ prodesse voluisse, may be the motto of many men who have only done the latter.

Encouraged by this meaning, may we not say, that there is now a spirit of domestic enjoyment that pervades the greater part of the nation, as it does of the families in it; disposes it not to shake off the "lightest," or even any part of the "discipline" it now willingly "endures*," either of the Church or State; to trust in its representatives the more, when it will have acquired more liberty in the choice of, and consequently more control over them; that it knows and guards against its enemies, both without and within; and knows also how to value the comparative superiority of its excellent constitution over all others that either bend under the yoke of despotism, or riot in the licence of freedom: feels that its rulers are tied down by the same laws as itself is, and only desires those laws to be made more efficacious and simple: if it wishes those respecting game to be amended, it is for the good of the landowners as well as occupiers, and the commercial men; for the justice and reasonableness of their enjoyments, whether they are influenced by the Saxon, Briton, or Cambro-Briton, &c. notions of feudal or manorial rights; and it also wishes that those rights and enjoyments should be widened to an extent in which all may participate, and with which all will be content. Thus it would rest in the "safe medium"

* O Akenside, you saw the dangers on both sides! But we are not between a "Scylla and Charybdis!" favente Deo, we shall steer, "medio tutissimè," between both: and there is sea room enough beyond: and we shall not want pilots.

between monarchical or aristocratical power, and democratic apparent liberty, and real despotism, both preparatory to what it would finally sink under, and lose its sway over other countries, by the loss of its sway over itself; it would preserve both, and with the "justice" of an "even hand."

The fear of popular effervescence seems now to prevail among all ranks of people, and probably will maintain order and unanimity among them, will bring the different parties to a compromise, that will settle the dispute between them, and keep them in order and awe of each other, and this from the highest to the lowest ranks of society; and king, lords, and commons, will preserve their several rights, and maintain their general unanimity, for generations yet to come. The higher orders are brought (terrified perhaps) into a respect for themselves, that will secure to them that of the lower.

Public opinion must, after all, regulate the government of a country; and will do it well, when well regulated itself, which it will be, when not dictated or expressed by a mob.

Allowed or not, all I can say of these speculations is, that they suggested themselves at the time, "*cum somnia vera.*"

CCCCV.

A person of an active imagination, who is too much in the habit of exercising it, may be apt to see things in too favourable or unfavourable a light, and equally

liable to suffer by it, either from present anxiety, or future disappointment. He has, therefore, to guard against both.

CCCCVI.

“Quo quo scelesti ruitis?”

may be addressed to the people of this country, as it was by Horace to the Romans; not so much on account of the former aiming at perhaps an impracticable reform, as of the abuses which required it, and which still continue, and of the licentious violence with which it has been required by them. It would be well if that licentiousness allows them long to remain “intacti Britanni,” or “fortiter *occupare* portum,” when they have arrived at it. Possibly, if God’s mercy does not avert it, a severer mode of reform may be inflicted; and who are those who may hope to be exempted from that infliction?

CCCCVII.

To my frequent quotation from Horace (I hope I have not fallen into the pedantry of making *mal à propos* ones,) I cannot help adding, that he was the more qualified to say,

“Naturam expellas furcâ, tamen usque recurret,”

as no man, uninspired, has known more of human nature, and of the different degrees of force which its impulses, good or bad, have over it, than he did. His descriptions of himself attest this: and, need I cite

his most beautiful tale of "The City and Country Mouse?"—"Happy, indeed, is the man," who in his retirement can say with him,

"Sylvarum et mihi me reddentis agelli;"

and can enjoy the continuance, as well as the momentary idea of,

"Beatus ille, qui procul negotiis," &c.

without the necessity of going back to the "*prisca gens mortalium*;" and can, more than Horace's frankness allowed him to do, exempt himself from the reproach of

"Romæ Tibur amem ventosus, Tibure Romam."

But our minds are too much in accord with the mutations of all earthly things, or, at least, too much under their control, to enjoy that happiness here: "In cœlo quies." If we could venture to dwell more upon, and "commune with ourselves," (and are we not enjoined occasionally to do this?) perhaps we might enjoy more of this "quies" here. But no—our contemplation is reserved for a higher object; and that too "in cœlo."

CCCCVIII.

"Knowledge is power:" they may subsist together in man, in an inferior degree, as they do in God, in an infinite one. The truth of the proverb is evinced in the power which man has over the brute creation, and even over his fellow bipeds: but there can be no

comparison between the degrees of it in man, and the infinity of it in God.

CCCCIX.

Instances sometimes occur, which almost oblige us to acknowledge the interference of Providence, by interrupting, or rather accelerating, the natural (or preordained, if the Calvinists will,) course of things: this, I think, affords an argument against, if not refutation of, the doctrine of Calvinism: God's immediate interposition takes place of the natural (or general) course of things. *Sed ab his ad nosmet, et quod ad nos maxime pertinet, transeamus.*

CCCCX.

The rapidity of thought, and the ebullition of spirits in youth, generally makes us unwilling to give our reason the time which thought requires: it is well, however, if youth admits of some preparation for the thoughtfulness of old age. If we have not made the most of our abilities in our youth, we shall, at least, have been prevented from overrating and being misled by them, till old age has enabled us to judge more fairly of them by a comparison with the acquirements of others, and with the far higher that we may hope to attain ourselves hereafter, under the protection of ONE who cares for all, as we have cared for those around us. And what a circumference is HIS!

CCCCXI.

It is happy for us, that in the decline of our life, and the increase of our infirmities, we can only have a general knowledge and recollection of what we enjoyed in the state of youth and health, without being able to compare the sensations which we then felt, with those which we now feel: we can only advert to those which more immediately preceded our present state: this smooths the path of life's decline, and saves us from much of the unhappiness which we should feel in our changes for the worse, and also makes us enjoy the more any immediate change for the better: if it is accompanied with a general increase of seriousness, it obviates Young's reproach upon us, that in the gentleness of life's decline,

“ We shut our eyes, and think it is a plain !”

The increase of seriousness still leaves us very sufficient enjoyment of life, and gradually prepares us, more or less, for the end of it. It increases our gratitude for the present bounties of our Maker, and our hopes of those which He has promised to us in future, and makes us more desirous of deserving them. Those who have experienced and felt the force of these changes in life, will be best able to appreciate them. It is not, therefore, so much to the young and vigorous, and still less to those who are deficient in right feeling, that these reflections should be addressed. The former, indeed, are more

likely to be moved by them than the latter; *their* strength is “hardened” by pride.

CCCCXII.

The labour of life is felt, when the elasticity ceases, which made the exertions to support that labour less necessary. In youth, some “lazy bones” excepted, flogging is more required to repress than to excite the springs of that elasticity: this flogging is inflicted upon the bodily organs of sense: in old age, the mind requires it more, to excite it to make those efforts which the stripes of affliction must be met by, and which, accompanied as they are with supplications for higher assistance, are the best preparations for that ease which will be the final reward of labour well supported, and of patience well exerted.

CCCCXIII.

We may very well suppose, that if we had a clear view of what will be our state immediately after death, it would be more than we could bear, and would put an immediate end to our existence: a degree of insensibility, therefore, seems to intervene, and we are let gently down into the grave: our existence here ceases only with the last breath we draw: our approach to this is made easier by the loss of our enjoyments as well as our wants.

CCCCXIV.

I have been told, that the use of thought is now more avoided than courted. I am, or rather should be, sorry to admit this ; for I think that reason has almost as much right as religion to say, " He that is not for me, is against me : " and can it be otherwise, when reason itself is appealed to by Him, who himself inculcated the highest duties of religion ? The exercise of reason requires thought, which should be addressed more to those who do not (not those who will not) think, than to those who do ; the latter do not want it.—" But you have written too much to be read."—By many, perhaps ; but I had rather be read by half a dozen thinkers—" *vel duo, vel nemo*"—than by twenty half dozens of those who neither think nor feel. They perhaps cannot ; the perverse will not.

CCCCXV.

How forcibly ought the fear of incurring the blame of

" *Video meliora, proboque,
Deteriora sequor,*"

to impress itself upon my mind, when I reconsider what I have written ! I shall have convicted myself by my own pen, and the severity of my sentences will revert upon me. Unconscious as I am of this, I can

appeal from unjust judges, and at least say, “ Deus misereatur,” et quod in me vitiosum est, corrigat; et —licetne adjungere?—quodcunque rectum sit, illi faveat, adjuvetque!

APPENDIX.

I.

YES, "deaf" as we may be, (see No. CLXXV. and CLXXXII.) we may still "commune with ourselves in our chambers," where our "stillness" will allow us to listen to the God within us, whose voice, "still and small" as it is, will make itself heard, when perhaps too late, hereafter.

II.

To what I have said of wit, in No. CLXXXVII., I may add, that however ingenious it may be, it is little better than folly. Humour, on the contrary, though sometimes "caricatured" into injustice, is acute description of character; it discriminates what wit confounds; mixed together, they correct each other; separated, they are vitiated: wit loses sight of justice, humour carries it to "summa injuria:" in the mixture, instead of being neutralised, they become more pungent, and the wit gives a seasoning to the acrimony of the humour, that renders the mixture more palatable, but less caustic; more volatile, but less adherent; more titillating, less painful; the sensation, more or less, approaching to pain, as the one or the other predominates, and the application is more or less personal. Wit gives an itching (sometimes the laugh of folly), humour rubs it into a sore.

III.

We may sometimes be inclined to plume ourselves upon the sincerity mentioned in No. CXCV., but, after all, it amounts to little more than a willingness to acknowledge what we are not ashamed of, and can put a little gilding over, or what we have some excuse for, or some countervailing quality to cover that shame with: the best of these is "charity;" but will it "cover" all our sins?

Fatenti et dubitanti crede, et si possis, responde.

IV.

I do not think I have laid too much stress on principles, in No. CXCV. A principle may be fairly deducible from practice, though not always visible in it, except to the clear and penetrating eye of an unprejudiced head, which will see that the practice could not long subsist, unless founded in principle. Do men, in the dimness of their sight, or the quickness of their presumptuous self-confidence, or the tenacity of their prejudices, expect that the Source of rectitude will have marred His own work by its inconsistencies? Do they think that principles were made for men, and not men for principles, the converse of what the Jews thought of the "sabbath?" Where is our responsibility, if our moral sense is no direction to it? What must they be, who would leave that sense without one? What, but the slaves of their passions, or their prejudices, which they sometimes mistake for principles?

V.

Let a thinking man tell me (and to such only I wish to address myself) whether, after all the communications he may have had with his thinking or not thinking fellow-creatures, he does not feel more satisfaction in ruminating over them in his arm-chair after dinner. And why should he not? Does it not prepare him for more social communications? But, after all,

his great dependence, under higher assistance, must be upon himself. *In loco*, April 25, 1831.

Why do not people think more? Is it because they cannot, or because they dare not?

VI.

In society some appear to attend to others, and attend really more to themselves; some appear to attend to themselves, and attend as much, or more, in reality to others; for "charity" must "begin at home," before it "stirs abroad." The attentions of others are so divided between themselves and those around them, that it is difficult to say which is their chief objects. Thus the balance is kept up, and the general good humour preserved.

VII.

Like all other excesses, that of frankness has its dangers; the openness with which it makes us express our sentiments, produces a confidence in ourselves, and a consequent warmth in our expressions, often offensive to the feelings, and sometimes injurious to the characters of others. Self-respect, self-distrust, and self-command, are the best preventives of those, and all other excesses: self-indulgence, which we sometimes mistake for "sincerity," is the greatest aggravator of them. All the respects above-mentioned are subservient to a still higher.

VIII.

A thinking and feeling man may, perhaps, without much vanity, indulge the expectation of a very great addition of knowledge, as well as happiness, in a future life: this expectation, alloyed as it is, forms his greatest happiness in this: for what bounds can his improvement have, when his body is changed to the "glorious one of Christ?"

But to return to earth: plays, the representations of its transactions, are either general or particular descriptions of human nature, and the interest felt in them by the reader is correspondent to that. Shakspeare's plays are the former, Alfieri's the

latter. Of Alfieri's it has been said, that the author makes his characters speak as he would himself; but do they not speak for themselves also? * Shakspeare's speak for all mankind, in similar, or even dissimilar situations; they, therefore, mislead the reader's judgment, in interesting his feelings, or they distract his attention, in multiplying its objects: they are more essays than plays, and what they say he carries home to his own breast and bosom, &c. &c. This may be considered both as an encomium and a criticism.

Of all plays, perhaps Sophocles's *Œdipus* is the most interesting, as being the most tremendously simple: I regret having only read it in Pere Brumoy's translation.

IX.

Subjects should be treated agreeably to their importance, and to our knowledge of them: if both are considerable, we may, and perhaps ought, to speak of them with confidence; if not, we should speak of them accordingly; remembering, that as "*sua est cuique sententia*," so ours is only "*sententia nostra*;" which may be the case with every one who hears us.

If the occasion deserves it, we may avail ourselves of Horace's rule,

"Ridiculum acri

Fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res,"

enjoying, however, our triumph with modesty; et "*fortiter*," et "*suaviter*:" the laugh of assurance should not be the laugh of insolence: otherwise we may provoke, but not persuade; make enemies, but not gain friends.

Whatever we may have to say upon a subject, we may fairly leave something for others to say: *les bons esprits peuvent se rencontrer, mais il ne faut pas qu'ils se heurtent*. If a man is the fiddle of a company, his tones should not be too harsh, nor too loud. Ridicule should be used with discretion; there are

* *i. e.* as their situations impel them.

subjects on which *nugari est nefas*, ever should be felt, and perhaps imposed; we should

——“ speak with awe, but veneration too,”

especially on sacred subjects. What merely pleases may soon be forgot: the deeper the subject, the deeper will be the impression. Wit,

“ Plays round the head, but reaches not the heart.”

But I shall “ beat my track” to barrenness ;

Too rich a crop exhausts the soil that bears it.

And,

Il faut instruire, et pas seulement amuser ;

Donnons le tems de penser à nos lecteurs

Et à nous mêmes aussi ; c'est assez jaser.

La gaieté Française seroit la légereté Angloise.

X.

If the happiness of another world was mixed with the enjoyments of this, it would not be heightened but alloyed by them. To have “ a rise in blessing,” we must

“ Toss fortune back her tinsel and her plumes,”

And seek more solid joys.

Can we always pour forth our feelings? No, we must wait till a change of being enables us to do it.

XI.

In an active mind, new ideas, pleasant or unpleasant, present themselves as we grow older; the unpleasant arise from a comparison of our present physical state with our former, and from the uncertainty of our future expectations; the pleasant, from a general sense of the goodness and mercy of God, which is the best and surest resource against any melancholy feelings or forebodings, and founded as it is on the dispositions which He has given us, must also be founded in truth; for He who knows

every thing, must have caused every thing. To Him we look up for all the blessings we enjoy; of which our friends, and, above all, the “*placens uxor*,” the companion of our joys and sorrows, are among the foremost. Any losses or disappointments that we may experience, we may hope and trust will be compensated in heaven.

XII.

Even our errors, if innocent, will be allowed by our Maker, though they may not come from Him: for they may be as consolatory to our minds as if they were founded in truth: and, while they move the pity perhaps of our friends, they will not lessen their regard for us. What indeed should we be, if we did not derive some pleasure from imaginary sources, limited as our knowledge is? But the great source of happiness must be real,* for it is warranted by all the attributes and declarations of God, and by all the necessities of man: it is solid and permanent, and not the less certain for its being hid from our bodily eyes; for “*invisibilia non decipiunt*.”

XIII.

Our desire to live should be founded on a desire to do our duty: if we sacrifice our lives to that, they will have been long enough, and will be well ended: so well, that the contempt of life will be justified by the motive of our sacrifice of it. But, to reap the full benefit of this, we must make the sacrifice to Him from whom we have received our being, and to whom our first duty is owing; otherwise we shall only have obtained “the praise of men.”

XIV.

Our Maker has an exclusive claim upon us, because all other claims are included in His; what includes all, indeed, can exclude none; and *vice versâ*. The multitude of objects confounds

* No, it is not a “*gratissimus error*,” whatever the unenlightened Cicero might think, if he really did think so.

our senses ; but how do they cross and jostle each other into methods and systems, or rather into one general system, under one great Creator and Arranger ! To Him all this order is owing, and all that is good in us, as well as the prevention from all that is evil. May he continue both to us, for the merits and through the mediation of our Saviour and Redeemer !

XV.

I know not whether some of my readers may not have thought me rather flighty in this Appendix ; but I do not despair of meeting with those whose thought and feeling will have carried them as far, without losing sight of their reason. I may have got out of the "broad highway of the world," but not into paths entirely untrodden : trodden by those who may feel that "*meminisse juvabit.*"

XVI.

However I may have endeavoured to pass

"From grave to gay, from lively to severe,"

in these "Thoughts," I might probably have better prepared myself for it, by catching more of the *ludibria vitæ*, in the "Highways and Byeways" of the world. I should, therefore, make a bad "Joe Miller," nor indeed do I wish to make a good one ; the *seria vitæ* must not be mixed with too much levity ; he who so mixes them, cannot well appeal to Him who

—"tunes his voice, if tuned ; the nerve that writes, sustains."

For,

Nerveless his hand, and weak his voice will be.

XVII.

There are few, if any, suggestions which a pure mind needs to hesitate in communicating to others. But what mind is pure enough to unfold all its recesses ? Where is he, whose "withers"

are so "unwrung," and whose charity is sufficient to disincline him from wringing those of others?

XVIII.

We may sometimes be afraid of rummaging a quiver of detached thoughts, lest we should be pricked ourselves by one of the arrows: we had rather shape and point our own; these may be either blunted or barbed, but not poisoned, it is to be hoped: the wounds we give should not be mortal; and if blood flows, it should be a salutary discharge.

XIX.

Too high a compliment is a tacit censure, ironical or not; and so ought the countenance of ill example to be. Censure may be reprobation, pity contempt. How new a thing may appear in new words!

XX.

"Sume superbiam—quæsitam meritis," &c.

Yes, but we must not put on our own laurel crown: it must be *data* as well as *quæsitâ*: we may invoke "Melpomene," but "will" she always "come, when called for?" Sume superbiam must not be ultra "merita."

XXI.

Assumed modesty is not affectation, when it is the desire of avoiding the appearance of impudence. "Totus mundus agit histrionem;" and plays should be examples for imitation rather than for aversion, as one is more likely to succeed than the other: the "veluti in speculum," both in appearance and in action, will invite imitation: it will encourage the good, or make the bad worse, even if vice meets with its punishment, which may be braved. A mask may be worn, but only on thoughts, not actions, which should be seen in all their beauty

or deformity : nor, according to the Italian proverb, “ *volto sciolto, pensieri stretti*,” should the countenance be dissembled as thoughts are; but if this apparent openness is to conceal ill intentions, the proverb cannot be too much reprobated.

XXII.

Censure either proceeds from envy, which is relieved, not satisfied by it, (for vice is not “ its own reward,” but punishment,) by our putting ourselves on a level with those whom we censure : nay, on a fancied superiority : *alumnus agit, magister dicit*.

XXIII.

“ *Verbum sapienti* :” and why not *sapientibus* ? “ One fool makes many ;” may not a wise man do the same ? But who is he ?

XXIV.

Strange facility of Horace’s mind, first to give a loose to the indulgence of his passions, and then to the frankness of his pen in the avowal of them ! and to atone for all this by the openness of his confessions, and by the earnestness of his dissuasions to others, from the same indulgence ! What are we, when we thus make our very virtues an encouragement of our vices ? and when we seek to recommend ourselves to others by the habits which we should reprobate in them, if they did not throw the same veil over them ! Does this mixture of inconsistencies make us really more estimable ? or do our bad qualities give a zest to our good ones ? The fact is, that we keep one another in countenance, sympathising both with the good and the bad : we want a better model, and we Christians have had it : we have learned the distinction between good fellows and good men.

XXV.

Men are often more disposed to attend to what they read, than to what they hear : their attention is less disturbed, either by

personal regards, or by personal jealousies. They in a manner lay the world aside, to attend to the book they have in hand.

XXVI.

“ Rochefoucault his Maxims drew from nature,” &c. But from what part of nature? What does their “ truth” amount to? An exaggerated representation of the worst qualities of human nature.

XXVII.

Hypocrisy would perhaps be a virtue, if it had no other end in view but to avoid setting an ill example to others; but a bad tree cannot “ bring forth good fruit.”

XXVIII.

An indiscreet display may either be from vanity, or want of judgment: at any rate we shall gain no credit by it, et “ Finis non coronabit opus.” We must leave something for the vanity of our readers or hearers.

XXIX.

Imputing self-delusion to a man is a gentler mode of giving him the lie; for if “ we deceive ourselves, the truth is not in us.” Let us take care, then, that in our thanksgivings we do not take the lie to ourselves.

XXX.

How great is the goodness of God, in allowing us to give the highest praise to Him, for any mental qualities that we may think we possess, (and can our gratitude have too many causes of excitement?) provided it is not accompanied with an insolent and presumptuous superiority over our neighbour, be he a “ publican,” or what he may. This is not glorifying ourselves, but Him who made us; and if we take a share of it to ourselves, such a “ vanity” surely is not “ given in vain.” The only comparison that we can lawfully make, is of our own unwor-

thiness with His perfections: if we strive to imitate Him, we shall of course avoid His opposite.

XXXI.

We are so apt to be governed by our evil propensities, that we have to guard against their mixing themselves with our best intentions.

XXXII.

If all proceeds from God, so must the qualities of our minds, as well as the forms of our bodies; and His gifts must be directed by His will, which shews itself in the variety of His works, as well in the moral as the natural world. That will must also shew itself in the mode of giving, which in man is modified by a due portion of free agency, to constitute and temper his responsibility, and the retributions which his use of it shall call for. This, I believe, is the limit of God's predestination, distinct as that must be from his prescience: leaving to Him the full exercise of His attributes, and to man the exercise destined for him of his free agency. Will not this satisfy a reasonable Calvinist? But what shall convince the Atheist, who thinks that we are to feel our superiority over the rest of the creation, and to partake in their and our fellow-creatures' enjoyments, and will not allow the same feelings to a Supreme Mind? If we do not acknowledge Him, we shall have both to acknowledge and feel the devil, who inspires us with these atheistical thoughts.

XXXIII.

When we have continued long in a habit of thinking ill of others, we should end with thinking ill of ourselves, if it was not for our self-love. It would perhaps have been better if we had begun with that. "*Charity*" would not then have "begun at home." Neither should we be the dupes of our charity to others. But can a party be impartial?

XXXIV.

To make an impression on our readers, a more authoritative tone may sometimes be required than is consistent with our knowledge of the subject. This, however, is but little *nostro periculo* ; for we shall still speak from our feelings, and they will not often mislead us.

XXXV.

When we converse with a man, we begin, more or less, with a general distrust of all mankind, especially if he is of a rank in life below ours. If his sentiments coincide with ours, our good opinion of him gradually increases, and we part from him with a more favourable opinion than we had before. If his rank in life is equal with ours, we at least conceal our opinion, unfavourable as it may be, and perhaps we are more civil to him than to our inferior. So do our interests and caprices govern us !

XXXVI.

The opinions of men are constantly varying, as their inclinations, prejudices, habits, interests, or the circumstances they are in, dispose them. The Almighty Ruler holds the scales in His hand, and determines which side shall preponderate, the equilibrium being settled by the eternal laws of justice, wisdom, and equity, and all the agitations of the moral world being a tendency, more or less, as in the natural, towards a restoration of that equilibrium.

XXXVII.

A total seclusion from the world must of course give a wrong bias to our opinions, and too much mixing with it will leave us no opinions but what we borrow from others, for we shall have neither time nor inclination to form our own : to say nothing of the worldly interests or party attachments that we may be engaged in ; all which a bye-stander is exempt from, as well as

from any errors that a collision with others, or the spirit of opposition may lead him into. A judicious observer will not be carried "Quocunque rapit tempestas," nor will he be bound by the long-worn chains of prejudice. Sometimes the chief proof that we give of the independence of our opinions, is by a constant opposition to those of others. We may fancy this is independence, without feeling that it is, in fact, a dependence on our own humour: so great, indeed, that it makes us give up the power of judging fairly of any thing.

XXXVIII.

If we neglect the use of the powers given us for our self-preservation, we throw back those powers to Him who gave them: what greater insolence, or ingratitude, can be shewn than this? Is it not "tempting God?" The vain Frenchman, who ridiculed this idea, must have thought only of the power of God, and forgot all the attributes that entitle Him to our gratitude and love: nay, he must have thought that those attributes are devoted solely to the use, the command, and the caprice of man. But if we thus "brave" Him, we shall have, when too late, to fear Him.

XXXIX.

Quaintness of expression is sometimes the effect of a lively imagination: originality must proceed from a creative mind. A copy must partly determine the merit of the original, whether it improves upon it or not. Nature's works require no such determination, and cannot be improved, nor often equalled, by a copy. But what shall I say of these "nugæ" of mine? are they worth copying? And dare I trust myself with the answer?

XL.

In our services we may be profitable to others, in our injuries really injurious only to ourselves: the one may be *in beneficium æternum*, the other only *in malum temporaneum* to those whom

we injure, but *in æternum* to ourselves. How much more ought this to excite our charity, than our ill-will, to our fellow-creatures ! But with our natural propensities, it is perhaps happy for us, that trifles, or approaches to trifles, often divert our attention from more important objects, whether serious or not. Ladies, is not this the case with shopping, or with talking of that, or other subjects ? But I must not be ungallant, still less unpolite.—But talking prevents too much thinking.—Ah, ha ! you acknowledge the preference you give, do you ? Well, then, I must allow that you talk to some purpose : *profitez en donc, faites valoir mon compliment : moi, j'en ferai de même* : let us, then, mix our propensities, and meet each other half way ; at the abiding place of reason, if it has one on earth.

XLI.

Bewildered as we are, and in a state of doubt and uncertainty respecting our highest and dearest interests, we naturally desire more satisfaction, and perhaps seek it in “new lights ;” but the old are sufficient, continued as they are to us, but accompanied with “fear and trembling :” vain and presumptuous, therefore, is the wish for more. *Repetitur hoc, et decies repetatur.*

XLII.

Neither “snatch” the “sceptre,” nor the “rod,” from the “hand” of Him who bears them ; but receive the former as Esther did from the hand of Ahasuerus, and bow thyself to the latter, for the “correction” thou wantest : and may the “will” of Him who gives it, “be done on earth as it is in heaven !” In heaven we know it is done, for that heaven, wherever it is, is His immediate abode, or perhaps the centre of His glory : on earth we may be equally sure it is done, though we cannot see its immediate effects ; but we have the conviction of His omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence.

XLIII.

There are some who find their enjoyment in the authority which they assume over their fellow-creatures: others who are satisfied with what is given them by those who feel themselves to be their equals. No tax is more readily paid than what we share in the benefit of. But that benefit must be personal and immediate, to impress itself upon us unthinking mortals.*

XLIV.

Some men have lived long enough if they have rendered a service to others that is sufficient to make them remembered, but not regretted: they will not be missed while what they have left behind them is enjoyed. How many authors, &c. will this comprehend! And will it not be sufficient for us to receive a double reward for what we have done? To enjoy, probably, the "praise of God," after having enjoyed that "of men?"

" Not absolutely vain is human praise,
If human is supported by divine:"

which here is supposed to be really the case.

XLV.

I will say nothing of long or short heads, or even of clear or dim eyes: I will only say, that modest discretion is sometimes only discreet modesty; and *vice versa*. Shall I have credit for both? It will be no more than credit for common sense. Sed procul a me hæc desideria. Me, qualis erim? Sententiæ meæ jus solum vindicans.

O Young, let me return to thee, but not end with thee, for a

* As is proved by what the great Lord Chatham justly called "the vulgar impatience of taxation." But I am afraid that this "vulgarity" will comprehend more than Horace's "profanum vulgus."

higher object claims my attention: He, who inspired thy "Night Thoughts,"

Who "tuned thy voice," and who thy "nerve sustain'd."
Proud shall I be, if I have learnt from thee.

XLVI.

A tutor has often a difficult task to perform, and there will not be many who are altogether equal to it: my own recollections urge me to give this warning to those whom it may concern.

XLVII.

I have been told, that I have made humiliating confessions in this book; to this I answer, that no confessions or retractations (though I am not aware that I have the latter to make,) can be humiliating, but the contrary, that shew a proper feeling. But I have to fear, that I have rather over than under-rated myself; if so, a retractation will indeed be wanted. We shall not hesitate to make it, if we have better feelings than those we retract: nor shall we fear the unjust imputations of others.

XLVIII.

I will not wish my readers worse, and I cannot wish them better, than the enjoyment of feelings which expand the mind by charity, elevate it by hope, and strengthen it by faith, in Him who gives, and Him who has confirmed these feelings. They are the best sweeteners of our "cup of bitterness," for they give it "the taste of heaven;" they verify the "*crede quod habes et habes*;" for what proceeds from the source of benevolence, must proceed from that of truth also: and they prove that man is made in "the image of God" Himself: not in flesh, but in spirit; for the virtues of which man is capable are divine.

XLIX.

May I return my "talent" to Him who gave it, with the produce of it? But is it a talent?

—"aut erit, aut non :
Divinare etenim"—nequeo.

L.

One duty of an author is to proportion his words to the ideas they are meant to express : *Sat unius, si sat alterius*. I hope at least that I shall have adhered to this motto better than our stage-coaches do now, which travel by the rule of "*Sat bene, si plus quam cito*," instead of the sober old one of "*Sat cito, si sat bene*." But if they break their passengers' necks by the way, what sort of an arrival will that be?

Et notre auteur, se sera-t-il cassé le cou aussi? *Sed sileat*.—One idea more, however : if a man cannot write like Tacitus, perhaps he had better be Tacitus himself. Excuse my ending with this pun, gentle reader; if it is not "*desipere*," I will atone for it by *tacere*, "*in loco*." And so, *vive, valeque*!

LI.

Ut valeas tamen, hæc præterea accipe. When the health is deranged (and probably the nerves affected) mental enjoyment must be an effort; when the health is good, it is spontaneous. In one state, contentment may be acquired, *quia mens se continet*; in the other, exhilaration naturally takes place: one is the sunshine, the other the clouds of the mind. In the second state, the moral faculties must be exercised, under the guidance of reason, with the aid she calls for; not philosophy, but religion: in the first, nature does the work herself.

Thus are our feelings moved, and thus are they acted upon by physical causes. *Quæ et Lectoribus meis, et mihi propitiæ sint*!

ERRATA ET ADDENDA.

Page 11. No. XXIV.

Note.—The negative proofs of this amount very nearly to a positive one, the want of which is only owing to the defects of our reason, which are made up by our feelings.

Page 17. No. XXXVII.

Note.—This was wrote at Nuneham, in December, 1829, after a visit there by one of the Magistri Oxonienses.

Page 19. No. XLIII.

Note.—But even the moral “law” of the Gentiles wanted the aid of a Divine revelation.

Page 20. No. XLV.

Note.—Caveant moniti, præsertim cum experti monent.

Page 22. No. LI.

Note.—Truisms have no force till they are felt.

Page 23. No. LII.

Note.—The proof of this seems to be, that we have no terms for half ideas.

Page 26. No. LX.

Note.—“ In cœlo quies:” in quiete cœlum.

Page 29. No. LXV.

Note.—Every cause must either be active itself, or else put in action by another, acting or itself acting upon, till we arrive at the primum mobile, or movens, of Supreme Power.

Page 30. Nos. LXVII. LXVIII. and LXIX.

Note.—It is of more importance to know what is not important, than what is: or, I should rather say, that the real importance is

judging of one by the other. The only safe comparison that we can make, is in comparing the two things mentioned in Nos. LXVII. and LXIX., which, in fact, admit of no comparison at all; but any other comparison would probably feed our pride, as it did that of the "Pharisee." So should we be less fit for the practice recommended in No. LXX.

Page 32. No. LXXII.

Note.—Principles that may be reduced to practice (which, if sound, they surely may,) are the best foundations for it. Those only that cannot, are purely abstract. Ill-founded or vitiated practice cannot be the "well," that deserves to be "let alone." It is rather the ill, that tends "in pejus ruere." This calls for "reform."

Ditto. No. LXXIII.

Note.—It is hard to say, whether it is worse to care too much about men, too little, or not at all; which, indeed, is impossible, for "premitatra comes, sequitur que fugarem."

Page 33. No. LXXV.

Note.—The best object of the first is, to assist and encourage others; that of the second, to support themselves, frail as that support is; for it is surely "a broken reed," that they "lean upon."

Page 34. No. LXXVII.

Note.—Whose bosom is at perfect peace? Who has the "murus aheneus?"

Ditto. No. LXXVIII.

Note.—But how many are our "secret faults?"

Ditto. No. LXXIX.

Note.—Innocent "oddities" are here meant.

Page 36. No. LXXXIV.

Note.—The "counteraction" is in the "murus aheneus," if we can find that shelter. See the next No.

Page 39. No. LXXXIX.

Note.—This sense of ignorance is our most valuable knowledge, as it gives us a consciousness that we are capable of more: it is a negative proof of it; and it ought to make us value more the knowledge we have.

Page 41. No. XCV.

Note.—The immediate advantages of “honesty” and “righteousness” are in the consciousness of them: our passions, unhappily, often make us blind to those which are more distant, but far greater; its immediate ones are anticipations of them, as, in fact, their violation gives an anticipation of future misery: but the “mammon” of this world will not let us be influenced by them.

Page 43. No. XCIX.

Note.—There may, however, be less danger in excusing than in “exalting” ourselves: one is the resource of fear, (or of self-indulgence,) the other the food of pride.

Page 45. No. CII.

Note.—Immoderate mirth or grief, if not madness, is equally foolish.

“Æquam memento rebus in arduis
 Servare mentem, non secus in bonis
 Ab insolenti temperatam
 Lætitiâ, moriture.”

Page 46. No. CVI.

Note.—Do we not “live to learn?” and are not observation and discussion the means? and our feelings what most require to be worked upon?

Page 48. No. CVIII.

Note.—“Suspensive doubt” will incline to belief, being, in fact, a want of fuller satisfaction.

Ditto. No. CIX.

Note.—Analogy is a wide field: its bounds are probably out of the reach of human ken: well indeed they may, for all is connected, under God.

Page 50. No. CXIV.

Note.—“Man proposes, God disposes.”

Page 54. No. CXIX.

Note.—The great waste of time is in the misemployment of it: idleness will lead to that, and all other “evil;” but useful meditation is not idleness.

Page 54. No. CXX.

Note.—Mr. Southey cannot mean passive “obedience,” which cannot be consistent with the general interest, the only security for mutual agreement between the monarch and his subjects. No “divide et impera” can be wanted where such an agreement subsists.

Page 60. No. CXXXVIII.

Note.—“Amplification” weakens, as compression strengthens: must not the first depress then too, and so far be allied to the “bathos?” A determined amplifier may

—“write about it, goddess, and about it.”

Pope’s Dunciad.

Page 65. No. CXLIV.

Note.—A doubt of every thing must at least approach to a denial of every thing; for the evidence of the senses must be rejected in it. Absolute certitude, indeed, we cannot have, from our want of power to reason metaphysically. How far then shall we carry our conclusions?

Page 63. No. CXLIII.

Note.—I believe it is only in the penitential, or truly devotional part of the Psalms, that the truly pious will sympathise; and for them indeed those parts seem to be meant.

Page 68. No. CXLIX.

Note.—Yes; but what light beams upon us from the promised mercies of God! This is not the false glare, the “Jack-a-lantern” of “new lights.” Whither may they not mislead us? after this fancied election of us, as the “chosen vessels?”

Ditto. No. CL.

Note.—What is truth, if it is not demonstrated by perfection? If it does not shine by its own light? And what are the degrees of goodness, if not crowned by perfection?

Page 72. No. CLVI.

Note.—When Young says,

“Teach my best reason, reason;” &c. &c.

he must mean to allude to the imperfection of our reason. This im-

perfection will not be made up by "new lights," which will immerge it into its pristine darkness. Better is the unenlightened common sense of the savages: better had we adore the sun, or even the moon, than follow such a Will-o'-the-wisp.

Page 72. No. CLVIII.

Note.—Pope's description of happiness may be a truism, ("happiness is happiness,") but it is no description at all. He says more properly elsewhere,

"Man never is, but always to be, blest."

Page 73. No. CLX.

Note.—Such are moral and religious principles; and political principles should be founded on them. What stronger appeal can be made to men's reason and feelings? May we not trust to them? If not, what must this world be? and what the Creator of it? Let us, then, conciliate: at least, let not "fear cast out love." Do we not ourselves fear the lower classes in proportion as we domineer over and oppress them? and perhaps vitiate them by our example? Their respect for us should be voluntary, and will, when it is deserved. Public opinion may be undefinable by us, as I believe it is; but public safety must depend upon it. Mutual confidence will secure it, and mutual confidence will only be secured by mutual love: thus do political principles and religious precepts go hand in hand. General acquiescence cannot be secured either by fear, or by any other feeling unworthy of man's nature. If a man can trust to himself, he can trust to others; for he will put a reasonable confidence in them, and no more. Little minds have little views: indolence, or perhaps timidity, or diffidence, will not allow more enlarged minds to trust even to their own feelings, &c. *communi sensui relinquenda.*

Page 73. No. CLXI.

Note.—If men are consistent in their conduct, we may safely give them credit for sincerity, as they fight the battle of virtue and religion as manfully as can be expected from human nature. They probably will stand the test referred to in No. CLX., and the "account" announced to them in No. CLXII.

Page 75. No. CLXIV.

Note.—Can we reasonably require more than what our reason is capable of? If we do, what but complete pyrrhonism will remain to us?

Page 76. No. CLXVI.

Note.—"Final causes" are amply sufficient to refer us with certainty to the agency of efficient ones, and also to satisfy us in our belief of the truth of the Gospel revelation, when fairly considered; every attribute of Divine power and perfection is manifested in them.

Page 76. No. CLXVIII.

Note.—The mind must necessarily be acted upon by the organs which are the instruments through which its own action is carried on. No distinct sounds can be emitted by a machine when either its pipes or its bellows are out of order; how should we feel the sublimity of "Handel's" music, if it was expressed by a defective organ, or an inadequate performer? There can be no deficiency in the celestial choirs. Will not the expectation of this prepare us for the certain event pointed out in No. CLXXI.? "Permanent" indeed will be the "availment" produced by such a preparation. But what "novelty" of excitement will be necessary to awaken us to feelings that are dead to the sublimities of the "Te Deum," familiar as it is to us in its English dress? How well does it prepare us for "Hallelujahs."

Page 77. line 19. *before* "many" *insert of.*

Page 81. No. CLXXVI.

Note.—What comprehends all, must in itself be simple; or at least homogeneous.

Page 83. Nos. CLXXVI. and CLXXVII.

Note.—Perhaps the disquietudes of the first of these Nos. are best allayed by the calm of the second; so much are we acted upon by physical causes.

Page 88. No. CLXXXVII.

Note.—"Wit, whither wilt?" "Any where," the Irishman might say.

Page 89. No. CLXXXIX.

Note.—Such "fear" is despair.

Page 91. No. CXCIH.

Note.—The less is “given,” the less will be “required:” but the degrees of “responsibility” may be almost infinite.

Page 92. No. CXCVI.

Note.—The communication to a fellow-creature, authorised as he may be to give absolution, is but a poor disburthenment to an oppressed and “wounded spirit.”

Page 96. line 7. *for* “yes (but,” *read* “yes, but (

Ditto line 20. *for* “perfect,” *read* personal.

Page 97. line 13. *dele* “the.”

Page 97. No. CCIV.

Note.—The godlike qualities of which man is capable, sufficiently attest the intention of God in “making” him; and the consequent declaration by his Maker equally attests the Divine authority of the Mosaic account, as well as of man’s having “fallen” from his original destination, by an act of disobedience to his Maker’s commands. His obedience to those since received can only ensure his restoration to the favour of God.

Page 99. No. CCX.

Note.—Instead of “improbable,” Mr. Hume should have said impossible: could he have proved this, he would have been right. But he satisfied himself with assuming the improbability. A cheap satisfaction, but may he not pay dear for it?

Page 102. No. CCXV.

Note.—That we are moral beings, is surely proved by our love of virtue and hatred of vice, and by the reproaches of our conscience, when we deviate from the one into the other; by our power of forming opinions, by the influence they have upon our hopes, fears, and expectations; by the judgment we form of men and things, by the sense of our responsibility, and by the very desire and endeavours to stifle and evade that responsibility; and, above all, by the sense of our duty to God, by the power of judging of His holy laws, His scriptural declarations and commandments, and of regulating our conduct and opinions by them, in which we should use that discretion and modesty which

are prescribed to us. That we are physically influenced, is equally proved by the varying state of our animal spirits, and by the hopes, fears, and expectations which they dispose us to entertain; by the effect of our constitutional temperament on all these, whether it is sanguine and bold, or cautious, timid, and even at times desponding; by the propensities which it gives to virtue or vice, good or evil, and by the struggle which these propensities sometimes force us to make, in resisting them; which, however, we have the power given us, with the aid that is properly applied for, to do. Nor can we account for our superiority over the brute creation, but by the possession of the reasoning faculty which they have not, at least not to a degree that involves their responsibility. All the other faculties of animals are either merely physical, or else are given them to answer the ends of their existence here (for our knowledge is chiefly limited to that of final causes,) and to obtain the benefits or incur the injuries they have to expect from their lord and occasional master, man, as well as to save themselves from what he is capable of inflicting upon them, which experience enables them to do. The other differences between man and the beasts *, in the liability of the former to envy, hatred (without offence given), power of drawing consequences, extent of the reasoning powers, even caprices and vacillations, produced by moral or physical causes, effects of habit, however begun, power of changing it, however difficult, and the very contempt of these faculties from comparative superiority or inferiority, the admiration of virtuous qualities, detestation of vicious ones, desire of imitation or avoidance, power of forming ideas more or less perfect, and the consequent sense of ignorance, in short all the moral powers of man, in their different degrees of perfection and imperfection, use or abuse; and, finally, their continuance, frequently to the last moment of his existence, all demonstrate the superiority of reason over mere instinct, and the consequent responsibility which the former, but not the latter, carries with it. This responsibility, in the expectations which the fulfilment or neglect of it give rise to, constitutes the great source of pain or pleasure, hope

* Beasts generally require offence, unless when pressed by hunger; man often "hates" from the mere propensities of his nature, and sometimes from his own consciousness. "*Quis enim aut eum diligit quem metuit, aut eum a quo se metui putat?*"

or fear, that man can experience here; and "thereafter," as those feelings have acted upon him here, will he find their realization, in the endless happiness or misery of another life.

Page 107, line 8, *for* "continuity," *read*, continuance.

Page 109, line 16, *for* "is here," *read*, here is.

Page 110, line 24, *for* "thoughts," *read*, thought.

Page 111. No. CCXXXVIII.

Note.—If the qualities are real, there must be a Being who possesses them, for entirely abstract they cannot be: there must be a living model of perfection, and that model must be God himself. The most powerful imagination must have something to build upon, or to look up to.

Page 113. No. CCXLV.

Note.—"Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien." Yes, but it must not be a "bien imaginaire:" if it is, it will soon become a "mal réel."

Page 115. No. CCLI.

Note.—The "sense of our ignorance" may make us wait for further information, but will not justify obstinacy, which is too commonly the strong hold of ignorance, which our pride or prejudices make us ashamed to confess.

Page 118, line 13, *for* "the ear, which," *read*, the ear which; i. e. *sine comma*.

Page, 119. No. CCLXI.

Note.—This omnipresence is a further proof of the divinity of Christ: for, he says, "where two or three of you are gathered together, there am I in the midst of you."

Page 123, line 15, *for* "to," *read*, in.

Page 127, line 5, *for* "proper," *read*, perfect.

Page 129, line 8, to "forced upon it."

Note.—Forced by our reason and our feelings.

Page 130, line 4, "first attended to."

Note.—See No. CCLIX.

Page 131. No. CCCXC.

Note.—Among the instances in which “familiarity breeds contempt,” are the goldfinch, the bulfinch, and that common flower, the daisy. The form, plumage, habits, and song of the goldfinch, are among the most pleasing of all the British birds; and those of the bulfinch, with its natural mellow notes, not the tiresome repetition of its taught whistle, are as pleasing a contrast to the first. The “sober-suited” linnet may be added to these, but not the gaudy and shrill-voiced canary bird, varied and gay as his notes are. As to the daisy, surely nothing can be more beautiful than a tuft of these flowers among the grasses, to say nothing of the veronica chamaedrys, justly called by the French, “plus je vous vois, plus je vous aime,” the lychnis dioica, the stellaria holostea, &c. in hedges and banks under them. The comparative neglect (at least) of these inhabitants of the garden of nature, so superior in real beauty to artificial gardens*, is, I think, among the instances of the folly and caprice that more or less governs our opinions and actions, as it does in the frequent preference we see given to trees planted, instead of those that are more natural to the country, and more beautiful, (particularly the small-leaved elm) than the substitutes for them. These absurdities may perhaps be dated from the time when Adam and Eve forfeited their happiness, and with it lost their original innocence, simplicity, and good sense, and ceased to be capable (with many of their sons and daughters in these our times) of truly enjoying what nature had provided for them.

Page 139, *dele* the inverted commas from lines 13 and 19.

Ditto, line 22, *for* “opinion,” *read*, opinions.

Pages 142 and 143. Nos. CCCX. and CCCXI.

Note.—If we have no feeling, we can have no sense, none at least that can be of any real use to us. Rousseau’s feelings were perverted by pride.

Page 147. No. CCCXVI.

Note.—Divine agency must be constant, but its action is invisible to us, or only known through general belief.

* A “superiority” which is increased by the vivid green that serves as a base for nature’s productions, instead of the dingy brown, either in or out of flower-pots, of our gardens and conservatories.

Page 150, note to No. CCCXVIII. *after* "moral," *read*, or spiritual, "than a," &c.

Page 151, line 25, *after* "given us," *add* a semicolon.

Page 152. No. CCCXXI.

Note.—All approach to sensual feelings or expressions in devotion, is equally inconsistent with good sense and good feeling: if our love is not corrected and refined by awe, it cannot be the "amor divinus," nor can we be qualified for the enjoyments held out to our view in the next number.

Page 160, No. CCCXXXV.

Note.—If this "avoidance" was general, the world would want no other penitentiary house but itself.

Page 161, No. CCCXXXVII.

Note.—That union would preclude all self-delusion.

Page 163. No. CCCXXXIX. end of.

Note.—The calm of a reasonable, patient, and resigned mind will exempt us from all these evils.

Page 164, lines 16 and 17, *for* "their," *read*, its.

Ditto, line 17, *for* "judgments," *read*, judgment.

Page 165. No. CCCXLIII.

Note.—Unfortunately the particular interests of some individuals, and the common fear of innovation, are obstacles to the recurrence to, and reliance on these "principles:" surely those who are so influenced cannot be proper judges. Therefore, "non tali auxilio, non defensoribus istis tempus eget." They would have "let their well alone," till all had fallen into ruin, or had been buried under one mass of corruption.

Page 171. No. CCCLIII.

Note.—The success of controversial struggles, however made, will not prevent this regret, unless want of feeling, or the triumph of victory, hardens the mind against it. But in such cases we must look for the approbation of those who "think right, and mean well." The object itself may be a standing reproach to us, for having screened our opposition to its removal behind the veil of public good, or any other pretext.

Page 178. No. CCCLXIX.

Note.—"Drawing consequences," sometimes requires more than common rationality; the sense of the deficiency of our reason is, perhaps, as far as it can be carried.

Page 181. No. CCCLXXIII.

Note.—Hardened indeed must be the heart, or blinded the mind, which cannot feel this.

Page 182. No. CCCLXXV.

Note.—The assurance of God's omnipotence and of his fidelity, are the best encouragements to confide in his promises.

Page 183. No. CCCLXXVI.

Note.—We may shut our "mind's eye" against "truisms," however self-evident they are, as we may our bodily eyes against the splendour of the sun: and so we shall, if we wish to remain in darkness.

Page 186. No. CCCLXXVIII.

Note.—What a "Jack-o'-lantern" for the eye of folly, "new lights" are! To what further follies may they not lead us! But "Unitarianism" has greater dangers, in proportion to the exertion of Satan's artifices. The "pit" may yawn before us, but our self-conceit will not let us stop at its brink. One plunge, and we are lost for ever.

Page 189. No. CCCLXXX.

Note.—This "self-examination" is not made by the Unitarians.

Page 197. No. CCCXCI.

Note.—"Nullum numen abest, si sit prudentia."

Page 201. No. CCCXCV.

Note.—If we are obstinate, we cannot "live to learn."

Page 202. No. CCCXCVII.

Note.—Can the respect paid to the highest rank be any compensation for the want of that which is due to moral worth?

———"So may the devil

Be sometimes honour'd for his burning throne."

How much reason have we to wish that such men may never sit upon an earthly one!

But their near relation to it forbids us to say more of them than that, "they are as they are;" and need we say more *?

Page 206, line 2, note to "a heated enthusiast."

No more than it can from a self-deluded Unitarian, or any other kind of sceptic.

Page 213. No. CCCCIV.

Note.—I believe I may add to these "speculative" expectations, that of the continuance of the liberal, but not ultra system † begun in the Catholic relief bill, but not followed up by those who, I think, ought to have had better notions of what the constitution of the country required: they however had the merit of beginning what the more liberal, and I trust judicious successors are carrying on. May the people be true to themselves in promoting and adhering to it! May their wishes for its success determine the legislature to unite in pursuing it!

Page 214, line 17, *for* "quotation," *read*, quotations.

A P P E N D I X.

No. IV.—Practice unfounded on principle, may be blown down by every gust of passion (which first raised it) or caprice.

No. VIII.—The sense of ignorance and the desire of knowledge are sufficient to produce and encourage this expectation, whatever further assurance we may, and do, want.

No. XIV.—"A mighty maze! Yet not without a plan."

No. XV.—A reasonable enthusiasm is not "flightiness."

No. XVII.—What would every man be, if he had a window in his breast? "Envy" would not be the only passion extinguished by it.

No. XVIII.—Yes, the "galled jade" may often "wince" here.

No. XIX.—Ironical praise is the severest censure.

* No, not to common feeling.

† "Ultraism" should be avoided on both sides, "*medio tutissimum*."

No. XXI.—Without consciousness and premeditation no mental regulation can be effectual: nothing but mere impulse would remain.

No. XXII.—Envious censure is mere backbiting.

No. XXIII.—“Who is he?” The “wise man, who knows that he is a fool.”

No. XXIV.—Horace, probably, was what he describes Tigellius to have been. “*Nil fuit unquam sic impar sibi.*” At least he must often have felt this, as he often confesses it, and, never more engagingly, than in his conversations with his servant, Davus, &c. In that with Damasippus he goes rather too far. But he was a heathen, and an Epicurean.

No. XXV.—The “*litera scripta*” will wait patiently for their judgments.

No. XXVII.—“*L’hypocrisie est l’hommage que le vice rend à la vertu,*” says Rousseau. Yes, and it is only in this sense that its evil is counteracted by good. But it cannot “cut virtue’s throat,” whatever ill will it may bear to it.

No. XXX.—Such self-satisfaction is a necessary spur to action.

No. XXXI.—Yes, so effervesces the mixture of human passions; and so passes the “feverish dream” of life.

No. XXXIII.—“I will rail only at myself,” says Orlando to the splenetic Jacques;—yes, but this “railing” will take an oblique direction towards others. “*We* are apt to do so or so,” says the censurer; very true, Mr. Censurer: “*Nos* numerus sumus.” And why should not we “eat our fruits” together? If they are “forbidden,” perhaps we may say, “*Defendit numerus,*” but can we hide ourselves in a crowd!

No. XXXVIII.—O then “tempt not God,” presumptuous and ungrateful “servant.”

No. XXXIX.—Let the “answer” be, yes, if I do not give the reins to my vanity, nor perhaps withhold the spur from my timidity.

No. XL. Such “*nugæ*” are at least useful. And can we hesitate to be taught by the ladies? How many virtues may be learnt from them! How many may we not have learnt from our mothers! And what attention and protection do we not owe them in return! Who would not, in this sense, be a “ladies’ man!”—Which of us owes them not that protection, instead of a selfish and cruel seduction, or

a neglect or ill usage after marriage, one of the best preventives of which, is the proper choice of a wife. Such a choice may produce what Horace so beautifully describes,

“ Felices ter et amplius
Quos irrupta tenet copula ; nec malis
Divulsus querimoniis
Supremâ citius solvet amor die.”

No. XLI.—“ Repetatur.” Yes, but to the “ deaf adder.”

No. XLII.—So sensible are we of the calls upon us ; and when so sensible, we almost deserve the credit it supposed in No. XLIV.

No. XLV.—“ Right,” indeed, must be the “ heads,” and right the “ hearts” too, that can read the “ Night Thoughts” with delight and profit.

No. XLVI.—Cicero tells us what is wanted both in the tutor and his pupil. But few are such as Cato, Scipio, and Lælius : and few such friends as the two latter* ; few, too, such hearers as Lælius had in Fannius and Scævola. The best admonitions are given from the experience of such a life as that of Cato’s, or of such a friendship as that of Scipio and Lælius : and are best bestowed on such as those to whom they were addressed.

No. XLVII.—“ Confessions” are admonitions to others. May they not be mutual ?

No. XLVIII.—Such “ feelings”

“ Lay the rough path of peevish nature even,
And open in each breast a little heaven.”

No. XLIX.—“ Talent” or not, we ought

“ To do our best, and best can do no more.”

No. L.—It is to be hoped that such “ coachmen” will not “ drive us to the devil.” They go devilish fast at least, and leave no time for the enjoyments meant in No. LI. ; which are the summa bona of the human mind. Quæ et lectoribus meis, et mihi adesse spero. Possumusne melius “ vivere et valere ?”

* Mihi quidem Scipio (says Lælius) quanquam est subito ereptus, vivit tamen, semperque vivet: virtutem enim amavi illius viri quæ extincta non est.—No, for “ virtue,” we may believe, looking up to Him who gave it, is immortal.

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